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Essays in Corporate Cash Holdings 
LIU Chenxi 
Abstract 
This dissertation addresses three topics in corporate cash holdings. The first paper 
provides a new determinant of cash holdings by examining the impact of earnings 
transparency on corporate cash holdings. Motivated by Barth et al. (2013), who 
show that firms with less earnings transparency tend to have higher cost of equity, 
this paper shows that the cross-section differences in earnings transparency cause 
variations in firm cash holdings because firms with less earnings transparency 
have more incentives to hold cash in order to avoid costly external financing. 
Using data of US firms from 1980 to 2013, it is found that earnings transparency 
is significantly negatively associated with cash reserves. This impact remains 
significant when corporate governance measures, accounting-based earnings 
quality, geography diversity and other information asymmetry measures are 
accounted for. And this impact is more pronounced in firms with more growth 
opportunities, more R&D expenses and more financial constraints. It is further 
found that firm with lower earnings transparency have a higher value of cash 
holdings, suggesting that cash held by firms with lower earnings transparency are 
expected to be used to invest, which is also a verification that firms with less 
earnings transparency hold more cash for precautionary motivation. 
The second paper studies on the channel of the relation between corporate cash 
holdings and stock return. Corporate cash holding is found to be able to predict 
stock return. Some scholars attribute this to the association of cash with 
systematic risk with respect to growth options. Others find that the relation is a 
mispricing effect. I try to test whether the relation between cash and return is 
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driven by systematic risk that captured by cash. The empirical results do not 
support the risk explanation of cash-return relation. First, the risk loading on 
CASH factor cannot predict returns, which is not consistent with rational 
frictionless asset pricing models. Second, CASH factor cannot reflect future GDP 
growth. Third, CASH and its factor loading exhibit no association with implied 
cost of capital derived from analysts’ earnings forecasts. Additionally, I find 
institutional investors tend to buy in more stocks of firms with more cash, and the 
cash-return relation is less pronounced in firms with more institutional investors, 
providing evidence supporting the mispricing explanation. Overall, this study 
casts doubt on the argument that cash can serve as a proxy of systematic risk in 
the explanation of cross sectional variation in stock returns while finds evidence 
of the mispricing story. 
The third paper studies the monitoring role of sovereign wealth funds on corporate 
cash holding policy and uses Temasek Holdings as the case. We find that 
Temasek’s presence has a negative effect on cash for companies with poor 
governance quality while its cash effect becomes positive for well-governed firms. 
Temasek’s discerning effect on cash policies highlights the effective monitoring 
role of sovereign funds. 
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Chapter 1: Earnings Transparency and Corporate Cash Holdings 
1.1 Introduction 
Corporate cash holdings exhibit a persistent increase in the past decades. The 
average cash-to-assets ratio of industrial firms rises from 10.5% in 1980 to 23.2% 
in 2006 (Bates, Kahle, and Stulz (2009)). This number keeps at high level of 
around 22% 1  till now. For the absolute amount, the reported aggregate cash 
holdings and short-term investments of universe COMPUSTAT firms excluding 
financial firms and utility firms are over $2.12 trillion at the end of 2014, 
experiencing a leap compared to $1.7 trillion of fiscal year 2006 shown by Duchin 
(2010). However, the question why firms hold cash draws attention only within 
recent years. Although the literature has provided several determinants of cash 
holdings, there are still space to explore what else factors could affect corporate 
cash holdings. This paper tries to provide a new determinant of cash holdings by 
investigating how earnings transparency affects cash holdings.  
Earnings transparency, firstly expressed by Barth, Konchitchki, and Landsman 
(2013) (hereafter, BKL (2013)), measures the extent to which firm’s accounting 
earnings is incorporated into the economic value. It is constructed based on the 
explanatory power (R-Square) of regressing stock return on earnings. Higher 
earnings transparency indicates more changes of firm value can be explained by 
earnings, or from the perspective of investors, it indicates investors can get more 
useful information to predict stock value based on earnings. Therefore, variations 
in earnings transparency lead to variations in information asymmetry. BKL (2013) 
find that everything equalling, firms with lower earnings transparency have more 
                                                          
1 The number is based on all public US firms listed on NYSE, Amex, Nasdaq excluding utility firms (with 
SIC code from 4900 to 4999) and financial firms (with SIC code from 6000 to 6999). The corresponding 
number of 1980 and 2006 is 10.8% and 23.8%, which are comparable to Bates et al. (2009). 
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costs of capital because uninformed market participants require higher returns to 
compensate on information asymmetry and vice versa.  
Opler et al. (1999) analyse comprehensively the implications of trade-off theory 
and financing hierarchy theory on corporate cash holdings and introduce us to 
how information asymmetry affects corporate cash holdings. As they document, 
the direct effect of information asymmetry on cash holdings comes from the high 
costs of capital caused by adverse selection; to avoid expensive external funds 
caused by high information asymmetry, firms keep more internal savings (Myers 
and Majluf (1984)).  
Given the settings of how information asymmetry affects corporate cash holdings, 
I hypothesize that firms will hold more cash reserves to avoid high equity costs 
associated with lower earnings transparency. This is intuitive since if firms realize 
that the expected costs of capital are high, they would hold more cash for future 
investments because of precautionary motive. To gain a basic idea about this 
relation, figure 1 breaks the final sample into firms with higher earnings 
transparency and those with lower earnings transparency and compares the 
average cash over total assets between these two kinds of firms from 1980 to 2013. 
This figure indicates an obvious gap in cash holding policies between these two 
kinds of firms. Specifically, we can recognize that firms with lower earnings 
transparency tend to persistently hold more cash than firms with higher earnings 
transparency.  
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Figure 1. Average annual cash holdings for firms with high transparency and firms with low 
transparency 
This figure plots the average annual cash over total assets of firms with high transparency and 
firms with low transparency. The sample is constituted of observations excluding financial and 
utility firm-years from 1980 to 2013 and is divided into 'High Trans' and 'Low Trans' groups based 
on 1-year lagged earnings transparency annually. A firm is assigned as high transparent firm if its 
lagged earnings transparency is higher than the median value, and otherwise it is assigned as a low 
transparent firm. 
 
Based on firms in United States from 1980 to 2013, I find that earnings 
transparency is cross sectionally negatively related to firms’ cash holdings. For 
example, the univariate statistics suggest that moving from the first earnings 
transparency quintile to the fifth quintile decreases the cash-to-net asset ratio 
(cash-to-asset ratio) by 16.6% (4.6%) and the average cash-to-net asset ratio 
(cash-to-asset ratio) in the sample is 36.3% (18.2%). In the multivariate tests, after 
controlling the general financial characteristics, firm fixed effects and time fixed 
effects, earnings transparency is still significantly negatively associated with 
corporate cash holdings. Because earnings transparency is correlated with firm 
financial characteristics, the marginal impacts of earnings transparency on cash 
holdings decline a lot compared to the univariate tests. However, the impacts are 
not trivial. Everything equalling, moving from the first quintile of earnings 
transparency to the fifth quintile increases the average cash over net assets ratio by 
4.13% (e{0.643-0.246)*0.103 *100%=4.13%), about 1.5% increase in the ratio given the 
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average value of cash over net assets 0.363. The results are consistent with the 
conjecture that firms would hold more cash to avoid higher external capital cost.   
To examine the impacts of earnings transparency on firms’ cash holdings policies, 
it is important to address the endogeneity problems. This study is exposed to two 
kinds of endogeneity problems. The first is the omitted variable problem. It is 
possible that the relation is caused by omitted variables that simultaneously 
related to both cash holdings and earnings transparency. This paper identifies 
three omitted variables: earnings quality, corporate governance and information 
asymmetry measures. The first omitted variable is earnings quality. García Teruel, 
Martínez Solano, and Sánchez Ballesta (2009) (hereafter, GMS (2009)), Sun, 
Yung, and Rahman (2012) (hereafter, SYR (2012)) have shown that accounting 
based measures of earnings quality (i.e., accrual quality, absolute abnormal 
accruals) are negatively related to cash holdings using Spain data and US data 
respectively. Since both earnings transparency and accounting-based earnings 
quality could measure firm-specific information contained in earnings, it is natural 
to ask whether earnings transparency could provide extra explanation of corporate 
cash holdings beyond accounting based earning quality. So I control these 
accounting-based measures and find that the negative effects of earnings 
transparency on cash holdings still hold. The second omitted variable is corporate 
governance. It is possible that the relation between earnings transparency and 
corporate cash holdings is because that both of them are affected by agency 
problems. So I control corporate governance measures (i.e., G-index, institutional 
ownership and inside ownership) in the multi-regression to exclude this possibility. 
The results still hold after corporate governance is controlled. The third omitted 
variable is multinational diversification. Fritz Foley et al. (2007) find firms hold 
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more foreign cash to avoid incurring taxes when repatriating foreign earnings, 
suggesting that multinational firms tend to hold more cash than domestic firms. 
Earnings transparency is likely to be different in multinational firms and domestic 
firms as the transparency of foreign earnings is intuitively lower. I exclude this 
possibility by dividing firms into domestic firms and multinational firms and 
doing the tests within subsamples separately. The idea is that if the correlation 
between cash holdings and earnings transparency is caused by the geography 
distributions of cash and earnings, we cannot find significant relation within 
subsamples with only domestic firms and the difference of coefficients between 
these two subsamples should be huge. However, the empirical results show that 
the coefficients of Trans are significant when either subsample is used and the 
magnitudes are similar. Last but not least, firm-level and year-level fixed effects 
are included in the models to capture fixed differences in cash holdings across 
firms and years. And it is shown that fixed effects have no influence on the results.   
The second endogeneity problem is the reverse causality problem. Since earnings 
transparency and corporate cash holdings are jointly determined, the negative 
relation between earnings transparency and cash holdings may be caused by the 
feedback effect of cash holdings on earnings transparency. To address this 
problem, following Harford, Mansi, and Maxwell (2008), I use one-year lagged 
earnings transparency as the independent variable; also I add one-year lagged cash 
holdings as the control variable to test the impact of earnings transparency on the 
change of cash holdings. The results suggest that the ex-ante earnings 
transparency has a negative effect on current cash holdings and a negative effect 
on the change of cash holdings.     
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To identify the channels how earnings transparency affects cash holdings, I 
investigate the heterogeneous effects of earnings transparency on cash holdings 
across subsamples. If firms hold more cash to avoid costly external financing 
associated with earnings transparency, keeping earnings transparency constant, 
firms suffered more when there was difficulty accessing in external capital market 
are expected to hold more cash. To verify this, I provide evidence based on three 
kinds of firms whose performances are more sensitive to costs of capital: (1) firms 
with more investment opportunities; (2) firms with more R&D investments; (3) 
financial constrained firms (firms whose investments are much dependent on 
financing). Accordingly, the full sample is divided based on market-to-book ratio, 
R&D expenses and financial constraint. The empirical results show that the effects 
of earnings transparency on cash holdings are more pronounced in firms with 
more investment opportunities (higher market to book ratio), more R&D expenses 
and more financial constraints. This subsample tests support the main hypothesis 
that earnings transparency affects corporate cash holdings through its effect on 
costs of capital. 
This paper also studies the influence of earnings transparency on the value of cash 
holdings. The paper mainly argues that firms with lower earnings transparency 
tend to hold more cash for precautionary motive and vice versa. Faulkender and 
Wang (2006) find that the marginal value of cash is higher for firms that have 
more difficulty to access the external capital market because cash can help them 
avoid incurring high costs. Hence, everything equalling, a firm's value is expected 
to increase more by holding more cash if it has lower earnings transparency and 
vice versa. Consistent with this rationale, I find a negative relation between 
earnings transparency and the value of cash holdings. 
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This study makes several contributions to the literature. First, it contributes to the 
literature on the determinants of corporate cash holdings. In existing literature, 
precautionary motivation and agency cost theory are the most generally used 
mechanisms to explain why firms hold cash. Based on these mechanisms, 
researchers have found lots of specific determinants of corporate cash holdings, 
such as financial characteristics (Opler et al. (1999)), firm diversification (Duchin 
(2010)), refinancing risk (Harford, Klasa, and Maxwell (2014)), corporate 
governance (Harford, Mansi, and Maxwell (2008)), shareholder protection 
(Dittmar, Mahrt-Smith, and Servaes (2003)). This paper tries to provide an 
additional determinant by examining how earnings transparency affects cash 
holdings. 
It also contributes to the literature on how financial report quality affects corporate 
financial decisions. The measures of earnings attributes include the earnings 
quality and earnings informativeness. Earning quality is measured as accrual 
quality or absolute abnormal accrual. Earnings informativeness is measured as 
how much information contained in earnings are incorporated into stock prices. 
Earnings quality is shown to have effect on corporate investment and financing 
policies (G. C. Biddle and Hilary (2006), G. Biddle, Hilary, and Verdi (2009), 
Gomariz and Ballesta (2014), GMS (2009), SYR (2012)). How earnings 
informativeness affects corporate financial policy is still an open question. The 
main reason might be that, as BKL (2013) show in their paper, the measure of 
earnings informativeness which is called earnings relevance in previous literatures 
(the adjusted R2 from firm-by-firm time-series return-earnings regressions using 
ten-year rolling window) has some drawbacks that it only reflects dated 
information but cannot capture the intertemporal variation of earnings-return 
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relation. Since they promote a better measure called earnings transparency to 
measure the information of earnings incorporated into stock price, this paper uses 
earnings transparency to study the impacts of earnings transparency on corporate 
cash holdings. This study shed lights on how earnings informativeness affects 
corporate financial policy.  
Before continuing, it is important to show that this paper is different from similar 
papers by GMS (2009), and SYR (2012). In their papers, they find accrual quality 
negatively affects cash holdings using Spain and U.S data respectively. This paper 
provides extra information on how earnings attribute affecting corporate cash 
holdings besides their papers. I start by arguing that earnings transparency is much 
different from accounting-based earnings quality both economically and 
statistically. Economically, accounting-based earnings quality measures the 
reliability of accounting information, while earnings transparency captures how 
much earnings information contributes to stock valuation. High earnings quality 
does not necessarily indicate high earnings informativeness, especially when 
additional information beyond earnings contributes more to stock value (Sinha 
and Watts (2001)). Statistically, the correlation between accrual quality and 
earnings relevance is very small in magnitude: 0.0528 (both Pearson and 
Spearman) (Francis et al. (2004)). Second, earnings transparency is a measure 
based on the relation of market returns and earnings, which cannot be fully 
manipulated by managers, indicating that earnings transparency is less 
endogenous than accrual quality in addressing cash holding issues. More 
importantly, this study is quite different from theirs in that I provide more 
consistent evidence to show how earnings transparency affects cash holdings 
through the channel of precautionary motivation. Specifically, when examining 
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how accrual quality affects the value of cash holdings, SYR (2012), using the 
methodology of (Dittmar and Mahrt-Smith (2007)), find that the value of excess 
cash increases with accrual quality, and they conclude that firms hold less cash 
when cash values more while they hold more cash when cash values less, which is 
count-intuitive. However, following Faulkender and Wang (2006), this paper 
actually finds that the marginal value of cash for firms with lower earnings 
transparency is higher. I also do this test using accrual quality, finding that, with 
the methodology of Faulkender and Wang (2006), good accrual quality decreases 
the marginal value of cash holdings, which is consistent with the effects of 
earnings transparency. Therefore, I argue that although SYR (2012) find good 
accrual quality can increase value of excess cash, they cannot conclude good 
accrual quality can increase the marginal value of total cash. This paper provides 
more consistent evidence on how earnings attributes affect the level of cash 
holdings and the value of cash holdings with a precautionary story.  
1.2 Hypothesis 
1.2.1 Precautionary Motivation 
The precautionary motive of cash holdings is promoted by Keynes (1936), who 
shows that financial fictions are important reasons for firms to hold cash. Because 
of the existence of financial frictions, firms may experience adverse shocks in 
forms of high costs of capital when accessing external financing markets. To 
avoid losses from lack of financing caused by high costs of capital, they tend to 
hold more cash. Stemming from this, recent studies find that firms with more 
growth opportunities, higher cash flow uncertainty and higher refinancing risk 
tend to hold more cash holdings (Opler et al. (1999), Harford, Klasa, and Maxwell 
(2014)). Information asymmetry is a specific form of financial friction. Firms with 
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more information asymmetry will stock more cash because external capital costs 
are much higher for them (Gao, Harford, and Li (2013)). 
1.2.2 Hypothesis Development 
Earnings transparency measures the extent to which the information reflected by 
earnings contributes to stock price. Higher earnings transparency, i.e. higher R2 of 
earnings-return regression, indicates the economic value relates more to earnings 
and therefore investors could get more information from earnings to predict stock 
return. So the information asymmetry associated with earnings is high when 
earnings transparency is low. Based on the well-established positive relation 
between information asymmetry and costs of capital, BKL (2013) document a 
negative relation between earnings transparency and the expected costs of capital. 
The precautionary motive suggests that firms trade off on external capital and 
internal capital and tend to save more cash during periods when external costs of 
capital are high. Therefore, the main hypothesis is obtained as below. 
Hypothesis 1: Earnings transparency negatively affects corporate cash holdings 
cross sectional, or, firms with lower earnings transparency tend to reserve larger 
cash holdings and vice versa. 
The precautionary motive also suggests that firms with better investment 
opportunities hold more cash because adverse shocks and financial distress are 
more costly for them (Bates, Kahle, and Stulz (2009)). Suppose hypothesis 1, i.e., 
firms with lower earnings transparency hold more cash for precautionary motive 
is right, holding earnings transparency constant, if firms lose more when there's a 
shortfall of cash flow, they will hold even more cash than firms whose value is 
less sensitive to cash flow shortfall. This will lead to heterogeneous effects of 
earnings transparency on cash holdings. I provide three scenarios when firms 
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would suffer from more losses if there's an adverse cash flow shock: (1) Firms 
with more investment opportunities (firms with higher market to book ratio), 
because more growth options would be foregone if there's a lack of funds; (2) 
Firms with more R&D expenses, because these firms have larger financial distress 
costs (Opler et al. (1999)) due to the nature of R&D investments; (3) Financial 
constrained firms, because investments in these firms depend more on financing 
availability. Hence, I have the first sub hypothesis of hypothesis 1. 
Hypothesis 1a: The negative relation between earnings transparency and cash 
holdings is more pronounced in firms with more growth opportunities, more RD 
expenses and more financial constraints. 
According to Faulkender and Wang (2006), the value shareholders place on cash 
is determined by the distributions of cash holdings, i.e., paying out as dividend, or 
servicing debt or other liabilities, or raising cash. Among these three kinds of 
distributions, they find that cash holdings increase firm value only when firms 
with high costs of external capital need to raise capital. As shown in hypothesis 1, 
firms with lower earnings transparency hold more cash for precautionary motive 
to avoid incurring higher external capital costs. Hence, I have the second sub 
hypothesis of hypothesis 1. 
Hypothesis 1b: The value of cash holding is negatively related to earnings 
transparency. 
1.3 Methodology, Variables and Data 
1.3.1 Methodology 
In the empirical sections, I investigate whether earnings transparency negatively 
affects corporate cash holdings. Since earnings transparency is calculated based 
on the relation between earnings and return with a period from three month after 
12 
 
previously fiscal year end to three months after the current year fiscal year end, 
both investors and firms cannot get the contemporary earnings transparency data. 
Instead, they make decisions based on previous data. Therefore, I use the 1-year 
lagged earnings transparency as independent variable. Using lagged earnings 
transparency also could control the reverse causality problem. The specific model 
is as below: 
Cashi,t  = β0 + β1 ∗ Transi,t−1 + γ
′ ∗ Xsi,t + ηi + τt + εi,t                         (1) 
,where Cash is firm cash holdings, Trans represents earnings transparency, and Xs 
are control variables following Opler et al. (1999).The following parts of this 
section are the detailed descriptions of the variables. The regressions are estimated 
using both OLS regression with firm and time fixed effects and Fama-Macbeth 
regression with Newey West test. 
1.3.2 Variables Description 
Cash Holdings 
Two measures of cash holding are used in this paper: the natural log of cash over 
net assets and cash over total assets. Since firms' ability to generate future profits 
is a function of assets in place, the first measure is calculated as the ratio of cash 
and short-term investments (#12) to net assets (Opler et al. (1999)). Net asset 
equals to total assets (#6) minus cash and short-term investments (#1). However, 
this measure generates extreme outliers for firms with most of their assets as cash. 
To address the skewness problem, following previous papers, I use the natural 
logarithm of cash over net assets in multivariate regressions. The second measure 
is cash and short-term investments (#1) over total book assets (#6). This measure 
                                                          
2 #No. means the Compustat data item number. 
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is also extensively used. I use both the two measures in most regressions and get 
similar and robust results. 
Earnings Transparency (hereafter, Trans) 
Trans is measured by the explanatory power (adjusted R2) of regressing returns on 
earnings and change in earnings in BKL (2013). Trans is constructed by two 
components. The first is called Transi in their paper. Transi is measured by the 
adjusted R2 of annual earnings-return regressions estimated across industry, 
capturing industry commons in earnings transparency since firms within the same 
industry have similarity in accounting practices. The second component is called 
Transin. It is calculated as the adjusted R2 from the annual returns-earnings 
regressions estimated across portfolios sorted by residuals from regressions 
calculating transi. Transin captures the differences of earnings-return relation that 
cannot be captured by industry variations. 'Trans' is calculated strictly following 
BKL (2013). 
Firstly, I estimate the model below annually to get the first component “Transi”:  
RETi,j,t = α0
𝐼 + α1
𝐼
𝐸𝑖,𝑗,𝑡
𝑃𝑖,𝑗,𝑡−1
+ α1
𝐼
∆𝐸𝑖,𝑗,𝑡
𝑃𝑖,𝑗,𝑡−1
+ Ͼ𝑖,𝑗,𝑡                   (2) 
, where RETi,j,t is the sign of annual compounded return for firm i in industry j 
during a period extending from 9 months prior to the fiscal year-end t and 3 
months after the fiscal year-end t, corresponding roughly with the period between 
earnings announcements, 
𝐸𝑖,𝑗,𝑡
𝑃𝑖,𝑗,𝑡−1
 denotes income before extraordinary items and 
discontinued operations (#18) deflated by price at the beginning of fiscal year 
(#199), ∆𝐸𝑖,𝑗,𝑡  denotes change of 𝐸𝑖,𝑗  from year t-1 to year t. The model is 
estimated annually across industry classified following Barth, Beaver, and 
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Landsman (1998). Transi is the adjusted R2 of the estimated regression and has an 
identical value for firms in the same industry. 
Secondly, I estimate a similar model below and get the second component 
“Transin”: 
RETi,p,t = α0
𝐼𝑁 + α1
𝐼𝑁
𝐸𝑖,𝑝,𝑡
𝑃𝑖,𝑝,𝑡−1
+ α1
𝐼𝑁
∆𝐸𝑖,𝑝,𝑡
𝑃𝑖,𝑝,𝑡−1
+ Ͼ𝑖,𝑝,𝑡.                               (3) 
The variables are similar to those in ‘Trans’ model except that these variables are 
calculated at portfolio level instead of industry level. Portfolios are classified 
based on residuals from the first step. Specifically, from the first step, I yield the 
estimated parameters on industry level, and then I input the firm- and year-
specific data to get the firm-level estimated value of return. The firm-level 
residual is the part of return that cannot be explained by the estimated model, and 
it is calculated as realized return minus estimated value of return. Based on the 
value of residuals, the sample is divided into 4 groups. In each year, the model is 
estimated across the 4 portfolios and the adjusted R2 from this regression is the 
second component, which is called Transin. The annual Transin has identical 
value for firms in the same portfolio.   
Finally, I get firm- and year-specific Trans which is equals to the sum of Transi 
and Transin. 
Financial Control Variables 
Following the existing literature on the determinants of corporate cash holdings, 
financial characteristics are controlled in the model. The variables are illustrated 
as follows. Market-to-Book ratio (hereafter, MB) is proxy for investment 
opportunity. Firms with more investment opportunities tend to hold more cash for 
precautionary use. Size affects corporate cash holding negatively. There are 
several reasons. First, larger firms generally are more profitable so firms do not 
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need to keep much cash than similar smaller firms. Second, larger firms have 
more assets that can be used as collateral so that they can more easily get external 
financing. Third, larger firms have less information asymmetry so that the external 
financing is cheaper. Forth, the transaction cost of converting financial assets to 
cash holdings is lower for large firms because of economies of scale. Cash flow 
from operation (hereafter, CFO) is a source of cash stockpiles; also cash flow can 
capture firms’ investment opportunity. Therefore, CFO is expected to be 
positively related to corporate cash holding. Capital expenditures (hereafter, 
CAPX) represents long-term expenses in current year, which is an outflow of 
liquid assets. It's expected that CAPX is negatively associated with cash holdings. 
Net working capital (hereafter, NWCAP) is current assets less current liabilities, 
which can be interpreted as the long-term capital used on current assets. NWCAP 
has a substitution effect on firm cash holdings because it can be easily converted 
to cash, indicating a negative relation with cash. Leverage is the ratio of long-term 
and short-term debt to total assets. Pecking order theory suggest that firms raise 
capital firstly from internal capital, then from equity market and finally from bond 
or debt market. High leverage signals that the firm is lack of internal funds. So it 
is expected that leverage is negatively related to cash holdings. Industry cash flow 
volatility (hereafter, Indsigma) captures not only cash flow uncertainty within the 
industry but also investment opportunities. So it is expected a positive relation 
between industry cash flow volatility and corporate cash holdings. Firms with 
more R&D expenditures (hereafter, R&D/sales) tend to have more investment 
opportunities, higher future cash flow risk, and higher probabilities to get 
distressed. Therefore, such firms tend to hold more cash in precaution. Acquisition 
(hereafter, Aqc) is also an expense of the current year, having a negative effect on 
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corporate cash holdings. Divdummy is a dummy variable to measure whether 
firms pay cash dividend. Dividend in cash is an outflow of cash. Addionally, 
paying dividends signals that firms do not intend to stockpile cash. So firms that 
have higher cash dividend are expected to hold less cash holdings. All in all, it is 
expected that firm with smaller size, higher market to book ratio, higher R&D 
expenses, more net working capital, less capital expenditure and acquisitions, 
higher cash flow volatility, higher cash flow, lower leverage and less cash 
dividend tends to hold more cash. The calculations of these variables are 
illustrated in the appendix.  
1.3.3 Data Source and Sample Construction 
I get firm specific financial data from COMPUSTAT industrial annual file and 
return data from CRSP annual file. Following both cash holding literature and 
Barth et al. (2013), the data requirements are the followings: (1) firms in the 
sample are incorporated in the United States; (2) observations have positive equity 
book value, positive assets and positive sales in a given year; (3) to mitigates the 
effects of outliers, it is treated as missing observations if any earnings variable of  
𝐸𝑖,𝑡
𝑃𝑖,𝑡−1
 and 
∆𝐸𝑖,𝑡
𝑃𝑖,𝑡−1
  is not between -1.5 and +1.5; (4) delete observations if share price 
in fiscal year end is less than $1; (5) R&D is set as 0 when is missing; (6) some 
obvious data errors are excluded, such as negative cash holdings, a higher value of 
cash holdings than total assets. (7) compounded annual return is trimmed at 1% 
level, and all the variables are winsorized at 1% level; (8) exclude financial firms 
(SIC codes 6000-6999) since they have to follow specific capital restrictions 
regulations and utility firms (SIC codes 4900-4999) since they are subject to 
regulatory supervision in a number of states; (9) there must be at least 10 
observations each industry year when calculating Transi.  
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The final sample is based on US firms for 34 sample years from 1980 to 2013. 
Because the construction of Trans requires lagged data of earnings and cash flow 
volatility are calculated with minimum 5 years data, some data prior to 1980 are 
used.  
1.3.4 The Determinants of Earnings Transparency 
BKL (2013) describe some sources that may cause the variations of earnings 
transparency. The sources include accounting system, manager discretion, 
accounting standards and clarity of firm disclosures. The sources are reasonable 
but not easy to measure in number. Here, I analyse some possible determinants 
and provide empirical results in Appendix B. The first is accounting based 
earnings quality. The precision of earnings affects the information quality of 
earnings, and hence the earnings transparency which captures the information of 
earnings related to stock return. The results show that better earnings quality, 
higher earnings transparency. Similarly, corporate governance also affect the 
information quality of earnings and hence earnings transparency. Better corporate 
governance leads to higher earnings transparency. The third one is the dummy of 
multinational firms. Foreign earning is less informative to investors, so that firms 
with more foreign earnings have lower earnings transparency. Hence MNC have 
lower earnings transparency. MNC is measured as 1 if firms whose foreign 
earnings are more than 25% of the total revenues in the past three years, otherwise, 
it equals to 0. The last is information asymmetry. Information asymmetry induces 
more agency problems, making earnings transparency become lower. I find 
consistent results empirically that accrual quality, institutional ownership, MNC, 
annual bid-ask spread and analyst numbers affect earnings transparency. 
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1.4 Empirical Results 
1.4.1 Summary Statistics 
Trans has two components called Transi and Transin. Transi is the adjusted R2 
from annually regressing compounded return on earnings and change in earnings 
across industry. It is industry-neutral and captures explanation variations of 
earnings on returns that can be captured by their industry membership. Transin is 
calculated as the adjusted R2 from regressing compounded return on earnings and 
change in earnings across portfolios sorted by firm-specific residuals that cannot 
explained by industry commons.  
Panel a, table 1 presents the industry classification details. This classification3 is 
following Barth, Beaver, and Landsman (1998). Panel B, table 1 provides the 
mean and median statistics of Trans, Transi and Transin across industries. Trans 
equals to the sum of Transi and Transin. Transi has industry variations. It is higher 
in industries of ‘Food’, ‘Textiles, printing, publishing’ and ‘Chemicals’, while 
lower in industries such as ‘Pharmaceuticals’, ‘Computers’ and ‘Services’, which 
is consistent with BKL (2013). Transin, which is industry-neutral, has few 
variations across industry. This statistical distribution is consistent with how it is 
constructed. 
Table 2 reports summary statistics of the key variables. The statistics include the 
mean, median, standard deviation, value of 25th and 75th percentiles. The ratio of 
cash to net assets (total assets less cash) is largely positively skewed with a mean 
value of 36.3% and a median value of 8.6%. The skewness of cash over total 
assets is less severe than that of cash over net assets, with a mean value of 15.7% 
and a median value of 7.9%. I use both cash over total assets and the nature log of 
                                                          
3 I also use two-digit SIC code, Fama French 17 industry classification and Fama French 48 industry 
classification to identify industries. It's shown that the main results are robust to different the industry 
classifications. 
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cash over net assets as the independent variable to provide more comprehensive 
and robust results. Trans in this sample has a mean value and a median value of 
0.459 and 0.451 respectively, comparable to 0.42 and 0.41 in BKL (2013), 
suggesting a symmetric deviation of Trans. As for other financial variables, the 
average MB is 1.803, with CFO of 4.2%, NWCAP of 13.4%, CAPX of 6.5%, 
leverage of 21.3%, Indsigma of 0.083, RD/sales of 14.9% and AQC of 2.1%. All 
the statistics are comparable with similar previous studies.  
Table 3 reports Pearson pairwise correlations between variables. Earnings 
transparency exhibits significant negative correlations with both cash over total 
assets and cash over net assets. The coefficients are 0.072 with p-values 0.0001 
and 0.056 with p-values 0.0001 respectively. For other control variables, the 
correlations between Trans and Realsize, NWCAP, CFO, leverage, divdummy are 
positive and significant, while the correlations between Trans and MB, CAPX, 
RD/sales, Aqc and Indsigma are negative and significant. Overall, this evidence 
show earnings transparency is significantly associated with cash holdings and the 
other financial characteristics, indicating that these financial variables should be 
controlled in the multivariate regressions. 
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Table 1 Industry classification and summary statistics of trans across industry 
This table provides the industry classification details and the summary statistics of earnings 
transparency across industry. Panel A presents the industry classification details. This 
classification follows Barth et al. (1998) dividing firms into 15 industries according to primary SIC 
codes. Panel B presents the summary statistics of earnings transparency within each industry 
except financial and utility industries. Specifically, it shows the mean, median, standard deviation, 
minimum, maximum, numbers of observations of earnings transparency. The sample used in panel 
B includes observations available both in COMPUSTAT and CRSP from 1980 to 2013. The data 
requirements are illustrated in the sample section. All variables are winsorized at 1% and 99% 
level. 
Panel A. Industry Classification 
Industry Primary SIC code 
1. Mining and construction 1000—1999, except 1300—1399 
2. Food  2000—2111 
3. Textiles, printing and publishing  2200-2799 
4. Chemicals  2800—2824, and 2840—2899 
5. Pharmaceuticals 2830—2836 
6. Extractive industries 2900—2999, and 1300—1399 
7. Durable manufacturers  3000—3999, except 3570—3579, and 3670—3679 
8. Computers  7370—7379, 3570—3579, and 3670—3679 
9. Transportation  4000—4899 
10. Utilities  4900—4999 
11. Retail  5000—5999 
12. Financial institutions  6000—6411 
13. Insurance and real estate  6500—6999 
14. Services  7000—8999, except 7370—7379 
15. Other >9000 
Panel B Statistics of Trans within each industry 
  Trans Transi Transin 
Industry Mean Median Mean Median Mean Median 
1.Mining, construction 0.464 0.448 0.108 0.077 0.357 0.338 
2.Food 0.495 0.501 0.142 0.135 0.354 0.335 
3.Textiles, printing, publishing 0.496 0.474 0.141 0.142 0.355 0.338 
4.Chemicals 0.498 0.497 0.143 0.137 0.356 0.338 
5.Pharmaceuticals 0.427 0.422 0.073 0.048 0.354 0.335 
6.Extractive industries 0.448 0.434 0.094 0.076 0.355 0.338 
7.Durable manufacturers 0.450 0.431 0.096 0.088 0.355 0.338 
8.Computers 0.439 0.431 0.084 0.080 0.355 0.335 
9.Transportation 0.455 0.434 0.101 0.095 0.354 0.335 
11.Retail 0.449 0.426 0.095 0.104 0.354 0.335 
14.services 0.427 0.405 0.073 0.061 0.354 0.335 
15.Other 0.417 0.441 0.072 0.089 0.343 0.331 
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Table 2 Description of variables 
This table provides summary statistics of main variables. The sample includes observations 
available both in COMPUSTAT and CRSP from 1980 to 2013. The data requirements are 
illustrated in the sample section. All variables are winsorized at 1% and 99% level. Cash/AT = 
cash holdings and marketable securities (#1)/total assets (#6). Cash/NAT = cash holdings and 
marketable securities (#1)/ [total assets (#6) - cash holdings and marketable securities (#1)]. 
TRANS is earnings transparency constructed following Barth et al. (2013). Transt-1 is 1-year 
lagged earnings transparency. RealSize is the natural log of total assets (#6) in 1994 dollars. MB = 
[total assets (#6)-book value of equity (#60) + share outstanding (#25)* prcc_f (#199)]/total assets 
(#6). RD/sales=XRD (#46)/sales (#12). CF= [OIBDP (#13)-Xint (#339)-Txt (#16)-Dvc 
(#21)]/total assets (#6). NWCAP= [wcap (#179) - cash holdings and marketable securities 
(#1))/total assets (#6). CAPX=capital expenditure (#128)/total assets (#6). Leverage = total 
liabilities (#181)/total assets (#6). Indsigma is the mean of the past 20 years cash flow volatility 
averaged in two-digit SIC code. Aqc=acquisitions (#129)/ total assets (#6). Divdummy is a binary 
variable. Divdummy equals to 1 if dvc (#21) is higher than 0, otherwise it equals to 0. 
 
Variable Mean Std.  P25 Median P75 max min N 
Cash/At 0.157 0.189 0.024 0.079 0.218 0.955 0.000 77689 
Cash/Nat 0.363 1.072 0.025 0.086 0.278 21.185 0.000 77689 
Trans 0.459 0.178 0.319 0.451 0.598 0.935 0.079 77689 
Transt-1 0.456 0.177 0.310 0.439 0.594 0.935 0.079 77689 
MB 1.803 1.408 1.046 1.361 1.986 20.279 0.504 77689 
RealSize 5.022 2.089 3.483 4.877 6.460 11.617 -0.253 77689 
CF 0.042 0.144 0.027 0.070 0.108 0.322 -1.076 77689 
NWCAP 0.134 0.182 0.003 0.121 0.259 0.608 -0.400 77689 
CAPX 0.065 0.064 0.023 0.045 0.083 0.482 0.000 77689 
Leverage 0.213 0.179 0.050 0.193 0.331 0.770 0.000 77689 
Indsigma 0.083 0.044 0.049 0.076 0.107 0.260 0.017 77689 
RD/sales  0.149 0.930 0.000 0.000 0.046 21.334 0.000 77689 
Aqc 0.021 0.057 0.000 0.000 0.008 0.436 -0.017 77689 
Divdummy 0.388 0.487 0.000 0.000 1.000 1.000 0.000 77689 
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Table 3 Pearson correlations between earnings transparency and cash holdings 
This table reports the Pearson correlations between earnings transparency and financial variables. The sample includes observations available both in COMPUSTAT and 
CRSP from 1980 to 2013. The data requirements are illustrated in the sample section. All variables are winsorized at 1% and 99% level. Cash/AT = cash holdings and 
marketable securities (#1)/total assets (#6). Cash/NAT= cash holdings and marketable securities (#1)/ [total assets (#6) - cash holdings and marketable securities (#1)]. 
TRANS is earnings transparency constructed following Barth et al. (2013). Transt-1 is 1-year lagged earnings transparency. RealSize is the natural log of total assets (#6) in 
1994 dollars. MB = [total assets (#6)-book value of equity (#60) + share outstanding (#25)* prcc_f (#199)]/total assets (#6). RD/sales=XRD (#46)/sales (#12). CF= [OIBDP 
(#13)-Xint (#339)-Txt (#16)-Dvc (#21)]/total assets (#6). NWCAP= [wcap (#179) - cash holdings and marketable securities (#1))/total assets (#6). CAPX=capital 
expenditure (#128)/total assets (#6). Leverage = total liabilities (#181)/total assets (#6). Indsigma is the mean of the past 20 years cash flow volatility averaged in two-digit 
SIC code. Aqc=acquisitions (#129)/ total assets (#6). Divdummy is a binary variable. Divdummy equals to 1 if dvc (#21) is higher than 0, otherwise it equals to 0. P-values 
are shown in brackets. 
  1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 
Transt-1 1             
             
Cash/At -0.072 1            
<.0001             
Cash/Nat -0.056 0.735 1           
<.0001 <.0001            
MB -0.115 0.379 0.267 1          
<.0001 <.0001 <.0001           
RealSize 0.055 -0.167 -0.106 -0.084 1         
<.0001 <.0001 <.0001 <.0001          
CF 0.027 -0.353 -0.370 -0.242 0.263 1        
<.0001 <.0001 <.0001 <.0001 <.0001         
NWCAP 0.033 -0.288 -0.228 -0.178 -0.238 0.191 1       
<.0001 <.0001 <.0001 <.0001 <.0001 <.0001        
CAPX -0.014 -0.194 -0.146 0.020 0.005 0.150 -0.196 1      
0.0002 <.0001 <.0001 <.0001 0.2062 <.0001 <.0001       
Leverage 0.025 -0.430 -0.228 -0.238 0.151 0.008 -0.114 0.121 1     
<.0001 <.0001 <.0001 <.0001 <.0001 0.0293 <.0001 <.0001      
Indsigma -0.065 0.360 0.289 0.256 0.060 -0.191 -0.192 -0.166 -0.177 1    
<.0001 <.0001 <.0001 <.0001 <.0001 <.0001 <.0001 <.0001 <.0001     
RD/sales  -0.025 0.382 0.524 0.241 -0.078 -0.464 -0.155 -0.065 -0.088 0.240 1   
<.0001 <.0001 <.0001 <.0001 <.0001 <.0001 <.0001 <.0001 <.0001 <.0001    
Aqc -0.018 -0.111 -0.074 -0.016 0.142 0.065 -0.063 -0.099 0.143 0.062 -0.040 1  
<.0001 <.0001 <.0001 <.0001 <.0001 <.0001 <.0001 <.0001 <.0001 <.0001 <.0001   
Divdummy 0.135 -0.218 -0.151 -0.119 0.311 0.180 0.090 0.047 -0.002 -0.265 -0.114 -0.010 1 
<.0001 <.0001 <.0001 <.0001 <.0001 <.0001 <.0001 <.0001 0.6568 <.0001 <.0001 0.0069  
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1.4.2 Univariate Test 
The results of univariate analysis of cash holdings associated with earnings 
transparency are reported in table 4. The table reports the mean value of cash 
ratios and other financial variables for firms grouped in quintiles based on Trans 
and also the differences of variables between the highest quintile and the lowest 
quintile. The difference-in-mean and t-statistics are calculated annually and 
averaged across year. It's found convincing evidence of the relatively higher cash 
levels in firms with lower earnings transparency than in firms with higher earnings 
transparency. For example, firms in the highest quintile of Trans averagely have 
18.2% of total assets as cash relative to 13.5% in firms with lowest quintile of 
Trans. The differences are even larger for cash over net assets, with 44.6% of 
mean value for lowest quintile firms relative to 28% of mean value for highest 
quintile firms. The univariate results suggests earnings transparency and corporate 
cash holdings are negatively correlated, which is consistent with hypothesis 1. 
Additionally, the results show a consistent relation between earnings transparency 
and financial characteristics (except cash flow) with the Pearson pairwise 
correlations in the previous section. Firm with less earnings transparency have 
significantly more growth options, smaller size, less net working capital, lower 
leverage, higher industry cash flow risk, less capital expenditure, higher RD 
expense, higher acquisition expense, less dividend pay-out ratio. 
1.4.3 Main Results 
The results of the previous subsections suggest a negative correlation between 
earnings transparency and corporate cash holding. In this section, I test this 
through multivariate regressions. The dependent variable is corporate cash 
holdings, measured as the nature log of cash and short-term investments divided 
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by net assets and cash and short-term investments over total assets. The 
independent variable is earnings transparency denoted as Trans. The fundamental 
control variables are described previously. Table 5 presents the main results of 
regressions predicting corporate liquidity levels in the 1980-2013 periods. In order 
to show the robustness of the relation between earnings transparency and 
corporate cash holdings, both OLS regressions and Fama Macbeth regressions are 
used. 
Table 4 Univariate tests 
This table presents the results of the univariate tests. The sample includes observations available 
both in COMPUSTAT and CRSP from 1980 to 2013. The data requirements are illustrated in the 
sample section. All variables are winsorized at 1% and 99% level. In each year, firms are classified 
into 5 groups according to the value of 1-year lagged earnings transparency. The ‘Low’ group 
contains observations with Lag (Trans) in the lowest quintile, while ‘High’ group are observations 
with Lag (Trans) in the highest quintile.  Cash/AT = cash holdings and marketable securities 
(#1)/total assets (#6). Cash/NAT = cash holdings and marketable securities (#1)/ [total assets (#6) - 
cash holdings and marketable securities (#1)]. TRANS is earnings transparency constructed 
following Barth et al. (2013). Transt-1 is 1-year lagged earnings transparency. RealSize is the 
natural log of total assets (#6) in 1994 dollars. MB = [total assets (#6)-book value of equity (#60) + 
share outstanding (#25)* prcc_f (#199)]/total assets (#6). RD/Sales=XRD (#46)/sales (#12). CF= 
[OIBDP (#13)-Xint (#339)-Txt (#16)-Dvc (#21)]/total assets (#6). NWCAP= [wcap (#179) - cash 
holdings and marketable securities (#1))/total assets (#6). CAPX=capital expenditure (#128)/total 
assets (#6). Leverage = total liabilities (#181)/total assets (#6). Indsigma is the mean of the past 20 
years cash flow volatility averaged in two-digit SIC code. Aqc=acquisitions (#129)/ total assets 
(#6). Divdummy is a binary variable. Divdummy equals to 1 if dvc (#21) is higher than 0, 
otherwise it equals to 0. The t-test and the Wilcoxon rank-sum test of the differences in cash 
holdings and other financial characteristics between high earnings transparency firms and low 
transparency firms are given in superscript ***, **, and * denoting statistical significance at the 
1%, 5%, and 10% levels, respectively. 
Variable low 2 3 4 high diff. 
Transt-1 0.246 0.350 0.476 0.565 0.643 -0.397*** 
Cash/At 0.182 0.164 0.158 0.145 0.135 0.046*** 
Cash/Nat 0.446 0.394 0.379 0.316 0.280 0.166*** 
MB 2.219 1.728 1.717 1.687 1.658 0.562*** 
RealSize 4.831 4.724 5.024 5.201 5.328 -0.497*** 
CF 0.052 0.024 0.034 0.049 0.052 0.000 
NWCAP 0.130 0.135 0.121 0.139 0.145 -0.015*** 
CAPX 0.070 0.063 0.064 0.065 0.063 0.007*** 
Leverage 0.198 0.216 0.220 0.217 0.216 -0.018*** 
Indsigma 0.085 0.084 0.084 0.081 0.079 0.006*** 
RD/sales  0.180 0.160 0.176 0.127 0.105 0.076*** 
Aqc 0.025 0.018 0.021 0.022 0.021 0.004*** 
Divdummy 0.325 0.301 0.387 0.437 0.488 -0.163*** 
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Table 5 Regressions of corporate cash holdings on earnings transparency 
This table presents estimates of regressions explaining corporate cash holdings. The sample 
includes observations available both in COMPUSTAT and CRSP from 1980 to 2013. The data 
requirements and the control variables are described in ‘sample’ and ‘variable description’ sections. 
All variables are winsorized at 1% and 99% level. For columns (1), (2), (3), (5), (6) the dependent 
variable is measured as cash and short-term investment divided by book assets. For columns (4) 
and (7), the dependent variable is the log of cash over net assets. The independent variable is 1-
year lagged earnings transparency. Columns (1), (2), (4), (5) and (7) show estimates from OLS 
regressions including year and firm fixed effects. Standard errors are clustered at the firm level. 
Column (3) and (6) are estimates from Fama-Macbeth regressions with Newey-West test. Robust 
standard errors are under coefficients. Significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels is represented 
by ***, **, and *, respectively.  
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 7 
VARIAB
LES 
Cash/At Cash/At Cash/At log(Cash/
Nat) 
Cash/At Cash/At log(Cash/
Nat) 
(Cash/At)
t-1 
    0.513*** 0.748***  
     (0.007) (0.019)  
[log(Cash
/Nat)] t-1 
      0.458*** 
       (0.006) 
Trans 0.003***       
 (0.002)       
Transt-1  -0.011*** -0.024*** -0.102*** -0.011*** -0.014*** -0.090*** 
  (0.003) (0.006) (0.027) (0.002) (0.003) (0.023) 
MB 0.009*** 0.009*** 0.018*** 0.076*** 0.006*** 0.004*** 0.056*** 
 (0.001) (0.001) (0.004) (0.007) (0.001) (0.001) (0.005) 
RealSize -0.005*** -0.004** -0.010*** -0.067*** -0.000 -0.002*** -0.028** 
 (0.002) (0.002) (0.001) (0.019) (0.001) (0.000) (0.012) 
CF 0.013 0.009 -0.067 0.253*** 0.057*** 0.063*** 0.487*** 
 (0.009) (0.010) (0.042) (0.070) (0.007) (0.015) (0.054) 
NWCAP -0.314*** -0.323*** -0.305*** -2.740*** -0.244*** -0.120*** -2.112*** 
 (0.009) (0.010) (0.019) (0.084) (0.007) (0.008) (0.061) 
CAPX -0.305*** -0.330*** -0.542*** -2.533*** -0.388*** -0.349*** -3.284*** 
 (0.013) (0.014) (0.059) (0.134) (0.011) (0.009) (0.109) 
Leverage -0.261*** -0.252*** -0.349*** -2.869*** -0.135*** -0.081*** -1.723*** 
 (0.008) (0.008) (0.018) (0.080) (0.006) (0.009) (0.057) 
Indsigma -0.023*** 0.000 0.433*** 0.964*** -0.009 0.097*** 0.486** 
 (0.035) (0.036) (0.076) (0.363) (0.022) (0.017) (0.223) 
RD/sales  0.013*** 0.013*** 0.104** 0.078*** 0.007*** 0.032** 0.047*** 
 (0.002) (0.002) (0.039) (0.012) (0.001) (0.014) (0.008) 
Aqc -0.185*** -0.185*** -0.243*** -1.278*** -0.336*** -0.413*** -2.678*** 
 (0.008) (0.008) (0.050) (0.087) (0.009) (0.034) (0.085) 
Divdum
my 
0.005* 0.007*** -0.028*** 0.044 0.001 -0.007*** -0.002 
 (0.003) (0.003) (0.007) (0.028) (0.002) (0.001) (0.018) 
Constant 0.299*** 0.294*** 0.303*** -0.953*** 0.151*** 0.101*** -0.393*** 
 (0.007) (0.008) (0.008) (0.073) (0.008) (0.007) (0.084) 
Year Y Y  Y Y  Y 
Firm Y Y  Y Y  Y 
N 89281 77,689 77,689 77,689 75,678 75,678 75,678 
adj. R-sq 0.806 0.809 0.481 0.753 0.866 0.799 0.810 
Number 
of groups 
    34     33   
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Columns from (1) to (4) are results of the relation between earnings transparency 
and corporate cash holdings. Column (1) presents the estimates of regressing cash 
over total assets on contemporaneous Trans. The estimates show that there's no 
significant relation between cash and contemporaneous earnings transparency, 
suggesting cash and earnings transparency are less likely to have feedback 
causality problems. The lagged earnings transparency is used not only to address 
reverse causality concerns, but also for the following reason: earnings 
transparency is measured as the R2 of regressing realized returns on earnings so 
that both the insiders and outsiders will not know its value until the subsequent 
period. This is also consistent with BKL (2013), who show that earnings 
transparency is negatively related to expected cost of capital and subsequent 
realized returns. Column (2) and column (3) show the results of regressing cash 
over total assets on lagged earnings transparency with OLS regression and Fama 
Macbeth regression respectively. To control the unobservable constant variables, 
all OLS regressions include firm level and year level fixed effects. Column (4) 
uses the natural log of cash over net assets as the dependent variable.  
The coefficients on Trans is negative and significant at 99% confidence level 
under all model specifications, suggesting that transparent firms are more likely to 
hold less cash compared to less transparent firms and vice versa. This is consistent 
with the hypothesis that high earnings transparency reduces information 
asymmetry among market participants, resulting in lower costs of equity and 
hence firms will hold fewer saving for precaution. In terms of economic 
significance, Column (2) indicates the average earnings transparency can explain 
3.2% of the cross-sectional variations of cash over total assets. Column (4) 
suggests that, all other things being equal, moving from the first quintile of 
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earnings transparency to the fifth quintile increases cash over net assets ratio by 
1.5%, a 4.1% increase given that the average value of cash over net assets is 0.363. 
The results are even stronger when using Fama Macbeth regressions as shown in 
column (3). 
Another way to address the adverse causality problem is to study the impact of 
earnings transparency on the change of cash holdings (Harford, Mansi, and 
Maxwell (2008)). This analysis is conducted by controlling lagged cash holdings 
in the regression. The results are presented in columns from (5) to (7). Column (5) 
and column (7) show results using OLS regressions. Column (6) shows results 
using Fama Macbeth regression. The coefficient of Trans keeps negative and 
significant at 99% confidence level, suggesting that when earnings transparency is 
higher, firms tend to decrease their holdings of cash with a higher speed and vice 
versa. The results are robust with different regression specifications and different 
measures of cash.  
While the key variable is earnings transparency, the regressions include control 
variables based on previous related studies. Specifically, the controls include 
market-to-book ratio, firm size, cash flow of operating, NWCAP, CAPX, leverage, 
Indsigma, RD/Sales, Aqc and Divdummy. Almost all the coefficients of control 
variables have their expected signs. Firms with higher leverage, more net working 
capital, more dividends, and more capital expenditures tend to hold less cash 
holdings, while firms with higher growth opportunity (higher market-to-book or 
higher R&D expenses), higher operating risk (Indsigma) and higher operation 
cash flows tend to have more cash reserves.  
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1.4.4 Other Control Variables 
1.4.4.1 Accounting-based Earnings Quality 
Besides earnings transparency, there are other measures called accounting-based 
measures to evaluate earnings-related information, such as accrual quality and 
absolute abnormal accruals. Both earnings transparency and these accounting-
based earnings quality are measures of the information contained in earnings. 
SYR (2012) and GMS (2009) find a negative relation between accounting-based 
earnings quality and corporate cash holdings based on firms listed on United 
States exchanges and Spanish exchange respectively. Although Francis et al. 
(2004) show that market-based earnings quality and accounting-based earnings 
quality have little statistical correlation, I control accounting based variables to 
provide evidence that earnings transparency can provide extra information in 
affecting firms’ cash holding policy.  
Accounting-based earnings quality are measured based on accounting information 
only, capturing the accuracy of financial reporting disclosing information about 
expected cash flows which can inform stakeholders. Accrual quality and absolute 
abnormal accruals are the most frequently used accounting-based earnings quality. 
Accrual quality is calculated as the standard deviation of residuals from a 
regression of accruals on operating cash flows of last year, present year and 
forward year Dechow and Dichev (2002). This measure captures the estimation 
errors of earnings under accrual accounting basis. Absolute abnormal accruals are 
accruals that cannot be explained by the fundamentals, i.e. revenues and gross 
PPE. These two measures are adverse earnings quality measures which means 
higher of these measures indicates poorer of earnings quality. 
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I control these two variables in model 4 to show the robustness of the impact of 
earnings transparency on cash holdings. The model is designed as follows: 
Cashi,t  = β0 +  β1 ∗ Transi,t−1 + β2 ∗ ACCi,t + γ
′ ∗ Xsi,t + ηi + τt
+ εi,t                         (4) 
, where ACCs represent accounting-based earnings quality measures, i.e., accrual 
quality and absolute abnormal accruals; Trans is earnings transparency and Xs are 
control variables. 
Table 6 Summary statistics for accounting-based earnings quality 
This table reports summary statistics of accounting based earnings quality variables and corporate 
governance variables. The constructions of accounting based earnings quality variables are 
provided in the appendix B. The definitions of other financial variables are the same as in previous 
tables. All variables are winsorized by 1% and 99%. AQ and Abs_Abn_Acc represent accrual 
quality, discretionary accruals and absolutely abnormal accrual respectively. Panel A presents the 
summary statistics of key variables of accounting-based earnings quality sample. Panel B reports 
the Pearson correlations between Trans and earnings quality measures. 
Panel A. Summary Statistics of accounting-based earnings quality sample   
Variable Mean Std.  P25 Median P75 max min N 
Cash/At 0.145 0.176 0.024 0.074 0.198 0.955 0.000 54658 
Cash/Nat 0.312 0.957 0.024 0.080 0.247 21.185 0.000 54658 
Trans 0.468 0.178 0.323 0.466 0.604 0.935 0.079 54658 
Transt-1 0.461 0.178 0.314 0.455 0.599 0.935 0.079 54658 
AQ 0.047 0.036 0.022 0.037 0.061 0.324 0.001 54658 
Abs_abn_acc 0.056 0.059 0.017 0.038 0.073 0.568 0.000 54658 
Panel B. Summary Statistics of Institutional ownership sample     
  1 2 3        
Transt-1 1          
         
AQ -0.108 1       
 <.0001        
Abs_abn_acc -0.069 0.434 1      
  <.0001 <.0001       
Panel A, table 6 reports the summary statistics of accounting-based earnings 
quality measures and the dependent and independent variables. AQ represents 
accrual quality and Abs_Abn_Acc represents absolute abnormal accruals. The 
mean (median) of AQ have a value of 0.047 (0.037), similar to 0.0442 (0.0313) in 
Francis et al. (2005). The mean (median) of Abs_Abn_Acc has value of 0.056 
(0.038), comparable to 0.088 (0.036) in Sun et al. (2012). Furthermore, the cash 
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ratios and Trans have values comparable to those in the sample of the main 
regression. Panel B shows that the correlation coefficients between Trans and the 
accounting based measures are very small, all less than 0.108, suggesting that 
earnings transparency and accounting based earnings quality contain little 
overlapped information statistically. 
Table 7 Regression estimates with accounting based earnings quality measures 
This table presents estimates results from regressions explaining firm level cash holdings when 
accounting based earnings quality are accounted for. The sample includes observations available 
both in COMPUSTAT and CRSP from 1980 to 2013. The data requirements and the control 
variables are described in ‘sample’ and ‘variable description’ sections. All variables are winsorized 
by 1% and 99%. In Columns (1), (2) and (3), the dependent variable is measured as log of cash and 
short-term investments over net asset ratios. In Columns (5), (6) and (7), the dependent variable is 
the cash and short-term investment divided by book assets. The independent variable is 1-year 
lagged earnings transparency. All columns present estimates from OLS regressions including year 
and firm fixed effects with standard errors clustered at the firm level. The standard errors are under 
the coefficients. Significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels is represented by ***, **, and *, 
respectively. 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
VARIABL
ES 
Cash/At Cash/At Cash/At log(Cash/N
at) 
log(Cash/N
at) 
log(Cash/N
at) 
Transt-1 -0.009*** -0.008*** -0.009*** -0.114*** -0.110*** -0.113*** 
 
(0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.031) (0.031) (0.031) 
AQ 
 
0.114*** 
  
0.977*** 
 
  
(0.036) 
  
(0.319) 
 Abs_abn_a
cc 
  
0.018* 
  
0.154 
   
(0.011) 
  
(0.106) 
MB 0.009*** 0.009*** 0.009*** 0.075*** 0.073*** 0.074*** 
 
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.009) (0.009) (0.009) 
RealSize -0.003 -0.003 -0.003 -0.071*** -0.068*** -0.071*** 
 
(0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.024) (0.024) (0.024) 
CF 0.011 0.012 0.012 0.324*** 0.334*** 0.326*** 
 
(0.012) (0.012) (0.012) (0.090) (0.090) (0.090) 
NWCAP -0.337*** -0.335*** -0.336*** -2.994*** -2.981*** -2.992*** 
 
(0.012) (0.012) (0.012) (0.103) (0.103) (0.103) 
CAPX -0.340*** -0.340*** -0.341*** -2.932*** -2.929*** -2.937*** 
 
(0.017) (0.017) (0.017) (0.160) (0.161) (0.160) 
Leverage -0.234*** -0.235*** -0.234*** -2.822*** -2.831*** -2.822*** 
 
(0.010) (0.010) (0.010) (0.097) (0.097) (0.097) 
Indsigma 0.032 0.029 0.032 0.924** 0.896** 0.923** 
 
(0.039) (0.039) (0.039) (0.421) (0.420) (0.421) 
RD/sales  0.010*** 0.010*** 0.010*** 0.057*** 0.059*** 0.058*** 
 
(0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.015) (0.015) (0.015) 
Aqc -0.188*** -0.190*** -0.191*** -1.509*** -1.522*** -1.531*** 
 
(0.009) (0.009) (0.009) (0.102) (0.102) (0.102) 
Divdummy 0.010*** 0.011*** 0.010*** 0.065** 0.070** 0.066** 
 
(0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.032) (0.032) (0.032) 
Constant 0.278*** 0.272*** 0.277*** -0.895*** -0.949*** -0.906*** 
 
(0.010) (0.010) (0.010) (0.096) (0.097) (0.095) 
Year Y Y Y Y Y Y 
Firm Y Y Y Y Y Y 
N 54,658 54,658 54,658 54,658 54,658 54,658 
adj. R-sq 0.810 0.810 0.810 0.751 0.751 0.751 
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Table 7 presents the regression results after controlling accounting based earnings 
quality measures. Column (1), (2) and (3) use cash over total assets as dependent 
variable, while Column (4), (5) and (6) use natural log of cash over net assets as 
dependent variable. Column (1) and column (4) are estimates before controlling 
accounting based earnings quality. Column (2) and (5) are results after controlling 
accrual quality. Column (3) and (6) are results after controlling absolute abnormal 
accruals. Under all regression specifications, the results show a significant 
negative relation between Trans and subsequent cash holdings, suggesting that 
earnings transparency captures different information related to earnings with 
accounting-based earnings quality measures in affecting corporate cash holdings. 
What’s more, the magnitudes of coefficients of Trans after controlling accounting-
based earnings quality measures are almost the same with those in the main 
regressions (table 5), indicating a low correlation between accounting based 
earnings quality variables and earnings transparency. 
1.4.4.2 Corporate Governance 
There are some papers studying how corporate governance affects earnings-return 
relation. For example, Fan and Wong (2002) find that a large separation of the 
voting and cash flow rights reduces the credibility of the accounting information, 
indicating that agency problems negatively affect earnings informativeness. 
Harford, Mansi, and Maxwell (2008) show that corporate governance has a 
positive impact on cash holdings because managers in firms with poor governance 
tend to dissipate excess cash on bad investments. To mitigate the possibility that 
the impact of earnings transparency on cash holdings is because corporate 
governance affects earnings quality and cash holdings simultaneously, I include 
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corporate governance measures in the regression. Specifically, I control 
governance measures in model 5. 
Cashi,t  = β0 +  β1 ∗ Transi,t−1 + β2 ∗ GOVi,t + γ
′ ∗ Xsi,t + ηi + τt
+ εi,t                         (4) 
, where GOV denotes corporate governance measures: g-index and institutional 
ownership and insider ownership; Trans is earnings transparency and Xs are 
control variables. 
Table 8 Summary statistics of corporate governance sample 
This table provides summary statistics of corporate governance variables. Panel A presents the 
summary statistics of the key variables of the sample when corporate governance is measured by 
Gindex following Gompers et al. (2003). The G-index sample is available from 1990 to 2007. 
Panel B presents the summary statistics of the key variables of the sample when corporate 
governance is measured by institutional ownership. The Institutional ownership sample is from 
1980 to 2013. Panel C presents the summary statistics of the key variables of the sample when 
corporate governance is measured by inside ownership. Inside ownership is the equity held by top 
5 officers divided by total common share outstanding. Inside ownership sample is from 1992 to 
2013. The definitions of other financial variables are the same as in previous tables. All variables 
are winsorized at 1% and 99% level. 
Panel A Summary Statistics of G-index sample 
Variable Mean Std. P25 Median P75 N 
Cash/AT 0.144 0.174 0.023 0.072 0.199 9294 
Cash/NAT 0.282 0.713 0.023 0.078 0.249 9294 
Trans 0.475 0.184 0.324 0.489 0.616 9294 
Transt-1 0.475 0.185 0.324 0.496 0.612 9294 
G-index 9.101 2.706 7.000 9.000 11.000 9294 
RealSize 7.095 1.436 6.052 6.952 8.033 9294 
Panel B Summary Statistics of Institutional ownership sample 
Variable Mean Std. P25 Median P75 N 
Cash/AT 0.157 0.189 0.024 0.079 0.218 77689 
Cash/NAT 0.363 1.072 0.025 0.086 0.278 77689 
Trans 0.459 0.178 0.319 0.451 0.598 77689 
Transt-1 0.456 0.177 0.310 0.439 0.594 77689 
Institutional Ownership 0.394 0.298 0.125 0.354 0.629 77689 
RealSize 5.022 2.089 3.483 4.877 6.460 77689 
Panel C Summary Statistics of Inside ownership sample 
Variable Mean Std. P25 Median P75 N 
Cash/AT 0.147 0.167 0.024 0.081 0.211 22236 
Cash/NAT 0.256 0.460 0.025 0.088 0.268 22236 
Trans 0.456 0.181 0.308 0.458 0.596 22236 
Transt-1 0.456 0.181 0.304 0.457 0.597 22236 
Inside Ownership 0.042 0.080 0.003 0.010 0.036 22236 
RealSize 7.075 1.549 5.961 6.927 8.057 22236 
 
33 
 
Table 8 reports the summary statistics of corporate governance variables. The first 
is G-index. G-index is a proxy of shareholder protection. Lower G-index indicates 
higher shareholder protection. Panel A is for G-index sample. G-index has a mean 
value of 9.101 and a median value of 9.000, comparable to 9.23 and 9.000 in 
Harford, Mansi, and Maxwell (2008). Since data for G-index are only available 
between 1990 and 2007 and only available for comparable larger COMPUSTAT 
firms, the sample have totally 12453 observations. The second measure of 
corporate governance is institutional ownership. Institutional investors tend to 
monitor managers more effectively. Panel B, table 8 documents the summary 
statistics of key variables of the institutional ownership sample. The institutional 
ownership has a mean value and median value of 0.394 and 0.354 respectively 
which are comparable with previous studies. The third measure is insider 
ownership. Managers holding more stocks are more likely to align their interests 
with firm owners. Insider ownership has a mean and median value of 0.042 and 
0.010 respectively.  
Table 9 shows that the impacts of earnings transparency on corporate cash 
holdings are still significant accounting for different corporate governance 
measures. The dependent variable is log of cash over net assets. In Columns (1) 
and (2), the governance measure is G-index. In Column (3), (4) and (5), the 
governance measure is inside ownership. In Column (6), (7) and (8), the 
governance measure is institutional ownership. The independent variable is 1-year 
lagged earnings transparency. Following Harford, Mansi, and Maxwell (2008), in 
Column (2), (5) and (8), I control year and industry fixed effects with standard 
errors clustered at the firm level. All other columns present estimates from OLS 
regressions including year and firm fixed effects with standard errors clustered at 
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the firm level. This table shows that the relation between earnings transparency 
and corporate cash holdings is negative and statistically significant after account 
for the impact of governance measures under different regression specifications. 
The results are similar when use cash over total assets as dependent variable. 
Table 9 Regression estimates accounting for corporate governance measures 
The table presents estimates results from regressions explaining firm level cash holdings when 
corporate governance are accounted for. The sample includes observations available both in 
COMPUSTAT and CRSP. The data requirements and the control variables are described in 
‘sample’ and ‘variable description’ section. All variables are winsorized by 1% and 99%. The 
dependent variable is log of cash over net assets. In Columns (1) and (2), the governance measure 
is G-index. In Column (3), (4) and (5), the governance measure is inside ownership. In Column (6), 
(7) and (8), the governance measure is institutional ownership. The independent variable is 1-year 
lagged earnings transparency. In Column (2), (5) and (8),I control year and industry fixed effects 
with standard errors clustered at the firm level All other columns present estimates from OLS 
regressions including year and firm fixed effects with standard errors clustered at the firm level. 
The standard errors are under the coefficients. Significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels is 
represented by ***, **, and *, respectively. 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) 
VARIA
BLES 
log(
𝐶𝑎𝑠ℎ
𝑁𝐴𝑇
) log(
𝐶𝑎𝑠ℎ
𝑁𝐴𝑇
) log(
𝐶𝑎𝑠ℎ
𝑁𝐴𝑇
) log(
𝐶𝑎𝑠ℎ
𝑁𝐴𝑇
) log(
𝐶𝑎𝑠ℎ
𝑁𝐴𝑇
) log(
𝐶𝑎𝑠ℎ
𝑁𝐴𝑇
) log(
𝐶𝑎𝑠ℎ
𝑁𝐴𝑇
) log(
𝐶𝑎𝑠ℎ
𝑁𝐴𝑇
) 
Transt-1 -0.099* -0.302*** -0.095** -0.105** -0.244*** -0.111*** -0.112*** -0.221*** 
 (0.056) (0.073) (0.041) (0.042) (0.055) (0.027) (0.027) (0.033) 
Gindext-1  -0.025***       
  (0.009)       
Institutional 
Ownershipt-1 
 0.437 0.672***    
    (0.287) (0.241)    
Inside 
Ownersh
ipt-1 
      0.082 0.402*** 
       (0.061) (0.057) 
MB 0.112*** 0.235*** 0.119*** 0.116*** 0.190*** 0.078*** 0.077*** 0.134*** 
 (0.018) (0.018) (0.011) (0.011) (0.012) (0.007) (0.007) (0.007) 
RealSize -0.226*** -0.145*** -0.192*** -0.189*** -0.118*** -0.070*** -0.077*** -0.105*** 
 (0.051) (0.020) (0.032) (0.035) (0.015) (0.019) (0.020) (0.009) 
CF 0.371 -1.616*** 0.314* 0.265 -0.448* 0.266*** 0.270*** -0.495*** 
 (0.288) (0.326) (0.184) (0.198) (0.231) (0.070) (0.071) (0.065) 
NWCAP -3.009*** -2.287*** -2.876*** -2.772*** -2.173*** -2.732*** -2.735*** -2.801*** 
 (0.220) (0.187) (0.167) (0.175) (0.148) (0.084) (0.084) (0.071) 
CAPX -4.573*** -4.936*** -3.383*** -3.305*** -4.674*** -2.554*** -2.564*** -3.662*** 
 (0.435) (0.529) (0.275) (0.292) (0.362) (0.136) (0.136) (0.163) 
Leverage -2.084*** -3.320*** -1.893*** -1.814*** -2.941*** -2.854*** -2.846*** -3.751*** 
 (0.187) (0.163) (0.137) (0.146) (0.131) (0.081) (0.081) (0.068) 
Indsigma -0.897 2.057*** -0.039 0.007 3.155*** 0.889** 0.901** 3.477*** 
 (0.665) (0.770) (0.519) (0.575) (0.579) (0.356) (0.357) (0.365) 
RD/sales  0.041 1.559*** 0.452*** 0.410*** 1.810*** 0.079*** 0.079*** 0.159*** 
 (0.114) (0.189) (0.112) (0.137) (0.193) (0.012) (0.012) (0.010) 
Aqc -1.784*** -2.577*** -1.719*** -1.744*** -2.839*** -1.284*** -1.285*** -1.915*** 
 (0.191) (0.214) (0.118) (0.119) (0.155) (0.087) (0.087) (0.104) 
Divdum -0.055 -0.284*** 0.003 -0.012 -0.249*** 0.045 0.044 -0.184*** 
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my 
 (0.063) (0.054) (0.045) (0.046) (0.043) (0.028) (0.028) (0.027) 
Constant -0.353 -0.533*** -0.716*** -0.143 -0.702*** -0.768*** -0.752*** -0.639*** 
 (0.317) (0.181) (0.194) (0.291) (0.152) (0.098) (0.099) (0.086) 
Year Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y 
Firm Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y 
N 12,453 12,453 23,058 20,789 20,789 77,223 77,223 77,223 
adj. R-
sq 
0.807 0.493 0.781 0.789 0.506 0.754 0.754 0.453 
 
1.4.4.3 Multinational Diversification 
The U.S. tax code binds firms to pay extra taxes when they repatriate foreign 
earnings from lower tax ratio countries, therefore U.S. firms would rather to hold 
earnings abroad in form of foreign cash holdings if there are repatriation taxes, 
suggesting a positive relation between cash holdings and repatriation taxes (Fritz 
Foley et al. (2007)). Foreign earnings and domestic earnings are valued differently. 
Bodnar and Weintrop (1997) and Christophe (2002) find that the value relevance 
of foreign earnings in form of ERCs (earnings return coefficient) is higher than 
the value relevance of domestic earnings. Therefore, it may be that the relation of 
earnings transparency and cash holdings could be caused by repatriation tax costs. 
Although to my knowledge, there's no literature on the direct relation between 
earnings transparency and its geography distribution, to make the results more 
convincing, I run the main regressions using sample with only domestic firms to 
exclude the influence of foreign sales. And compare the results to results with 
multinational firms (hereafter, MNCs). Firms are identified as domestic firms or 
MNCs following the approach of Pinkowitz, Stulz, and Williamson (2016). 
“Domestic firms” are firms with no foreign sales firms in the current and previous 
3 years. MNCs are firms with more than 25% of its sales coming from outside its 
home country in any of the prior 3 years. The results are shown in table 10. 
Column (1) and column (2) are estimates for domestic firms. Column (1) and 
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column (2) are estimates for multinational firms. The dependent variable is cash 
over total assets in column (1) and (3). The dependent variable is log of cash over 
net assets in column (2) and (4). All estimates are made with OLS regression. The 
results show that the coefficient of earnings transparency is negative and 
significant no matter which subsample is used. What’s more, there is little 
difference in the magnitude of the effect between these two subsamples. These 
evidences indicate that the effect of earnings transparency on cash holdings is not 
dominated by whether firms are domestic or multinational. 
Table 10 Regressions of corporate cash holdings on earnings transparency within domestic 
and multinational subsamples 
This table presents estimates from regressions explaining firm level cash holdings within domestic 
firms and MNCs. “Domestic firms” are firms with no foreign sales firms in the current and 
previous 3 years. MNCs are firms with more than 25% of its sales coming from outside its home 
country in any of the prior 3 years. The sample includes observations available both in 
COMPUSTAT and CRSP from 1980 to 2013. The data requirements and the control variables are 
described in sample and variable description section. All variables are winsorized at 1% and 99% 
level. Columns (1) and (2) are for domestic firms; column (3), (4) are for MNCs. For columns (1) 
and (3), the dependent variable is measured as cash divided by total assets. For columns (2) and (4), 
the dependent variable is the log of cash over net assets. The independent variable is 1-year lagged 
earnings transparency. All regressions are OLS regressions including year and firm fixed effects. 
Standard errors are clustered at the firm level. Robust standard errors are under coefficients. 
Significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels is represented by ***, **, and *, respectively. 
 Domestic Firms MNCs 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
Variables Cash/AT log(
𝐶𝑎𝑠ℎ
𝑁𝐴𝑇
) Cash/AT log(
𝐶𝑎𝑠ℎ
𝑁𝐴𝑇
) 
Transt-1 -0.014*** -0.107** -0.014** -0.165*** 
 
(0.005) (0.051) (0.006) (0.052) 
MB 0.004*** 0.044*** 0.010*** 0.075*** 
 
(0.002) (0.014) (0.002) (0.012) 
RealSize 0.012*** 0.043 -0.005 -0.105*** 
 
(0.004) (0.040) (0.005) (0.038) 
CF 0.045*** 0.562*** 0.030 0.278* 
 
(0.016) (0.133) (0.022) (0.156) 
NWCAP -0.346*** -2.933*** -0.321*** -2.440*** 
 
(0.016) (0.147) (0.021) (0.178) 
CAPX -0.259*** -2.008*** -0.473*** -3.035*** 
 
(0.019) (0.195) (0.040) (0.341) 
Leverage -0.273*** -3.180*** -0.200*** -2.256*** 
 
(0.014) (0.147) (0.018) (0.160) 
Indsigma 0.017*** 0.087*** 0.050*** 0.274*** 
 
(0.004) (0.025) (0.017) (0.087) 
RD/sales  -0.175*** -0.988*** -0.230*** -1.514*** 
 
(0.016) (0.194) (0.018) (0.159) 
Aqc -0.114 0.344 -0.021 0.022 
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(0.071) (0.732) (0.066) (0.701) 
Divdummy 0.004 0.053 0.010 0.006 
 
(0.004) (0.053) (0.007) (0.064) 
Constant 0.370
*** -0.668 0.310*** -0.244 
 
(0.096) (1.072) (0.038) (0.289) 
Year Y Y Y Y 
Firm Y Y Y Y 
N 25,621 25,621 15,265 15,265 
adj. R-sq 0.832 0.778 0.828 0.800 
1.4.4.4 Other Information Asymmetry Measures 
Since earnings transparency affects cash holdings through the costs of equity due 
to information asymmetry related to earnings, it is natural to ask how the 
information asymmetry related to earnings differs from other information 
asymmetry measures in affecting cash holdings.  
Chung, Kim, Kim and Zhang (2015) use different information asymmetry 
measures to test the effect of information asymmetry on corporate cash holdings. 
The measures include PIN, price impact, adverse selection components of the 
spread, dispersion of analysts’ earnings forecasts and the number of analysts. 
They find that these information asymmetry measures has a negative effect on 
cash holdings, that is, firms with higher information asymmetry tend to hold less 
cash. The idea is that when information asymmetry is high, the shareholders may 
not want managers to hold large amount of cash because it is costly for them to 
monitor managerial actions. Different from the measures of information 
asymmetry above, earnings transparency is a proxy for the information asymmetry 
related to earnings. And different from their paper, it is found in this paper that 
earnings transparency has a negative effect on cash. Since both earnings 
transparency and the measures above are proxy of information asymmetry, I 
include bid-ask spread and numbers of analysts to see whether the effect of 
earnings transparency on cash holdings still hold. Table 11 shows the results that 
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when bid-ask spread and numbers of analysts are controlled, the coefficient of 
earnings transparency is still negative and significant. 
Table 11 Regression estimates controlling information asymmetry 
This table reports the results of regression cash on earnings transparency when information 
asymmetry measures, including bid-ask spread and number of analysts are controlled. The 
dependent variable is the natural log of cash over net assets. The independent variable is 1-year 
lagged earnings transparency. B-A spread is annualized bid ask spread.  #Analyst is the number of 
analysts following a firm. Other controls are the same as defined in previous tables. All regressions 
are OLS regressions including year and firm fixed effects. Standard errors are clustered at the firm 
level. Robust standard errors are under coefficients. Significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels is 
represented by ***, **, and *, respectively. 
 (1) (2) (3) 
VARIABLES log(Cash/Nat) log(Cash/Nat) log(Cash/Nat) 
Transt-1 -0.083** -0.071** -0.083*** 
 (0.033) (0.032) (0.025) 
B-A spread -0.050*** -0.060***  
 (0.017) (0.012)  
#Analyst -0.002  -0.008*** 
 (0.002)  (0.002) 
MB 0.067*** 0.059*** 0.067*** 
 (0.007) (0.006) (0.005) 
RealSize -0.167*** -0.150*** -0.044** 
 (0.028) (0.024) (0.018) 
CF 0.210*** 0.179** 0.236*** 
 (0.077) (0.072) (0.060) 
NWCAP -2.178*** -2.100*** -2.216*** 
 (0.116) (0.109) (0.077) 
CAPX -2.315*** -2.309*** -1.981*** 
 (0.221) (0.200) (0.127) 
Leverage -1.600*** -1.942*** -2.529*** 
 (0.104) (0.099) (0.074) 
Indsigma 0.554 0.903** 0.923*** 
 (0.451) (0.438) (0.324) 
RD/sales  0.023*** 0.019*** 0.032*** 
 (0.007) (0.007) (0.007) 
Aqc -1.206*** -1.058*** -0.955*** 
 (0.096) (0.095) (0.083) 
Divdummy -0.012 0.052 0.032 
 (0.038) (0.037) (0.026) 
Constant -0.630*** -0.799*** -1.469*** 
  (0.206) (0.177) (0.123) 
Year Y Y Y 
Firm Y Y Y 
N 32,523 38,209 73,466 
adj. R-sq 0.800 0.786 0.725 
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1.5 Heterogeneity Effect of Earnings Transparency on Cash Holdings 
The tests above show that the effect of earnings transparency on cash holdings is 
significantly negative, providing support of hypothesis 1. To identify the 
‘precautionary motive’ channel, hypothesis 1a further states the heterogeneity in 
the impact of earnings transparency on cash holdings, that is, the effects are more 
pronounced in firms that are more sensitive to costs of capital. As discussed in the 
hypothesis part, these firms are usually with higher market to book ratio, more 
R&D expenses and more financial constraints. 
To conduct the heterogeneity tests, in each year, the sample is divided into two 
subsamples based on market-to-book ratio, R&D over sale ratio and financial 
constraints measures respectively. A firm is assigned as a high growth (low 
growth firm) firm if its market-to-book ratio is higher (lower) than the market-to-
book ratio of the firm at the 70th (30th) percentile of the annual market-to-book 
ratio distribution. Similarly, a firm is assigned as a high R&D expenditure (low 
R&D expenditure) firm if R&D over sale ratio is higher (lower) than the R&D 
over sale ratio of the firm at the 70th (30th) percentile of the annual R&D over 
sale ratio distribution. I use six financial constraints measures: dividend payout 
ratio, firm size (sales adjusted to 1994 dollars), bond rating, commercial paper 
rating, SA index (Hadlock and Pierce (2010)), WW index (Whited and Wu 
(2006)). Specifically, the firms are grouped as financial constrained firms if 
dividend (previous year sales) is less than the 30th percentile value, and are 
grouped as financial unconstrained firms if dividend (previous year sales) is 
higher than the 70th percentile value. The firms are grouped as financial 
constrained firms if SA index (WW index) is less than the 30th percentile value, 
and are grouped as financial unconstrained firms if SA index (WW index)  is 
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higher than the 70th percentile value. And the firms are grouped as financial 
constrained firms if firms with positive debt do not have a bond rating 
(commercial paper rating), and are grouped as financial constrained firms if firms 
with positive debt have a bond rating (commercial paper rating). 
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Table 12 Heterogeneity in firms with different growth options and R&D expenses 
This table reports the estimates from cross-section regressions explaining firm level cash holdings 
using growth and RD expenditure subsamples. The sample includes observations available both in 
COMPUSTAT and CRSP from 1980 to 2013. The data requirements and the control variables are 
described in ‘sample’ and ‘variable description’ section. All variables are winsorized by 1% and 
99%. The growth subsamples are grouped based on market-to-book ratio. A firm is assigned as a 
high growth (low growth firm) firm if MB is higher (lower) than the MB of the firm at the 70th 
(30th) percentile of the annual MB distribution. Similarly, a firm is assigned as a high R&D 
expenditure (low R&D expenditure) firm if RD/Sales is higher (lower) than the RD/Sales of the 
firm at the 70th (30th) percentile of the annual RD/Sales distribution. Column (1) and column (2) 
are results of growth subsamples. Column (3) and column (4) are results of RD expenditure 
subsamples. The dependent variable in all regressions is the natural log of cash over net assets. The 
independent variable is 1-year lagged earnings transparency. All columns present estimates from 
OLS regressions including year and firm fixed effects with standard errors clustered at the firm 
level. The standard errors are under the coefficients. Significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels is 
represented by ***, **, and *, respectively. 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
 Market to book ratio RD/Sales 
 Low Growth High Growth Low R&D High R&D 
Variables log(
𝐶𝑎𝑠ℎ
𝑁𝐴𝑇
) log(
𝐶𝑎𝑠ℎ
𝑁𝐴𝑇
) log(
𝐶𝑎𝑠ℎ
𝑁𝐴𝑇
) log(
𝐶𝑎𝑠ℎ
𝑁𝐴𝑇
) 
Transt-1 -0.045 -0.179*** -0.076** -0.124*** 
 (0.058) (0.048) (0.038) (0.047) 
MB 0.434*** 0.046*** 0.106*** 0.059*** 
 (0.098) (0.007) (0.016) (0.007) 
RealSize -0.067* 0.011 -0.132*** 0.017 
 (0.039) (0.031) (0.028) (0.030) 
CF -0.044 0.241** 0.183 0.309*** 
 (0.199) (0.103) (0.138) (0.089) 
NWCAP -2.700*** -2.748*** -2.598*** -2.893*** 
 (0.157) (0.148) (0.128) (0.130) 
CAPX -2.130*** -3.746*** -2.085*** -3.327*** 
 (0.258) (0.243) (0.172) (0.247) 
Leverage -3.291*** -2.413*** -2.637*** -2.768*** 
 (0.153) (0.141) (0.113) (0.143) 
Indsigma 0.248 0.304 1.250*** -1.086 
 (0.725) (0.688) (0.472) (0.767) 
RD/sales  0.189** 0.068***  0.068*** 
 (0.095) (0.012)  (0.010) 
Aqc -0.828*** -2.619*** -0.873*** -2.122*** 
 (0.183) (0.179) (0.124) (0.147) 
Divdummy 0.049 0.056 0.047 0.055 
 (0.043) (0.060) (0.037) (0.057) 
Constant -1.337*** -0.709*** -1.169*** -0.447*** 
 (0.170) (0.115) (0.110) (0.113) 
Year Y Y Y Y 
Firm Y Y Y Y 
N 23,719 23,719 39,976 23,719 
adj. R-sq 0.768 0.809 0.700 0.794 
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Table 13 Regression estimates across groups of financially constrained and unconstrained firms 
This table presents regression estimates across groups of financially constrained and unconstrained firms. I use letter (C) for constrained firms and (U) for unconstrained 
firms. The whole sample includes observations available both in COMPUSTAT and CRSP from 1980 to 2013. The dependent variable is natural log of cash over net assets. 
The independent variable is 1-year lagged earnings transparency. All variables are calculated the same as in previous tables. All regressions are specified as OLS regressions 
with year and firm fixed effects with standard errors are clustered at firm level. The standard errors are under the coefficients. Significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels is 
represented by ***, **, and *, respectively. 
 Payout Ratio sale Bond Rating Commercial Paper Rating SA Constrain WW Constrain 
 UC C UC C UC C UC C UC C UC C 
Transt-1 -0.053 -0.173*** -0.071 -0.099* -0.083 -0.085** 0.017 -0.099*** -0.086** -0.158*** -0.080* -0.113* 
 
(0.051) (0.048) (0.045) (0.058) (0.051) (0.040) (0.082) (0.034) (0.043) (0.061) (0.043) (0.063) 
MB 0.109*** 0.066*** 0.101*** 0.053*** 0.133*** 0.090*** 0.067* 0.107*** 0.115*** 0.038*** 0.108*** 0.035*** 
 
(0.018) (0.009) (0.020) (0.009) (0.023) (0.009) (0.035) (0.009) (0.018) (0.009) (0.020) (0.009) 
RealSize -0.158*** -0.003 -0.255*** 0.131*** -0.349*** -0.014 -0.221*** -0.077*** -0.226*** 0.092** -0.304*** 0.031 
 
(0.041) (0.025) (0.035) (0.034) (0.041) (0.029) (0.079) (0.025) (0.035) (0.041) (0.034) (0.033) 
CF -0.514** 0.148 -0.259 0.103 -0.400 0.205** -1.071 0.186** 0.143 0.218** -0.412 0.148 
 
(0.238) (0.092) (0.270) (0.097) (0.291) (0.097) (0.657) (0.093) (0.214) (0.094) (0.284) (0.096) 
NWCAP -3.517*** -2.355*** -3.037*** -2.392*** -2.584*** -2.646*** -2.658*** -2.551*** -3.205*** -2.619*** -3.276*** -2.306*** 
 
(0.187) (0.113) (0.183) (0.140) (0.227) (0.120) (0.417) (0.110) (0.164) (0.140) (0.174) (0.142) 
CAPX -3.771*** -2.019*** -3.570*** -2.091*** -2.913*** -2.324*** -5.150*** -2.291*** -3.674*** -1.948*** -3.408*** -1.952*** 
 
(0.287) (0.196) (0.322) (0.224) (0.329) (0.198) (0.819) (0.173) (0.259) (0.239) (0.288) (0.238) 
Leverage -2.645*** -3.066*** -2.260*** -3.636*** -1.486*** -2.882*** -2.648*** -2.408*** -2.185*** -3.793*** -2.468*** -3.396*** 
 
(0.154) (0.115) (0.154) (0.156) (0.173) (0.114) (0.333) (0.096) (0.140) (0.164) (0.147) (0.155) 
Indsigma 0.377 0.965* 0.192 1.135 0.043 1.165** 0.470 0.855** 0.384 1.614* 0.098 0.978 
 
(0.599) (0.581) (0.549) (0.808) (0.587) (0.513) (0.866) (0.427) (0.498) (0.882) (0.518) (0.724) 
RD/sales  0.557 0.082*** 0.159 0.073*** -0.003 0.078*** 0.657 0.072*** 0.206*** 0.067*** -0.045 0.076*** 
 
(0.500) (0.016) (0.362) (0.015) (0.048) (0.017) (0.858) (0.015) (0.051) (0.012) (0.062) (0.013) 
Aqc -1.721*** -1.219*** -1.383*** -1.456*** -0.946*** -1.125*** -1.516*** -1.063*** -1.384*** -1.469*** -1.264*** -1.751*** 
 
(0.195) (0.147) (0.159) (0.209) (0.148) (0.121) (0.296) (0.100) (0.135) (0.251) (0.140) (0.246) 
Divdummy -0.082 0.054 -0.034 0.172*** -0.080 0.132*** -0.061 0.050 0.034 0.108* -0.071 0.158** 
 
(0.053) (0.053) (0.046) (0.058) (0.056) (0.042) (0.150) (0.035) (0.046) (0.060) (0.049) (0.072) 
Constant -0.316* -1.091*** -0.135 -1.129*** 0.268 -1.194*** -0.060 -1.111*** 0.117 -1.380*** 1.126*** -1.245*** 
 
(0.190) (0.107) (0.201) (0.139) (0.272) (0.118) (0.597) (0.112) (0.295) (0.223) (0.309) (0.194) 
Year Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y 
Firm Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y 
N 22,338 33,941 23,719 23,719 16,450 36,632 5,435 47,647 26,563 19,830 24,740 21,961 
adj. R-sq 0.783 0.792 0.740 0.813 0.709 0.774 0.701 0.750 0.690 0.832 0.703 0.812 
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The results of subsample analysis are reported in table 11 and table 12. To save 
space, I only tabulate the results with the log of cash over net assets as the 
dependent variable. The results are quite similar when use cash over total assets as 
dependent variable. In table 11, Columns (1) and (2) present the results based on 
subsamples sorted by market-to-book ratio; columns (3) and (4) present the results 
for subsamples based on R&D expenses. It is found that the impacts of earnings 
transparency are stronger in high growth firms and in firms with more R&D 
expenditure. In column (3), because low R&D group are all constituted by firms 
without any R&D expenditure, the coefficient of R&D is shown as missing. The 
economic magnitude is also larger for firms with more growth opportunity and 
more R&D expenditures. Table 12 reports the results of how financial constraint 
affects earnings transparency-cash holding relation. It is shown that the effects of 
earnings transparency are much stronger for financial constrained firms based on 
almost all the six proxies. These results support the hypothesis 1a4.  
1.6 The Value of Cash Holdings and Earnings Transparency 
I finally test how earnings transparency affects the value of cash. Faulkender and 
Wang (2006) find that the marginal value of cash depends on the potential 
distribution of cash. The possible distributions of cash include: 1) paying 
dividends, 2) servicing debt or other liabilities and 3) raising cash. They 
empirically show that cash increases firm value only when it is raised for 
immediate use. And they find that cash values more when firms have less cash, 
less leverage, more investment opportunities and more financial constraints. 
Based on their paper, if the main hypothesis in this paper is accurate, cash held by 
firms with lower earnings transparency have a higher value. The reason is that 
                                                          
4 When I use 50% threshold and 40%, 60% threshold to get the subsamples, similar results are 
obtained. 
44 
 
firms with lower earnings transparency hold more cash in order to avoid high 
costs of equity, which is the ‘raising cash’ type distribution in Faulkender and 
Wang (2006). Following the methodology of their paper, I test the relation 
between value of cash holdings and earnings transparency using the model below: 
ri,t − 𝑅𝑖,𝑡
𝐵  = r0 +  r1 ∗ Transi,t−1 + r2 ∗ Transi,t−1 ∗
∆𝐶𝑖,𝑡
𝑀𝑖,𝑡−1
+ r3 ∗
∆𝐶𝑖,𝑡
𝑀𝑖,𝑡−1
+ r4
∗
∆𝐸𝑖,𝑡
𝑀𝑖,𝑡−1
+ r5 ∗
∆𝑁𝐴𝑖,𝑡
𝑀𝑖,𝑡−1
+ r6 ∗
∆𝑅𝐷𝑖,𝑡
𝑀𝑖,𝑡−1
+ r7 ∗
∆𝐼𝑖,𝑡
𝑀𝑖,𝑡−1
+ r8 ∗
∆𝐷𝑖,𝑡
𝑀𝑖,𝑡−1
+ r9 ∗
𝐶𝑖,𝑡−1
𝑀𝑖,𝑡−1
+ r10 ∗
𝐿𝑖,𝑡
𝑀𝑖,𝑡−1
+ r11 ∗
𝐶𝑖,𝑡−1
𝑀𝑖,𝑡−1
∗
∆𝐶𝑖,𝑡
𝑀𝑖,𝑡−1
+ r11 ∗
𝐿𝑖,𝑡
𝑀𝑖,𝑡−1
∗
∆𝐶𝑖,𝑡
𝑀𝑖,𝑡−1
+ εi,t                         (4) 
,where C denotes for cash, E for earnings, NA for net assets, RD for research and 
development, I for interest, D for dividends, L for leverage, M for market value, 
∆X for the changes in the variable X. The dependent variable is the excess stock 
return (the stock return adjusted by the return of Fama French 25 portfolios based 
on BM ratio and size). The variable of interest is  r2 . All these variables are 
constructed following Faulkender and Wang (2006). 
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Table 14 Earnings transparency and the marginal value of cash holdings 
This table presents the results of regressions of the excess stock return on changes in firm 
characteristics. All variables except Lt, excess stock return and earnings transparency are deflated 
by the lagged market value of equity (Mt−1). Ct is cash plus marketable securities, Et is earnings 
before extraordinary items plus interest, deferred tax credits, and investment tax credits, and NAt is 
total assets minus cash holdings. It is interest expense. Total dividends (Dt) are measured as 
common dividends paid, Lt is market leverage. ∆Xt is compact notation for the 1-year change, Xt–
Xt−1. The subscript t means the value of the variable is at the end of fiscal year t. All columns 
present estimates from OLS regressions including year and firm fixed effects with standard errors 
clustered at the firm level. The standard errors are under the coefficients. Significance at the 1%, 
5%, and 10% levels is represented by ***, **, and *, respectively. 
 (1) (2) 
Variables 𝑟𝑖,𝑡 − 𝑅𝑖,𝑡
𝐵  𝑟𝑖,𝑡 − 𝑅𝑖,𝑡
𝐵  
      
Transt−1 -0.148
*** -0.132*** 
 (0.013) (0.013) 
 Transt−1*∆Ct  -0.742
*** 
  (0.147) 
∆Ct 0.822
*** 1.634*** 
 (0.031) (0.094) 
∆Et 0.511
*** 0.509*** 
 (0.018) (0.018) 
∆NAt 0.205
*** 0.203*** 
 (0.009) (0.009) 
∆RDt 0.696
*** 0.706*** 
 (0.199) (0.197) 
∆It -1.199
*** -1.182*** 
 (0.132) (0.132) 
∆Dt 0.900
*** 0.913*** 
 (0.217) (0.216) 
Ct−1 0.538
*** 0.519*** 
 (0.025) (0.025) 
Lt -0.854
*** -0.842*** 
 (0.019) (0.019) 
Ct−1*∆Ct  -0.562
*** 
  (0.092) 
Lt*∆Ct  -0.997
*** 
  (0.101) 
Constant 0.133*** 0.118*** 
 (0.014) (0.014) 
Year Y Y 
Firm Y Y 
N 56,249 56,249 
adj. R-sq 0.317 0.325 
 
Table 13 presents the estimations. The coefficient of earnings transparency is 
negative and significant, suggesting that firms with higher earnings transparency 
tend to have lower abnormal subsequent return and vice versa, consistent with 
BKL (2013). The coefficient of the interaction term of earnings transparency and 
cash holdings is negative, suggesting that the marginal value of cash is higher in 
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firms with lower earnings transparency and vice versa. This result indirectly 
verifies the main results that firms with lower earnings transparency hold more 
cash for precautionary motive. 
1.7 Conclusion 
In this paper, I provide a new determinant of cash holdings by investigating how 
earnings transparency affects corporate cash holdings. Earnings transparency is a 
new measure of earnings informativeness and is first proposed by BKL (2013). It 
is calculated as the adjusted R2 of regressing stock return on earnings and change 
in earnings. Higher R2 means higher explanation, indicating that larger part of 
stock return could be explained by the information contained in earnings. BKL 
(2013) further find that firms with higher earnings transparency are expected to be 
able to raise external financing with a lower cost because earnings transparency 
could reduce information asymmetries between management and investors. Since 
one important reason that firms hold cash is to protect firms from capital shortfall, 
firms that can raise capital at lower cost are expected less likely to be in trouble of 
capital dilemma and hence hold less cash, suggesting a negative relation between 
earnings transparency and cash holdings. This paper empirically verifies this 
argument. To address the endogeneity problem, I identify four omitted variables: 
accounting-based earnings quality, corporate governance, multinational 
diversification and information asymmetry measures such as bid-ask spread and 
number of analysts. I controlled these variables in the regression, finding that the 
main results are not significantly influenced. Additionally, the effect of earnings 
transparency on cash holdings is caused by precautionary motives of firms 
holding cash. This can be supported by the following evidence. First, this effect is 
stronger among firms with more growth opportunities, more R&D expenses and 
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more financial constraints. Second, the marginal value of cash holdings is higher 
in firms with lower earnings transparency.  
Since the information environment is changing across time, it is interesting to 
know how the effect of earnings transparency on cash holdings changes. The SOX 
Act mandated strict reforms to improve financial disclosures from corporations 
and prevent accounting fraud. So SOX could improve earnings transparency and 
enhance the information environment of firms. I did the test and the results are 
shown in Appendix C. It shows that the effect is more pronounced before 2002. 
The coefficient of Trans is negative and significant before 2002, and it is not 
significant at all after 2002. The reason maybe that since the earnings 
transparency is improved, it would not be an important factor for the investors to 
take into account to price firms’ stock. Or it is because that the earnings 
information is less important than before because there are more and more sources 
to get firm specific information.  
The limitation of this study is that the endogeneity problem is not well addressed. 
Because earnings transparency is quite abstract and there is few literature on this 
area, the determinants of earnings transparency is not well defined and it is not 
easy to find some exogenous variable or shock to address the endogeneity 
problem. 
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Chapter 2: Is Cash-Return relation risk induced? 
2.1 Introduction 
In the paper of Palazzo [2012, Cash holdings, risk, and expected returns, Journal 
of Financial Economics, 104(1), 162-185], a relation between cash holdings and 
expected return is built based on the precautionary motivation for firms to hold 
cash. The idea of his paper is that firms save assets as cash to avoid the costly 
external funding when cash flow is highly positively correlated with aggregate 
shocks, indicating firms tend to hold cash to hedge on risk (higher correlation 
between cash flow and aggregate shocks) and hence firms with more cash have 
higher subsequent returns to compensate on this risk. Empirically he shows the 
spread return of portfolios sorted by cash cannot be fully explained by Fama 
French three factors, suggesting that the risk captured by cash holdings is different 
from market systematic risk, small size risk and low value risk. His paper 
indicates cash can serve as a risk proxy (Simutin, 2010). However, although the 
paper does provide evidence that cash holdings can explain cross sectional 
variations in stock returns, whether this relation is risk induced is not 
sophisticatedly evidenced. 
Besides the rational asset pricing theory, behaviour finance is another important 
strand to explain the variation in stock returns. Researchers have found some 
anomalies with respect to accounting information, such as accrual anomaly (e.g., 
Sloan, 1996) and net operating assets (e.g., Hirshlefer et al., 2004), cannot be 
explained by rational theories. Instead, these anomalies are found to be attributed 
to mispricing caused by investors’ limits of attention on the information contained 
in these financial numbers. Cash is also a kind of financial information. From 
perspective of corporate finance, the amount of cash held by firms is subject to 
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two important reasons: financial constraints (e.g., Almeida, 2004) and agency 
problems (e.g., Jensen, 1986). The financial constraint story indicates positive 
impacts of large cash holdings, while the agency problem story indicates negative 
impacts. If the market participants cannot interpret the information indicated by 
cash precisely, they would misprice the stock, resulting in anomalies in 
subsequent periods when the mispricing is corrected. 
There are recently two papers trying to explain cash-return relation through 
mispricing channel. The ideas in these two papers are quite similar: investors 
overreact on the agency problems captured by high cash holdings and 
underestimate the stock value, so buying stocks with high cash holdings will get 
high subsequent stock returns. The first paper is by Li and Luo (2016), finding 
that cash-return relation is heavily influenced by investor sentiment since the 
relation is more pronounced after high sentiment periods and that cash-return 
relation is stronger when limits-to-arbitrage measured by transaction costs, 
institutional ownership and idiosyncratic volatility is higher. The second paper is 
the working paper by Lam et al. (2016) who find that cash-return relation is a 
surrogate for knowing mispricing and support a mispricing channel how cash 
holdings and stock returns are correlated. First, they find that the return 
predictability in cash holdings is subsumed by accruals and profitability effects 
and also by net operating assets effect. Second, they find that the positive relation 
strengthens when limits to arbitrage is more severe, indicating that cash-return 
relation is stronger within firms with severe mispricing phenomenon.  
The above two papers, especially the latter one, contradict with Palazzo’s paper 
since if cash can serve as a proxy for systematic risk, the predictability of cash on 
stock return should not be subsumed by any other variables. Therefore, whether 
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returns on high cash holdings are compensation of systematic risk is actually in 
debate. However there are very few papers to dissect the cash-return relation in 
the existing literature. Whether cash-return relation is risk induced is still an open 
empirical question. This paper tries to fill this gap by exploring the ability of cash 
to serve as a risk proxy using a systematic way that researchers have developed.  
The controversy about whether it is the risk or the equity characteristics that 
explains expected returns for a specific anomaly has been studied since 1990s. For 
example, Daniel and Titman (1997) argue that it is the size and book-to-market 
characteristics rather than the loadings on SMB and HML that affect expected 
returns. Davis et al. (2000) find that risk factors explain expected returns better 
than characteristics when the sample periods is large and their test covers period 
from 1926 to 1997, compared to that of Daniel and Titman’s (1997) which covers 
from 1963 to 1997. Core et al. (2008) test whether the accruals quality is a priced 
risk factor. Mohanram et al. (2009) test whether PIN factor is priced. Hirshleifer et 
al. (2012) test whether the accrual anomaly is because of risk or mispricing. The 
methodologies used to test whether a factor is a risk factor are quite mature and 
systematic.  
Following these papers, I use several common used methods to test whether 
CASH can serve as a risk proxy in explaining the cross sectional variations of 
stock returns. First, I construct the cash factor, LMS (large amount minus small 
amount), by taking a long position on firms with large amount of cash holdings 
and taking a short position on firms with small amount of cash holdings. The 
mean monthly time-series premium for the LMS of 0.27% and is statistically 
different from zero with a significance level of 95%. 
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Then I use a two-stage cross sectional regression method (2SCSR).  In the first 
stage, it estimates factor betas and in the second stage, estimates the factor risk 
premiums. Under the rational factor pricing explanation of cash holding anomaly, 
expected returns are determined by a stock’s cash factor loadings. If cash affects 
stock returns because of systematic risk it captures, the risk premium on cash 
factor loadings should be positive and significant. However, it is found that the 
coefficient on LMS loadings is positive but is not significant. 
In addition to the 2SCSR tests, I also use several other approaches that are used in 
the literature. One such test is to examine whether LMS can predict future GDP 
growth. This methodology have been used by Chen (1991), Liew and Vassalou 
(2000), Chordia and Shivakumar (2006) and Mohanram and Rajgopal (2009) to 
test whether the Fama–French factors, price momentum and PIN are proxies for 
risk factors. Since GDP growth contains information of investment opportunities 
of the whole economy, if a risk factor represents the premium on systematic risk, 
i.e., compensation on the risk to the whole economy rather than some particular 
firms or industries, it should have a positive association with future GDP growth 
rate. However, in the context of this paper, the results show that there’s no such 
association between LMS and GDP growth rate. 
At last, I test whether LMS or LMS loadings affect the expected costs of capital. 
Compare with subsequent realized stock returns, ex-ante expected costs of capital 
are estimated using existing accounting information. Since ex-ante costs of capital 
have shown to be positively related to risk, correlation between LMS or LMS 
loadings and ex-ante costs of equity is a necessary condition to conclude that LMS 
and LMS loadings reflect systematic risk. Again, I couldn’t find empirical 
evidence of this. 
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Overall, I interpret these results shown in this paper as documenting that based on 
the tests of rational asset pricing framework, cash cannot serve as a proxy of 
systematic risk. 
This paper shed lights on the literature of cash anomaly. The topic on how cash 
holdings affect expected returns has drawn considerable attentions in the past 
several years. Excess cash holdings (Simutin, 2010), the level of cash holdings 
(Palazzo, 2012) and the change in cash holdings (Sodjahin, 2013) are found to 
have a positive relation with expected stock returns. Specifically, Simutin (2010) 
find that as a proxy for unexpected investment growth option, excess cash is 
positively associated with expected returns. Palazzo (2012) develops a rational 
model to show the positive relation between cash holdings and expected returns 
based on its relation with cash flow risk. Sodjahin (2013) argues that the change in 
cash holding is a proxy of the coming investment opportunity and the high return 
is a compensation for the risk that accompanies the new investment opportunity. 
Although they try to explain cash-return relation from a perspective of rational 
asset pricing theory that firms hold cash for future investment options, they didn’t 
provide solid evidence on this with reasonable asset pricing methods. What’s 
more, there are papers shown that cash-return relation is caused by investors’ 
misinterpretation of the information contained in cash holdings (Li and Luo 2016, 
Lam et al. 2016). In this study, I explore in further by asking whether there is a 
pervasive systematic factor with respect to cash holdings directly associated with 
return variability. 
In the next section, I describe the sample and replicate table 4 and table 5 in 
Palazzo’s paper. Section 3 reports the construction of LMS factor and its 
correlation with existing Fama and French factors. Section 4 shows the results of 
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two-stage cross sectional regressions. Section 5 tests the correlation between cash 
and future GDP growth. Section 6 reports the relation between ex-ante cost of 
equity and LMS/LMS loading. Section 7 concludes. 
2.2 Replication and Extension of Palazzo’s paper 
2.2.1 Data and Variables 
Stock price, stock return and shares of common outstanding are taken from Center 
for Research in Securities Prices (CRSP) monthly return file; quarterly financial 
data are obtained from Compustat Quarterly; monthly risk-free interest rate, the 
three Fama French factors (RM-RF, SMB, and HML) and momentum factor 
returns (UMD) are gotten through Kenneth French’s website. The sample is based 
on all NYSE/AMEX and NASDAQ firms with available data from both CRSP 
and Compustat quarterly with a period from July 1972 to December 2015. I filter 
and merge the datasets following the criteria below, most of which is borrowed 
from Palazzo’s paper (Plazzo, 2012): 1) the data from CRSP and Compustat 
Quarterly are merged by PERMNO; 2) the first six digits of Compustat 
Committee on Uniform Security Identification Procedures (CUSIP) must be same 
with the first six digits of the CRSP CUSIP code or the CRSP name CUSIP 
(NCUSIP) code; 3) only ordinary common shares (share codes 10 and 11 in CRSP) 
are considered; 4) observations related to suspended, halted, or non-listed shares 
(exchange codes lower than 1 and higher than 3 are excluded) ; 5) stocks in the 
sample should have reported returns for at least 24 months in 5 years prior to 
portfolio formation; 6) utility firms (SIC codes between 4900 and 4949) and 
financial firms (SIC codes between 6000 and 6999) are excluded; 7) observations 
with a negative book-to-market ratio or a negative cash-to-assets ratio are 
excluded from the sample. 
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For the measurements, cash holding is calculated as cash and short term 
investments (item CHE) over total assets (item AT). Size is the market value of 
stock at portfolio formation. Book equity is stockholder’s equity (item SEQQ), or 
common equity (item CEQQ) plus preferred stock par value (item PSTKQ), or 
asset (item ATQ) minus liabilities (item LTQ)) plus balance sheet deferred taxes 
and investment tax credit(item TXDITCQ) minus the book value of preferred 
stock (item PSTKRQ, or PSTKQ if PSTKRQ is not available). The book to-
market ratio is calculated by dividing book equity by market capitalization 
measured at portfolio formation. Return is adjusted using delisting return on 
delisting day.  
2.2.2 Replication of Palazzo’s paper 
To make this study comparable to Palazzo’s, in this section, I replicate the results 
of the portfolio characteristics and spread of return by one-way sort (table 3 and 
table 4) in his paper. Palazzo (2012) shows that cash holdings could explain the 
cross sectional variation in excess return that cannot be explained by existing 
models such as classic capital asset pricing model (CAPM), Fama and French 
(1992) three factor model.  
In particular, in table 3, Palazzo uses data over the periods from July 1972 to 
December 2009 and classifies the sample into 10 deciles in each month based on 
cash over total assets. In table 4, for portfolio construction, instead of rebalancing 
annually with annual accounting data, he constructs the portfolios based on 
quarterly accounting data. Following his paper, I use the quarterly accounting data 
available in month t in portfolio sorts starting at time t+i+1 if there has been an 
earnings announcement (item RDQ) in month t+i. For example, the first fiscal 
quarterly financial report (end in March) is announced on May 20, year t, then 
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these data are used to form portfolios starting from June, year t. I don’t require i to 
be 1, 2 or 3 in order to make the sample more continuous in monthly frequency. 
For example, the first fiscal quarterly financial report (end in March) is announced 
on July 20, year t, then these data are used to form portfolios starting from August, 
year t, although the interval between March to August is 5 months. If RDQ is 
missing, I use the accounting data from the latest fiscal quarter that at least six 
months prior to portfolio formation. If financial reports of two consecutive 
quarters are announced in the same month, I will use the latest quarter to sort the 
portfolio. For example, the financial reports of the first and second fiscal quarter 
in year t are announced on July 5, year t and July 20, year t, then I’ll use the 
information of the second quarter to sort the portfolio which starts in August, year 
t. 
I first show the results based on a period exactly same with Palazzo’s, i.e. from 
July 1972 to December 2009. Then I extend the sample period to 2015 since more 
data are available now and moreover this also could test the robustness and 
pervasiveness of the positive relation between return and cash holdings.  
Table 1 Characteristics of the ten cash-to-assets portfolios 
This table reports the average and median value (in the squared brackets) of the time series value 
of cross sectional mean values of firm characteristics across the ten portfolios which are 
rebalanced monthly based on cash over total assets. Column (1) to column (5) is summary 
statistics over periods from July 1972 to December 2009, which is the same as the time window in 
Palazzo’s paper. Column (6) to column (10) is the statistics of the period from July 1972 to 
December 2015. For the portfolio construction, I use the quarterly accounting data available in 
month t in portfolio sorts starting at time t+i+1 if there has been an earnings announcement (item 
RDQ) in month t+i. N is the average firm number contained in each portfolio. CAR is cash over 
total assets. Market size is the market value of stock at portfolio formation. Book equity is 
stockholder’s equity (item SEQQ), or common equity (item CEQQ) plus preferred stock par value 
(item PSTKQ), or asset (item ATQ) minus liabilities (item LTQ)) plus balance sheet deferred taxes 
and investment tax credit(item TXDITCQ) minus the book value of preferred stock (item 
PSTKRQ, or PSTKQ if PSTKRQ is not available). The BM (book to-market ratio) is calculated by 
dividing book equity by market capitalization measured at portfolio formation. Beta is the post-
rank beta which is calculated with full period sample. Beta is the post-rank beta following Fama 
and French (1992).  
 
 
 
 
56 
 
Portfolio 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)  (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) 
Palazzo’s paper: Jul. 1972 to Dec. 2009  My statistics: Jul. 1972 to Dec. 2015 
N CAR BM Market Size Beta  N CAR BM Market Size Beta 
1 244 0.00 1.13 832.79 1.01  234 0.00 1.09 1132.63 1.02 
  0.00 1.00 587.62 0.97   0.00 0.98 759.53 1.02 
2 244 0.01 1.11 1320.81 1.03  234 0.01 1.07 2079.96 1.04 
  0.01 1.02 577.24 1.01   0.01 0.97 1083.30 1.04 
3 244 0.02 1.10 1525.62 1.04  234 0.03 1.05 2427.21 1.06 
  0.02 0.98 921.98 1.02   0.02 0.93 1491.52 1.05 
4 244 0.04 1.07 1415.38 1.07  234 0.04 1.02 2136.87 1.08 
  0.03 0.96 749.23 1.04   0.03 0.90 958.81 1.08 
5 244 0.06 1.01 1430.08 1.08  234 0.07 0.97 2097.51 1.10 
  0.05 0.92 858.42 1.06   0.05 0.87 1071.79 1.11 
6 244 0.09 0.96 1581.96 1.11  234 0.10 0.91 2372.43 1.12 
  0.08 0.89 755.40 1.08   0.08 0.84 1134.17 1.12 
7 244 0.14 0.88 1274.50 1.16  234 0.15 0.84 2076.74 1.17 
  0.13 0.80 733.26 1.11   0.13 0.76 888.96 1.14 
8 244 0.21 0.82 999.07 1.20  234 0.22 0.79 1485.63 1.20 
  0.20 0.72 569.60 1.11   0.21 0.69 683.50 1.13 
9 244 0.32 0.74 885.47 1.25  234 0.33 0.71 1308.09 1.25 
  0.31 0.65 481.64 1.12   0.32 0.61 616.92 1.16 
10 244 0.55 0.66 459.47 1.28  234 0.58 0.62 762.25 1.29 
  0.59 0.60 332.78 1.16   0.60 0.56 372.24 1.26 
 
Table 1 presents the results of the summary statistics of firm characteristics. 
Columns from (1) to (5) are over period from July 1972 to December 2009. 
Compared to Palazzo’s paper, all the statistics are quite similar. In particular, book 
to market ratio, market value are decreasing with cash holdings, while post-rank 
market beta is increasing with cash holdings. This is also consistent with intuition 
that firms with more growth options, smaller size and more risk exposure tend to 
hold more cash. Columns from (6) to (10) report the summary over period from 
July 1972 to December 2015. The correlations between cash and book to market 
ratio, market value, post-rank beta are identical across these two different time 
windows.  
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Table 2 Equity returns and risk-adjusted returns across the ten cash-to-assets portfolios 
This table reports average monthly excess returns (Ret-Rf), average monthly market risk adjusted 
return (Alpha), and average monthly Fama French three-factor alphas (Alpha) of equal-weighed 
and value-weighted cash holding decile portfolios. Each month, all common stocks are sorted into 
deciles using the cash holding breakpoints of the NYSE stock sample. Panel A reports results 
within a period from July 1972 to December 2009 which are comparable to Palazzo (2012). Panel 
B are the estimates within a more recent period that is within a period from January 1980 to 
December 2015, which is also the sample period for the later tests. The portfolios are held for one 
month. Returns and alphas are in percentage terms.  
Panel A Equity returns and risk-adjusted returns across the ten cash-to-assets portfolios 
during July 1972 to Dec. 2009 
 Equally Weighted  Value-weighted 
 CH1 CH5 CH10 ∆CH  CH1 CH5 CH10 ∆CH 
Panel A.1 Excess return 
𝑟𝑖
𝑒  0.527 0.944 1.323 0.796  0.421 0.470 0.752 0.331 
𝑡𝑟𝑖
𝑒 1.79 3.06 3.4 3.22  1.72 1.88 1.97 1.11 
Panel A.2 Market risk adjusted return 
      α 0.078 0.452 0.762 0.684  0.002 0.030 0.158 0.156 
𝑡α 0.38 2.42 2.45 2.24  0.02 0.34 0.62 0.54 
𝛽MKT 1.040 1.141 1.301 0.261  0.973 1.021 1.378 0.405 
𝑡𝛽MKT 15.37 18.6 18.22 2.46  27.89 21.2 15.49 3.64 
Panel A.3 FF three factor risk adjusted return 
      α -0.346 0.120 0.857 1.203  -0.059 -0.066 0.574 0.633 
𝑡α -2.79 1.14 3.48 4.21  -0.43 -0.77 2.9 2.59 
𝛽MKT 1.017 1.068 0.971 -0.046  1.004 1.048 1.063 0.059 
𝑡𝛽MKT 27.84 29.26 17.79 -0.63  32.01 23.42 17.23 0.72 
𝛽SMB 0.888 0.940 1.290 0.402  -0.029 0.056 0.622 0.650 
𝑡𝛽SMB 8.4 9.27 13.51 2.19  -0.37 0.84 7.63 4.48 
𝛽HML 0.588 0.415 -0.408 -0.996  0.113 0.159 -0.856 -0.969 
𝑡𝛽HML 6.74 5.28 -4.36 -6.72  1.47 2.77 -11.87 -7.77 
Panel B equity returns and risk-adjusted returns across the ten cash-to-assets portfolios 
during Jan. 1980 to Dec. 2015 
 Equally Weighted  Value-weighted 
 CH1 CH5 CH10 ∆CH  CH1 CH5 CH10 ∆CH 
Panel B.1 Excess return 
𝑟𝑖
𝑒  0.592 0.965 1.330 0.737  0.470 0.578 0.806 0.336 
𝑡𝑟𝑖
𝑒 2.2 3.47 3.77 3.27  2.12 2.54 2.35 1.26 
Panel B.2 Market risk adjusted return 
      α 0.042 0.368 0.653 0.611  -0.037 0.041 0.097 0.134 
𝑡α 0.22 2.19 2.38 2.24  -0.33 0.54 0.43 0.52 
𝛽MKT 1.054 1.143 1.296 0.242  0.971 1.027 1.358 0.387 
𝑡𝛽MKT 17.31 20.73 20.26 2.55  30.81 23.75 16.95 3.87 
Panel B.3 FF three factor risk adjusted return 
      α -0.300 0.118 0.759 1.059  -0.095 -0.030 0.459 0.553 
𝑡α -2.54 1.29 3.5 4.08  -0.78 -0.39 2.53 2.49 
𝛽MKT 1.016 1.055 0.972 -0.044  1.000 1.048 1.065 0.066 
𝑡𝛽MKT 30.54 31.13 19.44 -0.66  34.88 25.96 19.02 0.88 
𝛽SMB 0.876 0.914 1.296 0.420  -0.017 0.046 0.628 0.645 
𝑡𝛽SMB 8.97 9.62 14.17 2.45  -0.23 0.73 8.1 4.68 
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𝛽HML 0.593 0.393 -0.408 -1.001  0.124 0.143 -0.851 -0.975 
𝑡𝛽HML 7.25 5.29 -4.64 -7.21  1.69 2.57 -12.3 -8.22 
 
Table 2 presents the results of the difference in excess and risk adjusted returns 
between top and bottom deciles for both the equally weighted and value-weighted 
portfolios. Panel A reports the results over period from July 1972 to December 
2009. Panel A.1, A.2 and A.3 report excess return, excess returns adjusted by 
CAPM model and excess return adjusted by Fama and French (1992) three factor 
model respectively.  
The results are similar to Palazzo’s paper in all respects. Firstly, the difference in 
excess returns, excess return adjusted by CAPM model and excess return adjusted 
by Fama and French (1992) three factor model between the top and bottom cash-
to-assets deciles are all positive. For equally weighted portfolios, all return 
spreads are statistically significant, but for value weighted portfolios, only Fama 
French three-factor adjusted return spread is statistically significant. The 
magnitudes are also similar to his paper. For example, panel A.1 shows that the 
excess return is 0.796% per month for equally weighted and 0.331% for value 
weighted, comparable to 0.69% and 0.38% respectively in palazzo’s paper. 
Secondly, differences in loadings on market size, growth options which is 
reported in panel A.3 are positive and significantly different from zero for both the 
equally weighted and the value-weighted portfolios. When the sample is extended 
to December 2015, all results remain similar. 
2.3 Construction and Summary Statistics for Factor returns 
So far, I have replicated palazzo’s paper and shown that the results are quite 
similar to theirs’, indicating that the following results are comparable and 
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suggestive to his arguments. In this section, I construct the cash factor using the 
same sample obtained in the section 2. 
2.3.1 The Construction of LMS 
Following the construction approach of Fama and French three factors, I create 
the cash-based factor which I call LMS (large amount minus small amount) as a 
zero-investment factor-mimicking portfolio. LMS is formed based on cash and 
size groups via independent sorts. In particular, in each month, all stocks with 
non-missing size, non-missing cash and positive book equity value are assigned 
into two size groups (S or B) based on whether the value of size is smaller or 
larger than the median value of their NYSE breakpoints. Also in each month, all 
stocks are sorted independently into three cash portfolios (S, M, or L) based on the 
30% and 70% NYSE breakpoints. Taking intersections of two size portfolios and 
three cash portfolios, I form six portfolios which are called S/S, S/M, S/L, B/S, 
B/M, and B/L. The value-weighted monthly returns of these six portfolios are 
calculated for each month. The cash factor ‘LMS’ (large amount-small amount) is 
the difference between the weighted average of the returns on the two large 
amounts of cash portfolios (S/L and B/L) and the equal-weighted average of the 
returns on the two small amounts of cash portfolios (S/S and B/S): (S/L + B/L)/2- 
(S/S + B/S)/2.
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Table 3 Time series relationship between cash factor (LMS) and Fama-French factors 
The table documents summary statistics (Panels A), the correlations among the three Fama and 
French (1993) factors and the cash factor (LMS) (Panels B) and time series relationship between 
LMS and Fama-French five factors computed at the monthly level from July 1972 to December 
2015. Rm-Rf is the excess return on the market portfolio. SMB is the return to size factor-
mimicking portfolio. HML is the return to book-to-market factor-mimicking portfolio. RMW is 
return to operating profitability factor-mimicking portfolio. CMA is return to investment factor-
mimicking portfolio. UMD is return to momentum factor-mimicking portfolio. LMS is the return 
to the cash holding factor-mimicking portfolio. The construction of the cash holding portfolio is 
explained in the text. The returns in Panel A are shown in percentages. Panel B contains the time-
series correlations between the factor portfolios over the sample period. Figures below (above) the 
diagonal are Pearson (Spearman rank-order) correlations. Panel C presents the time series 
relationship between LMS and Fama-French five factors and also momentum factor. 
Panel A summary statistics 
Factor N Mean Std Dev t Value     
Rm-Rf 522 0.522 4.577 2.61     
SMB 522 0.165 3.124 1.21     
HML 522 0.368 2.986 2.81     
RMW 522 0.262 2.363 2.53     
CMA 522 0.344 1.980 3.97     
UMD 522 0.699 4.449 3.59     
LMS 522 0.274 2.884 2.17     
Panel B Correlations 
  Rm-Rf SMB HML RMW CMA UMD LMS  
mkt_rf 1 0.259 -0.330 -0.232 -0.339 -0.107 0.196  
 <.0001 <.0001 <.0001 <.0001 0.0147 <.0001  
SMB 0.271 1 -0.150 -0.297 -0.120 -0.014 0.164  
<.0001  0.0006 <.0001 0.006 0.7461 0.0002  
HML -0.318 -0.235 1 -0.091 0.686 -0.101 -0.536  
<.0001 <.0001  0.0371 <.0001 0.0205 <.0001  
RMW -0.256 -0.450 0.206 1 -0.153 0.149 -0.216  
<.0001 <.0001 <.0001  0.0004 0.0007 <.0001  
CMA -0.389 -0.125 0.700 0.040 1 -0.002 -0.351  
<.0001 0.0043 <.0001 0.3593  0.9681 <.0001  
UMD -0.143 -0.005 -0.166 0.094 0.019 1 0.073  
0.0011 0.9162 0.0001 0.0309 0.6569  0.095  
LMS 0.208 0.357 -0.633 -0.570 -0.391 0.123 1  
<.0001 <.0001 <.0001 <.0001 <.0001 0.005   
Panel C Time-series regression of Cash Factor on other factors 
Model  LMS=α+β(rm-rf)+s SMB+h HML+ m UMD+ r RMW +c CMA+εi 
Model α β s h m r c Adj. R2 (%) 
3-factor 0.464 -0.027 0.212 -0.572    0.444 
 4.82 -1.2 6.67 -16.96     
4-factor 0.451 -0.024 0.212 -0.567 0.014   0.444 
 4.58 -1.05 6.66 -16.39 0.62    
5-factor 0.664 -0.065 0.023 -0.526  -0.579 -0.043 0.607 
 7.98 -3.31 0.82 -13.71  -15.28 -0.72  
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2.3.2 Summary Statistics of LMS and Fama-French Factors 
The summary statistics of Fama French factors and cash factor is reported in panel 
A of table 3. The sample consists of 522 monthly time-series return over period of 
July 1972 to December 2015. The mean monthly time-series return to LMS is 
0.27%, indicating a mean annual risk premium of about 3.24%. The return to 
LMS is different from zero with a significance level of 95%. The modest 
significance of risk premium does not provide strong evidence that cash is priced 
(Shanken and Weinstein, 2006). 
Panel B of Table 3 reports the correlations between Fama French 5 factors, 
momentum factor and cash factor. The correlation table shows that the cash factor, 
i.e. LMS is positively related to market risk factor and size factor and negatively 
correlated with market to book ratio factor, investment factor and profitability 
factor. As for the magnitude, LMS is highly correlated with HML(r=-0.633) and 
RMW (r=-0.570), modestly correlated with SMB and CMA, and have low 
correlations with market risk premium(r=0.208) and UMD (r=0.123).  
2.3.3 Time-series Regression of LMS on Fama-French Factors 
Note that statistically significant spreads on cash are not sufficient evidence that 
cash is a priced risk factor since LMS may be subsumed by the existing Fama–
French risk factors. Therefore, I test whether LMS is subsumed by regressing 
LMS on Fama and French 3 factors, 4 factors and 5 factors respectively. The idea 
is that if LMS can be fully explained by other factors, the estimated intercept 
which represents the unexplained part should be insignificant. Specifically, the 
model is as following:  
LMS𝑡 = 𝛼 + 𝛽(𝑅𝑚 − 𝑅𝑓)𝑡 + 𝑠SMB𝑡 + ℎHML𝑡 + 𝑚UMD𝑡 + 𝑟RMW𝑡 + 𝑐CMA𝑡 +
ε𝑡. 
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The results are reported in Panel C, table 3. Overall, Panel C provides several 
implications. First, the intercept is significant in all model specifications, 
suggesting LMS can explain the variation in stock return that cannot be captured 
by existing factors. Second, UMD has little to do with LMS since the coefficient 
of UMD is insignificant and the adjusted R-square doesn’t increase at all when 
UMD is augmented. Third, LMS is highly correlated with HML and RMW both 
in magnitude and in significance. This is consistent with the argument from 
corporate perspective, that, firms higher investment opportunity (lower book to 
market ratio), less profitability (more financial constraints) tend to hold more cash. 
Fourth, the explanation power increased from 44.4% of regression of LMS on 
Fama and French 3 factors to 60.7% of regression of LMS on Fama and French 5 
factors.  
2.3.4 Factor Loadings in Three-factor and Five-factor Models 
From the last subsection, we know that LMS has little correlation to do with UMD, 
so in the rest tests, I use Fama and French 3 factor model and 5 factor model 
instead of the four factor model.  
In this subsection, I investigate the effects of cash on contemporaneous equity 
returns, as manifest in the factor loadings and explanatory power of three-factor 
(the market risk premium, size premium, and value premium) and five-factor (the 
market risk premium, size premium, value premium, profitability premium and 
investment premium) asset-pricing models augmented with LMS. The models are 
illustrated as below: 
𝑅𝑖,𝑡 − 𝑅𝑓,𝑡 = 𝛼 + 𝛽(𝑅𝑚,𝑡 − 𝑅𝑓,𝑡) + 𝑠𝑆𝑀𝐵𝑡 + ℎ𝐻𝑀𝐿𝑡 + 𝑙𝐿𝑀𝑆𝑡 + 𝜀𝑡 
𝑅𝑖,𝑡 − 𝑅𝑓,𝑡 = 𝛼 + 𝛽(𝑅𝑚,𝑡 − 𝑅𝑓,𝑡) + 𝑠𝑆𝑀𝐵𝑡 + ℎ𝐻𝑀𝐿𝑡 + 𝑐𝐶𝑀𝐴𝑡 + 𝑟𝑅𝑀𝑊 +
𝑙𝐿𝑀𝑆𝑡 + 𝜀𝑡. 
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I begin by estimating the above two models for each of the 10565 firms with at 
least 18 monthly returns between July 1972 and December 2015. Then I take 
means of coefficient estimates and t-statistics for the 10565 regressions. If LMS 
proxy for new factor premium, it should have a significant effect on explaining the 
variations in returns. The coefficient of LMS should be positive and significant, 
and the explanatory power should be enhanced after LMS is augmented into these 
models.  
Table 4 Firm specific regressions of contemporaneous excess return on factor returns 
This table reports average coefficient estimates and average R2 of 10491 time-series regressions of 
monthly contemporaneous firm level excess stock returns (stock return minus the risk-free rate) on 
the Fama–French factors and LMS (the cash factor). The first two columns are the estimates of 
Fama French 3 factors and cash factor, and the last two columns are the estimates of Fama French 
5 factors and cash factor. Rm-Rf is the excess return on the market portfolio. SMB is the return to 
size factor-mimicking portfolio. HML is the return to book-to-market factor-mimicking portfolio. 
RMW is return to operating profitability factor-mimicking portfolio. CMA is return to investment 
factor-mimicking portfolio. UMD is return to momentum factor-mimicking portfolio. LMS is the 
return to the cash holding factor-mimicking portfolio. The data period is from July 1972 to 
December 2015. The firms included in the sample need to have at least 18 months data during the 
whole period. 
 (1)  (2)  (3)  (4)  
 3 factor model augmented with LMS 5 factor model augmented with LMS 
 Coef. t-stat Coef. t-stat Coef. t-stat Coef. t-stat 
Intercept -0.086 -2.8 -0.087 -2.65 0.123 3.25 0.101 2.49 
Rm-Rf 1.017 108.03 0.991 101.53 0.945 84.26 0.933 81.49 
SMB 1.016 73.66 0.994 71.1 0.967 63.84 0.958 62.37 
HML 0.111 6.84 0.139 7.12 0.097 4.4 0.097 4 
RMW 
  
  -0.316 -11.89 -0.310 -11.17 
CMA 
    
-0.106 -3.31 -0.095 -2.92 
LMS 
  
-0.030 -1.35 
  
-0.055 -2.4 
R2 0.192 0.212  0.230 
 
0.248 
 N 10565  10565  10565 10565 
 
Table 4 presents the estimates of time-series regressions of stock excess returns on 
contemporaneous factor returns on firm level. Column (1) reports the estimates of 
Fama and French three-factor model. Column (3) reports the estimates of Fama 
and French five-factor model. Column (2) and column (4) are results when LMS 
is included.  
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The estimates under all model specifications show that all the Fama French factor 
loadings are significant at 99% level. For explanatory power, column (1) and 
column (3) show that the three factors and five factors explain an average of 19.2% 
and 23% of the total variation in the sample firms’ excess returns. The rest 
columns report the mean coefficient estimates and statistics for regressions when 
LMS is included. Column (2) shows that the coefficient of LMS is negative with 
t-statistics of -1.35. Column (4) shows that the coefficient of LMS is negative with 
t-statistics of -2.4. What’s more, the coefficients of other factors do not change 
much, and for explanatory power, when LMS is included, the figure of both 
models increases by around 2%. All these indicate LMS provides limited 
information in explaining stock return. 
2.4 The Two-stage Cross-sectional Regression (2SCSR) 
So far, I have shown that the cash premium ‘LMS’ is positive and marginally 
significant; LMS is not subsumed to other factors; LMS have limited power in 
explaining the variations in stock return time serially. In this section, I test 
whether the LMS is a priced risk factor using a two-stage cross-sectional 
regression approach (2SCSR). This method has been applied by previous papers 
to test whether a candidate variable is a priced risk factor. For example, Daniel 
and Titman (1997) use this method to test whether size and book to market ratio 
are priced; Core and Guay (2008) use this approach to test whether accrual quality 
is priced; Mohanram et al. (2009) use this approach to test whether PIN is priced. 
To apply this method, I first estimate factor loadings for LMS and other risk 
factors. Then I run a cross-sectional regression of returns on factor loadings to test 
whether the factor loadings can predict returns. Since Fama and French (1992) 
show that the estimated factor loadings for individual stocks are noisy, and it will 
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cause bias if use noisy factor loadings in Fama–Macbeth regression. To mitigate 
this concern, following previous studies (Khan, 2008), I do the tests at portfolio 
level instead of firm level. 
2.4.1 The First Stage: Estimate Factor Loadings 
In the first stage, I estimate factor loading by regression the excess return of a 
portfolio on Fama and French factors and LMS. LMS is defined as the equally 
weighted average of the value-weighted hedge returns (high CASH–low CASH) 
for two size groups. I conduct this analysis both for the Fama–French 3-factor 
model (Rm–Rf, SMB, HML) augmented with LMS, as well as for the Fama–
French 5-factor model (Rm–Rf, SMB, HML, RMW, CMA) augmented with LMS. 
Specifically, the models are shown below. 
𝑅𝑃,𝑡 − 𝑅𝐹,𝑡 = 𝑏0 + 𝑏𝑞,𝑅𝑀,𝑡−𝑅𝐹,𝑡(𝑅𝑀,𝑡 − 𝑅𝐹,𝑡) + 𝑏𝑝,𝑆𝑀𝐵𝑆𝑀𝐵𝑡 + 𝑏𝑝,𝐻𝑀𝐿𝐻𝑀𝐿𝑡 +
𝑏𝑝,𝐿𝑀𝑆 + 𝐿𝑀𝑆𝑡 + 𝜀𝑝,𝑡; 
𝑅𝑃,𝑡 − 𝑅𝐹,𝑡 = 𝑏0 + 𝑏𝑞,𝑅𝑀,𝑡−𝑅𝐹,𝑡(𝑅𝑀,𝑡 − 𝑅𝐹,𝑡) + 𝑏𝑝,𝑆𝑀𝐵𝑆𝑀𝐵𝑡 + 𝑏𝑝,𝐻𝑀𝐿𝐻𝑀𝐿𝑡 +
𝑏𝑝,𝑅𝑀𝑊𝑅𝑀𝑊𝑡 + 𝑏𝑝,𝐶𝑀𝐴𝐶𝑀𝐴𝑡 + 𝑏𝑝,𝐿𝑀𝑆𝐿𝑀𝑆𝑡 + 𝜀𝑝,𝑡. 
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Table 5 Portfolio time-series regressions of contemporaneous excess returns on factor 
returns 
This table presents average coefficient estimates and average R2 of time-series regressions. Panel 
A is for regressions of monthly contemporaneous portfolio value weighted excess stock returns 
(stock return minus the risk-free rate) on the three Fama–French factors and the LMS (Cash factor). 
Panel B is for regressions of monthly contemporaneous portfolio excess stock returns (stock return 
minus the risk-free rate) on the five Fama–French factors and the LMS (Cash factor). The first two 
columns consist of 9 (3*3) size and cash portfolios and 10 size portfolios; the next two columns 
consist of 30 (10*3) size and cash portfolios, and 27 (3*3*3) size, cash and LMS portfolios. Rm-Rf 
is the excess return on the market portfolio. SMB is the return to size factor-mimicking portfolio. 
HML is the return to book-to-market factor-mimicking portfolio. RMW is return to operating 
profitability factor-mimicking portfolio. CMA is return to investment factor-mimicking portfolio. 
LMS is the return to the cash holding factor-mimicking portfolio. T-statistics are computed based 
on the standard error of the portfolio-specific coefficient estimates.  
Panel A: Fama French 3 factor model augmented with cash factor 
 9 size-cash 10 size  30 size-cash 27 size-cash-lms loading 
Intercept -0.024 0.068 0.030 0.063 -0.021 0.080 -0.043 0.055 
 -0.32 1.82 1.33 2.18 -0.46 2.98 -0.92 1.11 
Rm-Rf 1.065 1.060 1.077 1.075 1.084 1.078 1.070 1.064 
 67.21 69.47 70 72.26 113.88 117.4 74.49 71.12 
SMB  0.527 0.569 0.665 0.680 0.610 0.656 0.541 0.586 
 2.92 3.16 4.51 4.61 7.27 8.01 5.33 6.03 
HML 0.181 0.067 0.119 0.078 0.214 0.089 0.204 0.083 
 1.59 1.11 2.61 1.62 3.59 2.72 2.89 1.84 
LMS  -0.199  -0.071  -0.218  -0.211 
  -1.39  -2.64  -2.84  -1.58 
R2 0.884 0.912 0.907 0.909 0.808 0.834 0.768 0.815 
Panel B: Fama French 5 factor model augmented with cash factor 
 9 size-cash 10 size  30 size-cash 27 size-cash-cash loading 
Intercept -0.055 0.040 0.046 0.082 -0.050 0.057 -0.078 0.024 
 -0.56 0.89 4.38 3.62 -0.83 1.99 -1.18 0.45 
Rm-Rf 1.073 1.063 1.076 1.072 1.091 1.080 1.078 1.068 
 72.11 93.39 73.94 80.89 104.41 122.73 87.16 87.29 
SMB 0.578 0.581 0.675 0.676 0.664 0.668 0.596 0.599 
 3.35 3.36 4.74 4.74 8.45 8.49 6.43 6.46 
HML 0.094 0.019 0.028 -0.001 0.120 0.035 0.113 0.032 
 0.88 0.32 0.77 -0.02 2.11 1.03 1.7 0.74 
RMW 0.114 0.031 -0.024 -0.056 0.114 0.021 0.122 0.033 
 1.1 0.46 -0.61 -1.3 1.85 0.59 1.42 0.7 
CMA 0.015 0.009 0.012 0.010 0.003 -0.004 0.016 0.010 
 0.46 0.27 0.56 0.44 0.17 -0.18 0.58 0.33 
LMS  -0.143  -0.054  -0.161  -0.153 
 
 -1.03  -2.03  -2.35  -1.14 
R2 0.902 0.920 0.914 0.915 0.828 0.842 0.792 0.824 
 
Table 5 reports the average estimates of the coefficients and their t-statistics, 
along with the adjusted R2. In a paper with similar research methodology, Core 
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and Guay (2008) claim that if the portfolios do not generate enough cross 
sectional variations in the factor to be tested, it would have systematically bias and 
show lower statistical power when testing whether the factor is a priced risk factor. 
To address this concern, I use four different sets of portfolios to make sure the 
results are robust: 9 size-cash groups (3*3), 10 size groups, 30 size-cash groups 
(10*3), and finally 27 size-cash-LMS groups (3*3*3). 9 size-cash groups are 
sorted based on the P30 and P70 NYSE breakpoints of size and cash. 10 size 
groups are sorted based on the NYSE decile breakpoints of size. 30 size-cash 
groups are based on NYSE decile breakpoints of size and the P30 and P70 NYSE 
breakpoints of cash. For 27 size-cash-lms groups, 9 size-cash groups are firstly 
sorted based on the P30 and P70 NYSE breakpoints of size and cash. Then each 
size-cash group is further sorted by the value of P30 and P70 of firm-level LMS 
loadings. All size groups and cash groups are sorted independently. Then for each 
portfolio, I compute the value weighted return within each month, getting 522 
monthly returns over the period of July 1972 to December 2015. 
Panel A of table 5 presents summary results of the time-series regressing of excess 
stock returns on Fama and French 3 factors and LMS at portfolio level. The first 
and second columns of the table present the average of estimates of 9 time-series 
regressions for the 9-size-cash portfolio. Similarly, the third and fourth columns 
are for the 10-size portfolio; the fifth and sixth columns are for 30-size-cash 
portfolio; the last two columns are for the 27-Size-Cash-LMS portfolio. The 
results show that both the magnitude and significance of the coefficients of FF 
factors are consistent with previous studies. The average loadings on the market 
risk premium, size premium and value premium is around 1, 0.6 and 0.2 
respectively for all portfolio classifications. When LMS is added to the models, 
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the coefficients of market factor and size factor are almost the same as estimates 
of models without LMS while the coefficient of HML changes a lot. This is 
consistent with previous results of this paper that LMS has a high correlation with 
HML, so LMS and HML explain overlapping variations in stock return. The 
coefficient of LMS is negative and statistically significant only for 10-size 
portfolio and 30-size-cash portfolio, indicating cash affects stock return strongly 
conditional on size. The Fama and French factors explain an average of 88%, 91%, 
81% and 77% of the time-series return variation in the four sets of portfolio 
returns. LMS factor contribute an increase in the explanatory power of the models 
with a range from 0.2% to 4.7%. Panel B of table 5 reports summary results of 
regressions of excess stock return on Fama and French 5 factors and LMS factor 
at portfolio level. From this table, we get similar information as for LMS. 
2.4.2 The Second Stage: Fama-Macbeth Regressions 
In the second stage, I conduct monthly Fama and MacBeth (1973) cross-sectional 
regressions of value weighted excess returns on factor loadings to ascertain 
whether LMS factor loadings predict returns within each of the four sets of 
portfolios. The model as below is estimated over period from July 1972 to 
December 2015: 
 𝑅𝑃,𝑡̅̅ ̅̅ ̅-𝑅𝐹,𝑡̅̅ ̅̅ ̅=𝛾0 + 𝛾1𝑏𝑝,𝑅𝑀,𝑡−𝑅𝐹,𝑡 + 𝛾2𝑏𝑝,SMB + 𝛾3𝑏𝑝,HML+𝛾4𝑏𝑝,LMS + 𝜀𝑝,𝑡. 
69 
 
Table 6 Cross-sectional portfolio regressions of excess returns on factor betas 
This table presents the Fama Macbeth estimates and R2 of cross sectional regressions of value 
weighted monthly excess returns on Fama and French (1992) three factor loadings and cash 
holding factor loadings. Panel A presents the replication of Petkova (2006)’s estimates of 
regressing average 25 Size-BM portfolio excess returns on factor loadings.  Panel B, C and D are 
estimates based on 9 Size-Cash portfolios, 10 Size portfolios, 30 Size-Cash portfolios and 27 Size-
Cash-LMS portfolios respectively over period of July 1972 and December 2015. All the factor 
loadings are calculated with full-period data on a multivariate time-series regression of portfolio 
returns on the respective factors during the period of July 1972 and December 2015. bRm-Rf is the 
portfolio beta related to the RM_RF factor. bSMB is the portfolio beta related to the SMB factor. 
bHML is the portfolio beta related to the HML factor. bLMS is the portfolio beta related to the CASH 
factor. T statistics are based on newy-west tests.  
Panel A: 25 size and book to market portfolios 
Replication of Petkova (2006) over period July 1963 to December 2001 
   Intercept bRm-Rf bSMB bHML Adj R2  
Petkova's estimate  1.15 -0.65 0.16 0.44 0.71  
FM t-stat   3.3 -1.6 1.04 3.09   
My Estimate  1.020 -0.529 0.180 0.475 0.55  
FM t-stat   3.203 -1.509 1.096 2.888   
Panel B: 9 size and cash holdings portfolios 
My estimate over the period July 1972 to December 2015 
  Intercept bRm-Rf bSMB bHML bLMS Adj R2 
Estimate   -2.075 2.597 0.124 -0.387  0.71 
FM t-stat   -1.765 2.254 0.692 -1.838   
Estimate   -2.098 2.631 0.096 -0.301 0.190 0.78 
FM t-stat   -1.808 2.323 0.499 -0.909 1.312  
Panel C: 10 size portfolios 
My estimate over the period July 1972 to December 2015 
Estimate   -0.440 1.062 0.004 0.336  0.63 
FM t-stat   -0.589 1.422 0.016 0.660   
Estimate   -0.370 0.991 0.012 0.321 -0.248 0.71 
FM t-stat   -0.392 1.025 0.056 0.611 -0.456  
Panel D: 30(10*3) size and cash holding portfolios 
My estimate over the period July 1972 to December 2015 
Estimate   -0.646 1.221 0.199 -0.350  0.41 
FM t-stat   -1.129 2.133 1.199 -1.686   
Estimate   -0.920 1.523 0.099 -0.096 0.252 0.44 
FM t-stat   -1.635 2.650 0.611 -0.409 1.715  
Panel E: 30(10*3) size and cash holding portfolios 
My estimate over the period July 1972 to December 2015 
Estimate   0.833 -0.215 0.207 -0.175  0.46 
FM t-stat   1.556 -0.378 1.209 -0.727   
Estimate   0.927 -0.324 -0.353 0.160 0.274 0.52 
FM t-stat   1.835 -0.601 -1.823 1.080 1.653  
 
The cross-sectional regressions are run for each of the 522 months from July 1972 
to December 2015, and the parameters are averaged and t-statistics estimated 
using the Fama and MacBeth (1973) procedure. Table 6 presents Fama Macbeth 
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regression results. Including different Fama-French factors produces similar 
results for different. To save place, I tabulated only the results using the Fama-
French 3-factor model (Rm-Rf, SMB, and HML) augmented with LMS. To show 
consistence over the tests, in the following tests, I also show estimates of 
regressions on the three Fama–French factors. To make sure the empirical 
approach correct, I replicate Table V, Petkova (2006) first. The first two rows of 
Panel A of Table 6 present results of the second stage in Petkova’s (2006) with a 
sample period of July 1963 to December 2001 and the second two rows show my 
replication over the same period. The results are quite similar in that, the market 
loading is negative and marginally significant, the size (SMB) loading is positive 
but insignificant, and the book-to-market (HML) loading is positive and 
significant. This is also consistent with the literature. 
Panels from B to E of Table 6 present the second stage results for 4 sets of 
portfolios: 9 size-cash portfolios, 10 size portfolios, 30 size-cash portfolios, 27 
size-cash-LMS_loading portfolios. In each panel, the estimates for Fama–French 
3-factor model are presented in the first two rows, followed by the results for 
Fama–French 3-factor model augmented with LMS. If LMS were a risk factor, it 
would be expected to have a positive coefficient. However, the estimated 
coefficients on the LMS beta are negative and not statistically significant from 
zero in all of the models. The estimated coefficients on the market are positive and 
significant when portfolios are sorted based on size and cash, indicating that size-
cash portfolios create the most variation in market risk premium. This is also 
consistent with table 1 that cash holdings are increasing when firm risk increases. 
The coefficients on size and book-to-market factor betas are insignificant in these 
specifications. Previous studies show that the coefficient on HML beta is positive, 
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but in this paper, it is not the case, which may because of the variation in the beta 
loadings of HML factor is not significant since portfolios are not sorted based on 
book-to-market ratio in this paper. 
Overall, the results from the two-stage cross-sectional regressions are consistent 
with previous tables/studies and cast doubt on whether LMS is a priced risk factor. 
2.5 LMS and Future GDP Growth Rate 
In this section, I will discuss the relation between LMS and GDP growth rate. 
Chen (1991) shows that in intertemporal market equilibrium, the state variables 
that are priced are those that can forecast changes in the investment and 
consumption opportunity sets. The predictive power of the proposed new factor on 
future GDP growth has been used by various scholars to test whether there is a 
risk effect of the underlying variable on stock returns. For example, Liew and 
Vassalou (2000) use this approach to examine whether there is low value risk and 
small size risk; Chordia and Shivakumar (2006) use this approach to evident 
earnings momentum is a risk factor; Mohanram(2009) use this approach to 
examine whether PIN is a priced risk factor. In this paper, if LMS is a risk factor 
in an inter-temporal asset-pricing model such as Merton (1973), it would have a 
positive relation with GDP growth rate. 
Following Chen (1991) and Liew and Vassalou (2000), I regress future GDP 
growth on lagged values of the Fama–French factors as well as LMS. The specific 
model is shown below: 
GDPGrowtht+1,t+12 = 𝛼 + 𝛽(𝑅𝑀 − 𝑅𝐹)𝑡−11,𝑡 + 𝑠𝑆𝑀𝐵𝑡−11,𝑡 + ℎ𝐻𝑀𝐿𝑡−11,𝑡 +
𝑚𝑈𝑀𝐷𝑡−11,𝑡 + 𝑙𝐿𝑀𝑆𝑡−11,𝑡 + 𝜀𝑡.  
The dependent variable is the continuously compounded growth in real GDP over 
months from t+1 to t+12 and the explanatory variables include the value-weighted 
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excess market return(Rm-Rf), SMB, HML, UMD and LMS, all of which are 
compounded over months t-11 to t. GDP data is available from the U.S. Bureau of 
Economic Analysis. Since data of GDP growth rates are available at quarterly 
frequency, consecutive annual growth rates have three overlapping quarters, 
inducing serial correlation in the residuals of our regressions. To address this 
concern, I use the Newey and West (1987) estimator and set the parameter q equal 
to three. 
Table 7 Future GDP Growth on Fama–French factors and the CASH factor. 
This table presents the regression coefficients from regressing real GDP growth on the Fama–
French factors and the CASH factor. GDP growth is the future 12-month-ahead compounded 
growth rate. Rm-Rf is the excess return on the market portfolio. SMB is the return to size factor-
mimicking portfolio. HML is the return to book-to-market factor-mimicking portfolio. UMD is 
return to momentum factor-mimicking portfolio. LMS is the return to the cash holding factor-
mimicking portfolio. All these factors are annually compounded from the monthly factors over 
month t-11 and month t. Since data on GDP is reported quarterly, the regressions are based on 
quarterly data. GDP data is obtained from the US Bureau of Economic Analysis. Since the 
calculation of compounded factors need data of previous 11 months data. The final sample used of 
this test is from December 1972 (Q4, 1972) to December 2015 (Q4, 2015). Panel A is the replicate 
of Mohanram et al.’s respective results over December 1984 to December 2002. Panel B is the 
main estimates of this test in this paper. Since the regressions use overlapping data, the t-statistics, 
which are reported in parentheses, are based on Newey–West standard errors. 
Model: GDPGrowtht+1,t+12= α +β(Rm-Rf)t-11,t+sSMB t-11,t +hHML t-11,t +mUMD t-11,t +lLMS t-11,t +𝜀t 
Panel A: Replicate Mohanram et al.(2009) over period December 1984 to December 2002 
 α β s h m  Adj R2 
Fama-French 3 factor 0.148 0.204 -0.111 0.097   0.162 
 7.84 2.65 -0.83 1.32    
        
Fama-French 4 factor 0.175 0.195 -0.058 0.049 -0.157  0.231 
 15.49 2.81 -0.6 0.71 -2.2   
Panel B: My estimates over period December 1972 to December 2015 
 α β s h m l Adj R2 
Fama-French 3 factor 0.117 0.207 0.132 0.190   0.123 
 6.96 2.91 1.15 2.3    
Fama-French 4 factor 0.120 0.203 0.130 0.184 -0.018  0.118 
 5.79 2.73 0.94 1.84 -0.24   
        
LMS 0.145     0.031 -0.005 
7.3     0.4  
Fama-French 3 factor 
and LMS 
0.108 0.212 0.119 0.268  0.136 0.134 
4.7 2.83 0.83 1.71  0.82  
Fama-French 4 factor 
and LMS 
0.113 0.204 0.113 0.264 -0.042 0.152 0.133 
4.62 2.63 0.8 1.68 -0.59 0.99  
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Table 7 presents the results. Because GDP growth rates are observed at quarterly 
frequencies, the regressions use quarterly data. The time series sample is 
constituted with 173 quarters over period December 1972 to December 2015. 
Panel A reports the replication results of table 6, Mohanram et al. (2009) over 
period December 1984 to December 2002. I get very similar results to theirs that 
only the coefficient of market premium is significantly different from zero. Panels 
from B to E show the results using four different portfolios with LMS included in 
the model. Under all sample sets, I find that the coefficients on LMS are positive 
but not significant. Further, the adjusted-R2 of the regression is only about -0.5% 
when LMS is included by itself. FF factors can explain around 12% variations in 
GDP growth rate and this figure increases by only about 1% when LMS is 
augmented. These results suggest that LMS fails a macro-economic test of 
whether it is a risk factor. 
2.6 LMS and ex-ante Expected Cost of Equity 
Another possible way to assess whether LMS is a priced risk factor is to examine 
whether a higher LMS is associated with a higher ex ante cost of capital (i.e., 
implied cost of capital, ICOE). Because of their nature as proxies for expected 
returns, ICOE can be used as the risk-related compensation. If the relation 
between LMS and future return is attributable to market mispricing, then the 
relation between LMS and the ICOE would not be pronounced. On the contrary, if 
LMS is a priced risk factor, then we would expect a higher LMS to be associated 
with higher ICOE. In particular, I use the following model to conduct the firm-
level regressions of ante cost of capital measures on CASH and the control 
variables: 
𝑅𝑃𝑖,𝑡 =  𝛼 + 𝛽 𝐵𝑒𝑡𝑎𝑖,𝑡 + 𝑠𝐿𝑆𝐼𝑍𝐸𝑖,𝑡 + 𝑏𝐿𝐵𝑀𝑖,𝑡 + 𝑑𝐿𝐷𝑀𝑖,𝑡 + 𝑐𝐶𝐴𝑆𝐻𝑖,𝑡 + 𝜀𝑖,𝑡 , 
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where RP represents the risk premium, calculated as ICOE minus risk free rate; 
Beta represents the market risk loadings calculated over period from July 1972 to 
December 2015; LSIZE is calculated as the natural log of market value; LBM is 
the natural log of book to market ratio; LDM is the natural log of 1 plus long-term 
debt over market value; CASH is cash and short-term investments over total assets.  
Following Ohlson and Juettner-Nauroth (2005) model, I estimate ICOE with the 
following model: 
𝑟𝑒 = 𝐴 + √𝐴2 +
𝑒𝑝𝑠1
𝑃0
(𝑔2 − (𝛾 − 1)) , 
Where A =
1
2
(γ − 1) +
𝑑𝑝𝑠1
𝑃0
 and 𝑔2 =
𝑒𝑝𝑠2−𝑒𝑝𝑠1
𝑒𝑝𝑠1
, eps1 and eps2 are consensus 
estimates of 1-year-ahead and 2-year-ahead annual eps, g2 is the average of short-
term growth rate (eps2/eps1-1), dps1 is the estimated dividend in the next period 
assuming historical payout and g is the estimate of the long run economy-wide 
growth rate. (γ-1) is set as Rf -3%, where Rf is the yield on 10-year notes. 
Since the estimated ICOE is in an annually frequency, I do this tests using annual 
data. The annual accounting data is obtained from compustat annual industrial. 
EPSs are obtained from I/B/E/S Summary. 10-year notes yield is obtained from 
CRSP Index. After merging all the variables together, I keep only firms that are 
used in previous tests in order to make the sample firms consistent in all tests. The 
final sample is constructed with 70805 firm-year observations from fiscal year 
1974 to fiscal year 2015. The accounting variables are all winsorized at 1% and 99% 
level in each fiscal year. 
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Table 8 Regression of RP on cash 
This table presents the estimates of regressions of RP on cash and control variables. The sample 
period is from fiscal year 1974 to fiscal year 2015. Implied Cost of Capital estimates are calculated 
using stock prices and earnings forecasts as of the end of the previous year, based on the Ohlson 
and Juettner-Nauroth (2005) OJ model. Risk Premia, RP, are calculated from implied cost of 
capital estimates by subtracting out the risk free rate. LSIZE is calculated as the natural log of 
market value; LBM is the natural log of book to market ratio; LDM is the natural log of 1 plus 
long-term debt over market value; CASH is cash and short-term investments over total assets.  
Panel A presents mean value of RP, beta, log of size, log of long term debt, log of book-to-market 
ratio and cash over total assets. Panel B presents the correlations of these variables. Panel C 
presents the estimates of cross-sectional Fama-Macbeth regression of RP on risk factors. 
Panel A: Mean of RP and Risk Factors 
 
RP(%) Beta LSIZE LDM LBM CASH 
 
15.593 1.157 5.942 0.243 -0.685 0.145 
Panel B: Correlation of RP and Risk Factors 
 
RP Beta LSIZE LDM LBM CASH 
RP 1 0.072 -0.314 0.197 0.190 -0.054 
  
<.0001 <.0001 <.0001 <.0001 <.0001 
Beta 0.078 1 0.036 -0.043 -0.107 0.217 
 
<.0001 
 
<.0001 <.0001 <.0001 <.0001 
LSIZE -0.342 0.040 1 -0.142 -0.361 0.004 
 
<.0001 <.0001 
 
<.0001 <.0001 0.3339 
LDM 0.153 -0.077 -0.051 1 0.456 -0.378 
 
<.0001 <.0001 <.0001 
 
<.0001 <.0001 
LBM 0.227 -0.083 -0.356 0.469 1 -0.330 
 
<.0001 <.0001 <.0001 <.0001 
 
<.0001 
CASH -0.065 0.192 0.022 -0.551 -0.309 1 
 
<.0001 <.0001 <.0001 <.0001 <.0001 
 
Panel C: Regression of RP and risk factors 
 
Intercept Beta LSIZE LDM LBM CASH Adj R2 
Annual FM 20.367 1.702 -1.283 4.347 0.892 -0.399 0.159 
 
26.34 12.99 -15.7 23.32 3.98 -0.91 
 
 
Panel A of Table 8 presents the mean value of key variables. The mean value of 
RP, Beta, LSIZE, LDM, LBM and CASH is around 15.59%, 1.157, 5.94, 0.234, -
0.685 and 0.145 respectively. Panel B shows the correlations between these 
variables. It is shown that RP is positively related to Beta, long-term leverage, 
book to market ratio, and negatively related to size and cash. Panel C shows the 
estimates of Fama Macbeth regression. The coefficient of CASH is negative and 
is not significantly different from zero, indicating that there is no association 
between CASH and ICOE. The inconsistent relationship between CASH and ex-
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ante risk provide extra evidence that CASH cannot be considered a reliable proxy 
of systematic risk. As for the coefficients of other variables, market beta, book to 
market ratio, long-term debt increase the cost of equity, while size decreases it. 
This is consistent with previous studies (Mohanram, 2009), and also consistent 
with the intuition that firms with higher systematic risk, lower growth options, 
higher leverage tend to have higher costs of equity, while firms with bigger size 
tend to have lower costs of equity.  
2.6.1 LMS loadings and ex-ante Expected Cost of Equity 
Since LMS loading represents the risk exposure to LMS, and ex-ante costs of 
equity is also proxy for the expected risk, we should see a positive correlation 
between LMS loading and ex-ante costs of equity if LMS is the risk compensation 
on large amount of cash. To test this argument, I run the cross-sectional Fama 
Macbeth regressions following the model as: 
𝑅𝑃𝑖,𝑡 = 𝛼 + 𝛾1𝑏𝑖,𝑅𝑚−𝑅𝑓 + 𝛾2𝑏𝑖,SMB + 𝛾3𝑏𝑖,HML + 𝛾4𝑏𝑖,LMS + 𝜀𝑖,𝑡 
,where the independent variables are firm-level factor loadings calculated over full 
sample period from July 1972 to December 2015 for firms with at least 18 months 
during this period. 
77 
 
Table 9 regressions of RP on risk factor loadings 
This table presents the estimates of regressions of RP on factor loadings. The sample period is 
from fiscal year 1974 to fiscal year 2015. Implied Cost of Capital estimates are calculated using 
stock prices and earnings forecasts as of the end of the previous year, based on the Ohlson and 
Juettner-Nauroth (2005) OJ model. Risk Premium, RP, are calculated from implied cost of capital 
estimates by subtracting out the risk free rate. LMKT, LSMB, LHML, LLMS are the firm-level 
factor loadings with regard to market risk premium, SMB, HML, LMS. Thet are the coefficients 
estimates of regressing excess return on these factors over full period for firms with at least 18 
months observations. Panel A presents the correlations between RP and factor loadings. Panel B 
presents the estimates of cross-sectional Fama-Macbeth regression of RP on risk factor loadings. 
Panel A: Correlation of RP with factor loadings  
  RP LMKT LSMB LHML LLMS   
RP 1 0.051 0.154 0.046 0.024   
  <.0001 <.0001 <.0001 <.0001   
LMKT 0.062 1 0.055 0.169 -0.013   
 <.0001  <.0001 <.0001 0.0005   
LSMB 0.181 0.071 1 0.059 -0.060   
 <.0001 <.0001  <.0001 <.0001   
LHML 0.074 0.140 0.091 1 0.472   
 <.0001 <.0001 <.0001  <.0001   
LLMS 0.007 -0.019 -0.077 0.335 1   
 0.0802 <.0001 <.0001 <.0001    
Panel B: Regression of RP on factor loadings  
 Intercept LMKT LSMB LHML LLMS Adj R2 N 
Annual FM 12.832 1.011 2.092 0.644 0.127 0.058 42 years 
 16.6 4.45 12.37 3.56 1.26   
 
Panel A, table 9 presents the correlation between RP and the factor loadings, 
suggesting a positive correlation of RP and the factor loadings. Panel B, table 9 
reports the estimates of the Fama-Macbeth cross-sectional regression. The 
coefficients of market loading, SMB loading and HML loading is positive and 
significant, while the coefficient of LMS loading is not significant. This test does 
not support that LMS is a risk factor, indicating that cash-return relation is not 
because of systematic risk captured by cash. And high cash level cannot suggest 
high systematic risk. 
2.7 The potential Mispricing Explanation of Cash-return Relation 
So far, I have provided evidence that cash-return relation is not due to the 
systematic risk related to cash holdings. In this chapter, I will explore the potential 
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behaviour explanation. As mentioned, the cash-return relation may due to the 
limited attention of investors on cash information. The investors may interpret 
firms with higher cash holdings as firms with more agency problems since 
managers in firms with more agency problems tend to hold more cash to get 
private perquisites. In this case investors tend to undervalue the stock prices of 
firms with more cash holdings. And hence stocks of firms with more cash 
holdings tend to get higher subsequent return. I’ll use two methods to provide 
evidences of mispricing explanation by using institutional investors as 
sophisticated investors. The first is to test the trading behaviour of institutions in 
relation to cash. The second is to test the differences in return spread by cash 
between firms with more institutional investors and less institutional investors. 
2.7.1 Trading Behaviour of Institutions pre-anomaly of Cash 
Institutional investors are proved to be sophisticated investors. Sophisticated 
investors have the ability to predict stock return and they would sell a stock if it is 
overpriced and buy it if it gets undervalued. So I first test whether there are more 
institutional investors invest on long leg of pre-anomaly portfolios. If institutional 
investors increased before cash anomalies are formed, the cash holding anomaly is 
more likely to be because of the mispricing effect. In this test, two measures of 
institutional investors are considered. The first is the number of institutional 
investors. The second is the number of shares held by institutional investors. The 
data of institutional investors are available at quarterly frequency and are obtained 
in file s34 in Thomson Reuters.  
Table 10 reports the results of the change of institutions pre-anomaly. Panel A is 
the summary statistics of institutions and change in institutions. It’s shown that 
averagely there are around 83 institution investors per firm. The shares held by 
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institutions account for around 41% of the total shares. Panel B shows the changes 
in institutional investors for cash holding anomaly stocks. I first sort the sample 
into three portfolios based on cash over total assets in quarter q. Then I calculate 
the change in institutions from the beginning of quarter q to the end of quarter q. 
The zero-investments on long in high cash portfolio and short in low cash 
portfolio earn an average return of 0.6%. Both change in number of institutions 
and change in shares of institutions show monotonically decreasing from the long 
leg of cash portfolio to short leg of cash portfolio, suggesting that the institutions 
tend to invest more on high cash portfolio to get higher subsequent return. 
Table 10 Summary of change of institutional investments pre-anomaly 
The table reports the changes of institutional invests and the difference between long and short leg 
based on cash holdings during the calendar quarter prior to anomaly portfolio formation over the 
period of July 1980 to December 2015. Panel A presents the summary statistics of four 
institutional ownership variables including the number of institutional investors (#inst(q)), the 
percentage of institutional shares (%inst(q)), the change in the number of institutional shareholders 
(∆#inst(q-1 to q), calculated as number at the end divided by the number at the beginning of period 
minus one) and the change in percentage of institutional shares (∆%inst(q-1 to q), calculated as 
end of period percentage minus beginning). The institutional investor variables are winsorized at 
the 1% level in both tails. Panel B reports the changes in institutional investor base for cash 
holding anomaly strategy. The statistics of panel C are the time-series mean and t-statistics.  
Panel A: Summary statistics for institutional ownership pre-anomaly 
 Mean Std. P25 Median P75 
#inst(q) 83.2 128.9 11.0 35.0 105.0 
%inst(q) 40.9% 29.4% 14.3% 37.2% 64.9% 
∆#inst(q-1 to q) 4.0% 21.6% -5.9% 0.0% 9.4% 
∆%inst(q-1 to q) 0.2% 5.9% -1.6% 0.0% 2.1% 
Panel B: Changes in institutional investor base for cash holding anomaly stocks 
 Che/at(q) ∆#inst(q-1 to q) ∆%inst(q-1 to q) Excess retun(monthly) 
Long 0.40 4.77% 0.30% 1.31 
Neut 0.09 3.83% 0.12% 1.03 
Short 0.02 3.35% 0.04% 0.70 
L-S 0.38*** 1.43%*** 0.25%*** 0.60*** 
 
2.7.2 Comparison of Return Spread by Cash between HIO and LIO 
If the cash prediction of returns is due to the mispricing caused by investors’ 
limited attention of the cash implications on firm performance, it should be 
expected that there would be less cash mispricing for firms held by more 
institutional investors who are more informed and sophisticated in reading 
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accounting information. This mechanism has been used to test the accrual 
mispricing due to investors’ limited attention by Collins, Gong and Hribar (2003). 
I use institutional ownership to proxy for institution investors. I divide the sample 
into 25 (5*5) portfolios based on cash and institutional ownership and aim to find 
the differences in abnormal returns spread by cash between high institutional 
investor group (i.e., HIO) and low institutional investor group (i.e., LIO).  
Table 11 reports the results showing how institutional investors affect the return 
spread across cash holding quintiles. LIO indicates the group with lowest quintile 
of institutional investors. MIO indicates the group with medium quintile of 
institutional investors. HIO indicates the group with highest quintile of 
institutional investors. The abnormal returns include excess return, excess return 
adjusted by market risk and excess return adjusted by Fama French 3 factors. In 
the LIO, these three variables get values of 1.096%, 0.992% and 1.189% 
respectively with significance at 99% level. While in the HIO, they are 0.314%, 
0.079% and 0.560% and are not statistically significant. The values in MIO are in 
between the respective values in HIO and LIO. Panel D shows the differences in 
abnormal return spread by cash between HIO and LIO. The differences are all 
statistically significant; indicating that return spread by cash in firms with more 
institutional ownerships is lower than that in firms with less institutional 
ownerships. These results suggest that the return spread by cash is due to a 
mispricing effect due to limited attention of investors on cash information.
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Table 11 Institutional investors and return spread across cash holding quintiles 
This table reports cash holdings, excess return and risk adjusted return on portfolios sorted by cash 
holdings quintiles and institutional quintiles independently. ‘Diff (5-1)’ represents the difference in 
cash holdings and abnormal returns between highest quintile cash holdings firms and lowest 
quintile cash holding firms. Panel A, Panel B and Panel C reports the average value of cash and 
abnormal return across cash holding quintiles in firms with lowest quintile, medium quintile and 
highest quintile of institutional investors respectively. ‘Difflow-Diffhigh’ is the Difference in 
abnormal returns spread by cash between HIO and LIO. 
Quintiles Cash Ret-Rf αmkt α3factor 
Panel A Lowest quintile of Institutional Investors (LIO) 
1 0.008 0.564 0.065 -0.096 
2 0.034 0.619 0.077 -0.022 
3 0.090 1.232 0.692 0.563 
4 0.209 1.300 0.708 0.683 
5 0.513 1.660 1.057 1.093 
Diff(5-1)  1.096 0.992 1.189 
T-statistics 5.17 3.87 4.9 
Panel B Medium quintile of Institutional Investors (MIO) 
1 0.008 0.506 -0.172 -0.464 
2 0.034 0.831 0.115 -0.188 
3 0.088 0.997 0.280 0.052 
4 0.214 1.131 0.385 0.348 
5 0.523 1.262 0.475 0.591 
Diff(5-1)  0.756 0.647 1.055 
T-statistics 2.98 1.98 3.65 
Panel C Highest quintile of Institutional Investors (HIO) 
1 0.009 0.703 0.058 -0.129 
2 0.035 0.855 0.204 0.059 
3 0.091 0.826 0.150 0.044 
4 0.203 0.954 0.193 0.237 
5 0.446 1.017 0.137 0.430 
Diff(5-1)  0.314 0.079 0.560 
T-statistics 1.18 0.24 2.34 
Difference in abnormal returns spread by cash between HIO and LIO 
Difflow-Diffhigh  0.782 0.914 0.630 
  2.99 2.85 2.39 
 
2.8 Conclusion 
This paper tries to test whether cash-return relation is caused by systematic risk. 
Palazzo (2012) finds a positive correlation between cash and equity return. He 
claims that cash holdings have a link with systematic risk, and therefore, firms 
with more cash have higher stock return for compensation on the systematic risk 
embedded within them. This argument is interpreted in the paper of Simutin(2010) 
that cash could serve as a proxy of systematic risk. However, none of them 
empirically verify this argument with the methodology used in the literature. 
Recently, there are papers studying the cash-return relation from behaviour 
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finance perspective, finding evidence supporting a mispricing explanation story 
and also casting doubt on whether the relation between cash and return really 
exists. So this paper tries to follow the systematic methodology in the literature to 
test whether cash could be proxy for systemic risk in explaining the variations in 
stock returns. First, the two-stage cross-sectional regression show that LMS 
loading is not priced. Second, LMS is not correlated with the macro-economy 
growth rate, which is not consistent with the intertemporal asset pricing theory. 
Third, both cash and LMS loading are not associated with the implied costs of 
equity, which typically have a positive correlation with systematic risk. I further 
explore the potential mispricing explanation and find supporting evidences. First, 
it is found that sophisticated investors tend to buy in more stocks in firms with 
more cash than stocks in firms with less cash, consistent with the argument that 
sophisticated investors get can earn higher return by recognizing mispriced stocks. 
Second, it is found that the cash-return relation in firms with more sophisticated 
investors are less pronounced than in firms with less sophisticated investors, 
consistent with the view that sophisticated investors help correct mispricing effect.  
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Chapter 3: The Effects of Sovereign Funds on Corporations: Evidence of 
Cash Policies in Singapore 
3.1 Introduction 
The decision of whether and how much to hold internal funds, including cash and 
short term investments, is an essential issue in the conflict between shareholders 
and managers, according to Jensen and Meckling (1976) and Jensen (1986). 
Recently, the issue of cash holdings has received great scrutiny as corporations 
around the globe hold increasingly large amounts of cash. As Duchin et al. (2017) 
illustrate, this phenomenon is recent: “Apple, for example, holds $121 billion, or 
70% of its book assets, in financial assets.” An article in Bloomberg by Sarah 
Frier reports: “U.S. companies outside of the finance industry are holding more 
cash on their balance sheets than ever, with $1.64 trillion at the end of 2013.” 
Researchers are starting to link corporate cash holdings to governance and agency 
problems. Harford, Mansi, and Maxwell (2008) find that U.S. firms with weaker 
corporate governance structures have smaller cash reserves. Gao, Harford, and Li 
(2013) show that agency conflicts dominate financing constraints, as managers 
hold more cash to increase their perquisite consumption. Duchin et al. (2017) find 
that U.S. industrial firms with poor governance hold substantial risk assets, such 
as debt or equity, an alternative form of cash holding. These papers suggest that 
agency problems5 can explain cash holdings, because managers hoard cash either 
to extract private benefits or to spend it inappropriately. 
                                                          
5 Alternative factors also explain corporate cash holding. For example, firms may hold more cash 
for a precautionary motive in case they cannot raise capital at a low cost (Kaynes, 1936). Opler et 
al. (1999) and Sufi (2009) show that financial constraints can determine the amount of cash 
holdings, since constrained firms seem to hold more cash than non-constrained ones.  
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Different from the U.S., in Asia or Europe state ownership is widespread in the 
corporate world. For example, Bortolotti and Faccio (2009) show that the state 
remained the largest ultimate owner of about one-third of 141 privatized firms in 
developed countries from 1996 to 2000. Jones et al. (1999) also report that 
governments maintained a controlling stake in the majority of state-owned 
enterprises (SOEs) from 59 countries from 1977 to 1999. State owned enterprises 
have long been criticized as low-efficiency and burdened by severe agency 
problems due to their ownership structures (Dewenter and Malatesta, 2001; 
Megginson and Netter, 2001; Claessens and Djankov, 2002). The key issue is lack 
of efficiency in SOEs. No previously published literature, however, links 
government ownership to agency problems and corporate cash holding. 
In this research, therefore, we explicitly study the corporate cash holding 
problems associated with agency problems and corporate governance and link 
cash holding to Sovereign Wealth Funds’ monitoring role. Sovereign Wealth 
Funds are established to invest and hold SOEs on government behalf and they are 
delegated monitoring vehicles. One important question is whether Sovereign 
Wealth Funds exert impact on portfolio firms by reducing cash-related agency 
problems in SOEs that notoriously lack effective monitoring. 
We form the following two hypotheses related to Sovereign Wealth Funds’ 
control of agency problems and effect on management of cash reserves. Our first 
hypothesis posits that Sovereign Wealth Funds have an important effect on the 
corporate cash holdings. If Sovereign Wealth Funds effectively oversee firms on 
behalf of the governments, they should exert great impact on firms’ corporate 
policies. Due to the monitoring role of Sovereign Wealth funds to reduce cash-
related agency problems, the related firms will hold significantly more cash than 
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comparable firms. Our second hypothesis, the spending hypothesis borrowing 
from Harford, Mansi, and Maxwell (2008) posits that Sovereign Wealth Funds 
will have effect on their portfolio firms by making them to spend substantially less 
in investment or acquisitions while spending more on cash dividend payouts.  
Singapore has been heralded as an extraordinary example of achieving some 
efficiency, although the state has prevalent ownership in corporations. The 
Singapore government indirectly holds SOEs via its sovereign fund, Temasek 
Holdings, to which it delegates the oversight role. Many countries, including 
Malaysia, China, and Indonesia have attempted to adopt Singapore's practice of 
establishing their own sovereign funds to oversee the massive state-owned 
enterprises. The corporations owned by Temasek are labeled as government 
linked corporations (GLCs) in Singapore. It is, therefore, important to understand 
the effect that sovereign funds exert on state-owned corporations. As the role 
model for SOEs, GLCs in Singapore offer an ideal setting to study the question 
posed in our research. 
We scrutinize GLCs by examining their corporate policies, including investment, 
acquisition, payout, and especially cash holding. The empirical analysis sheds 
light, from the perspective of cash holding, on the effect of sovereign funds with a 
delegated monitoring role on SOEs. 
We collect a comprehensive sample of Singapore’s listed firms and the voting 
rights of Temasek in each firm from 2004 to 2013. We find that, on average, 
GLCs hold more cash than otherwise similar non-GLCs, which is contrary to the 
findings reported by Chinese firms by Megginson et al. (2014). Specifically, we 
observe that GLCs hold 5%-12% more cash on average than other firms. We use 
the percentage of voting rights owned by Temasek and find similar results.  
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However, the effect of Temasek on cash holdings depends on corporate 
governance, especially transparency. For GLCs, the positive effect of Temasek on 
cash comes from firms with stronger corporate governance. For GLCs with 
weaker governance, Temasek’s cash effect is negative. These findings suggest that 
Temasek is able to cast a discerning and observable effect on GLCs’ cash policies 
by allowing firms with low-level agency problems to hold more cash while 
reducing cash for firms without sound governance in place. 
We further explore the channels through which Temasek casts their effect on 
corporate cash holdings. Firstly, we explore whether this effect comes from 
investment opportunity or financial constraints, such as firm size or Tobin’s Q. 
We find that a GLC’s foreign revenues and low expenditures mainly explain their 
high level of cash holdings. This suggests that GLCs save cash from foreign 
revenues, spend less on acquisition or investment. We then explore how Temasek 
Holdings affect the spending of excessive cash. It’s found that in good governed 
firms Temasek Holdings reduces CAPX, indicating that Temasek Holdings firms 
hold more excessive cash by monitoring managers and reducing their aggressive 
expenditure of cash on CAPX. We also find that Temasek Holdings affect the 
expenditure of excessive cash by increasing stock repurchases while reducing 
dividend payouts in bad governed firms, consistent with its marginal negative 
effect on cash holdings in bad governed firms. The cash effect of Temasek, 
however, may have some undesired consequences on subsequent firm 
performance when GLCs hold excessive cash. 
Our paper is the first to look at the effect of Sovereign Wealth Funds on corporate 
policies especially cash holdings. This paper extends the literature on cash holding, 
corporate governance, ownership, and corporate policies. The findings indicate 
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that sovereign funds exert significant influence on corporate cash policies. Due to 
the presence of Temasek Holdings as the active shareholder, GLCs hold more 
cash only when they carry sound corporate governance practices. There are 
several alternative explanations for holding more cash, e.g., financial constraints 
(Borisova et al., 2012) or precautionary saving (Duchin et al., 2013). We show 
that our findings are not likely to be driven by these alternative explanations when 
we control for these factors. GLCs, on average, spend less in expenditures, 
including investment or acquisition, while paying out more dividends to 
shareholders. Our research sheds new light on the effect of state ownership on a 
firm’s financial decisions in general.  
Our research also contributes to the literature on the effect of state ownership, 
cash, and performance. For example, Megginson et al. (2014) find that state 
ownership in China has a negative impact on cash because SOEs have a “soft 
budget constraint,” as SOEs can count on the government to get funding to 
mitigate financial constraints. Kusnadi et al. (2015) find that non-state-controlled 
firms in China hold less cash than state-controlled firms because of political 
extraction due to higher tax rates and more expensive bank loans. Fan, Wong, and 
Zhang (2007) show that performance measures are negatively related to the level 
of state ownership among Chinese firms. La Porta, Lopez-de-Silanes, and Shleifer 
(2002) use international data to find that government ownership of banks is 
relatively inefficient. Dittmar, Mahrt-Smith, and Servaes (2003) show that firms 
in countries with strong investor protection hold less cash. Unlike SOEs in other 
countries where government is the direct stakeholder, Temasek in Singapore acts 
as a sovereign fund that directly owns the shares and oversees its corporations; 
while government indirectly controls corporations via Temasek. This delegated 
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monitoring and controlling role of Temasek allows it to exert great influence on 
the corporate finance and governance of GLCs. Our research thus provides 
important insight on how governments around the world can monitor SOEs 
through sovereign funds as delegated monitoring roles. 
The rest of paper is organized as follows. Section 2 provides a brief introduction 
of backgrounds for GLCs and Temasek Holdings and forms a hypothesis. Section 
3 presents the data and summary statistics used in this paper. Section 4 presents 
the main empirical results. Section 5 summarizes and concludes the paper. 
3.2 Background  
GLCs, created by the Singapore government in late 1960s, promote the 
industrialization and development of strategic industries in the economy. 
Pioneering GLCs focus on pivotal industries such as shipping, aviation, or finance. 
GLCs operate fully as for-profit commercial entities, the same as private sector 
companies. Unlike SOEs in other countries, GLCs in Singapore do not receive any 
subsides or preferential treatment from the government. 
Temasek Holdings was formed in 1974 as a private holding company wholly 
owned by the Ministry of Finance. At that time, 36 companies were transferred to 
Temasek’s control from the Ministry of Finance. Currently, Temasek Holdings 
directly holds more than 20 first-tier listed GLCs in our sample. The first-tier 
GLCs can directly or indirectly hold other public or private firms; therefore, the 
total number of GLCs is around a hundred. Temasek has invested in a wide range 
of sectors, including financial services, telecommunications media and technology, 
transportation and industrials, consumer and real estate, energy and resources, and 
life sciences and agriculture6. In this paper, we use the time series information of 
                                                          
6See more on http://www.temasekreview.com.sg/major-investments/index.html. 
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Temasek’s voting rights for each firm to identify whether a firm is GLC or not. 
Since GLCs are not fully owned or controlled by the government, their objectives 
are to maximize the shareholder’s value. Temasek serves like an influential 
monitor. Voluminous research shows that GLCs perform better (Ramirez and 
Ling, 2004; Ang and Ding, 2006) and have better governance (Mak and Li, 2001; 
Yuanto, 2011) than other firms in Singapore. 
3.3 Data and Summary Statistics 
3.3.1 The Database 
The main database used in this paper is the S&P Capital IQ (McGraw Hill 
Financial) database. The Capital IQ database provides annual historical financial 
statements for Singapore Stock Exchange (SGX) listed companies. These 
financial statements consist of 12 different Statements: Key Stats, Income 
Statement, Balance Sheet, Cash Flow, Multiples, Historical Capitalization, Capital 
Structure Summary, Capital Structure Details, Ratio, Supplemental, Pension 
OPEB, and Segments. These statements are each downloaded, and the required 
financial data is then extracted. In our sample, we only consider firms listed on the 
SGX main board with headquarters situated in Singapore and exclude firms that 
are defined as funds or trusts. The firm’s industry classifications are based on the 
Fama-French 17 industry classification using their respective 4-digit SIC code. 
We also exclude financial firms and utility firms since they obey different 
disclosure regulations, and their liquidity positions are different from the rest. 
Considering the impact of extreme value and outliers, we winsorize all firm 
characteristics at the 1st and 99th percentiles. The final sample consists of 485 
unique firms with 4,195 firm-year observations from 2004 to 2013. Finally, we 
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collect the data from the corporate governance index of firms in Singapore from 
the Corporate Governance Centre at Singapore Management University.7 
In addition to the firm's annual financial statements, we collect Temasek's 
ownership of listed SGX firms in terms of percentage of common equity owned 
by Temasek Holdings (Private) Limited. Although Temasek Holdings is a private 
company and, therefore, not required to disclose their portfolio holdings, public 
firms, on the other hand, are required to disclose their ownership structure. Since 
we are interested in the influence of Temasek on GLCs, we utilize the voting 
rights held by Temasek instead of the cash flow rights. As documented in Lin et al. 
(2011), large shareholders can exercise effective control over a company with a 
relatively small direct stake in the cash flow rights by using pyramid ownership 
structures and cross-holdings. In order to compute voting rights, we sum all the 
voting rights held by Temasek up to the secondary chain of corporate control 
using a threshold of 10%, indicating a major shareholder. For example, suppose 
Firm A owns 50% of firm B, and Firm B owns 20% of Firm C; the cash flow 
rights of Firm A onto C are 10% (=50% times 20%), and the voting rights of Firm 
A onto C are 20% (since 50% implies that Firm A has full control over Firm B). 
Voting rights are censored to 0 if less than 1%. We also use a Temasek dummy to 
indicate GLCs, which take the value one if Temasek has voting rights (Temasek 
Voting Rights >0) and takes the value zero otherwise. Evidence shown using the 
Temasek indicator variable is robust for both the cash flow rights and the voting 
rights variable. 
                                                          
7This corporate index begins with the Singapore Management University, the Sim Kee Boon 
Institute, from the year 2007, based on the OECD principles of Corporate Governance to identify 
listed companies. It is the mostly widely used index in both academia and industry. Each year the 
Securities Investors Association Singapore (SIAS) presents an Investors’ Choice Award (ICA) 
based on the score. 
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3.3.2 Cash Holding 
The main focus of the regression’s dependent variable is a firm’s cash holding, 
since larger firms tend to hold more cash than smaller firms. We, therefore, use a 
firm's Cash Ratio, which is calculated as the Total Cash and Short Term 
Investments scaled by Net Assets. Net Assets is the Total Assets less Total Cash 
and Short Term Investments, similar to Yun (2009), who points out that scaling by 
total assets will cause mechanical negative correlation between size and cash. 
Alternatively, we measure cash as ‘cash over total assets’ which is also 
extensively used in the literature.  Our results are robust to either of the measures. 
3.3.3 The Corporate Governance Index 
Using an index measure of corporate governance to estimate the degree of agency 
problems of firms has been popular since the publication of Gompers, Ishii, and 
Metrick (2003). Similarly motivated, Singapore Management University’s Sim 
Kee Boon Institute for Financial Economics (SKBI) developed an index for 
companies listed in the Singapore Stock Exchange (SGX) based on the Singapore 
Code of Corporate Governance, namely the Singapore Corporate Governance 
Index (CGI). This index is a weighted average questionnaire score of five 
different categories: Rights of Shareholder, Equitable Treatment of Shareholders, 
Roles of Stakeholders, Disclosure and Transparency, and Board Responsibilities 
and Composition. The resulting CGI sample provided by SKBI consists of 2534 
firm-year observations from 2007 to 2013 and ranges from 0 to 100. A higher 
score indicates that a firm practices better corporate governance. 
3.3.4 Firm Characteristics 
Motivated by Gao et al. (2013), the following firm characteristics that may 
explain variations in a firm's cash holdings are included as controls in the 
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regressions: Firm Size, Cash Flow, Revenue Growth, Leverage, Net Working 
Capital, Capex, Acquisition, R&D, Dividend Dummy, Payout Ratio, Tobin's Q, 
Foreign Revenue, and Multinational Corporation (MNC). Size is the natural 
logarithm of net assets. Cash Flow is the operating cash flow scaled by net assets, 
where operating cash flow is computed as EBITDA minus Total Interest Expense 
minus Income Tax Expense. Revenue Growth is the percentage of change in 
Revenue. Leverage is the Long-Term Debt scaled by Net Assets. Net Working 
Capital is Current Assets minus Current Liabilities minus Total Cash and Short 
Term Investments, scaled by Net Assets. Capex is Capital Expenditure scaled by 
Net Assets. Acquisition is the Acquisition Expenditures scaled by Net Assets. 
R&D is the R&D Expenditure scaled by Net Assets. Payout Ratio is calculated as 
Dividend over Net Income. Tobin's Q is calculated using Total Assets minus Total 
Common Equity plus the Market Value of Equity scaled by Total Assets. Foreign 
Revenue is the Total Revenue minus Revenue Earned in Singapore scaled by 
Total Revenue. MNC is an indicator variable that takes the value one, if a firm’s 
Foreign Revenue is equivalent to or more than 20%, and zero otherwise. Other 
cutting off values that qualify a firm as MNC, such as 10%, are also used, and the 
results are consistent. In addition, for all regressions, we control for year and 
industry fixed effects. 
3.3.5 Summary Statistics and Univariate Analysis 
Table 1 provides the summary statistics of the main variables in the full sample 
and in the sub-sample (Temasek-owned versus non-Temasek-owned). For each 
statistical summary, we report the number of observations and the mean value of 
the variables. The difference in the mean is reported in columns 7.In the full 
sample, the cash over total assets of firms in Singapore is around 20%, which is 
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comparable to the average cash ratio of listed firms in the U.S. as shown in Gao, 
Harford and Li (2013) that this number is around 20% in each year from 2001 to 
2011.. As for the firm characteristics, firms in Singapore are less leveraged, have 
less net working capital, and spend less on capital expenditure and R&D 
investment, but they give more dividend payout as compared to firms listed in the 
U.S. Most firms listed in Singapore pay dividends. In the U.S., only around 33% 
of public firms pays dividend (Gao, Harford and Li (2013)), whereas, in this 
sample, 65% of public firms pay dividends.  
Columns 2-7 of Table 1 report and compare the financial characteristics of GLCs 
and Non-Temasek-owned firms. As for GLCs or Temasek-owned firms, they, on 
average, hold less cash but are much larger in size than non-Temasek-owned firms. 
On average, Temasek-owned firms have net assets about twice the amount of non-
Temasek firms. The univariate comparison provides a simple impression that 
GLCs have less cash without controlling for firm characteristics related to 
financial constraints or investment opportunities. In addition, within Singapore, 84% 
of Temasek-owned firms pay dividends compared to 64% of non-Temasek-owned 
firms. Similarly, the payout ratio of GLCs is, on average, larger than for non-
Temasek firms. In terms of investment opportunities, GLCs have a higher Tobin's 
Q than non-Temasek firms, suggesting that they have more growth opportunities 
for investment. Lastly, using the CGI measure for corporate governance, 
Temasek-owned firms, on average, practice better corporate governance than non-
Temasek-owned firms. This is consistent with the findings by Sim et al. (2014). 
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Table 1 Summary statistics 
The sample consists of 4195 firm-year observations from 2004 to 2013, collected from Capital IQ. 
The firm’s industry classification is based on the Fama French 17 industry classification using 
their respective 4-digit SIC code. Cash is the Total Cash and Short Term Investments scaled by 
Net Assets where the Net Assets are computed as Total Assets less Total Cash and Short Term 
Investments.Cash_At is computed as cash over total assets. Industry-adjusted cash is the industry-
median-adjusted cash scaled by Net Assets. ∆cash is the change in cash ratio. Size is the natural 
log of Net Assets. Cash Flow is the operating cash flow scaled by Net Assets, where operating 
cash flow is computed as EBITDA minus Net Interest Expense minus Income Tax Expense. 
Revenue Growth is the percentage change in Revenue. Leverage is the Long-Term Debt scaled by 
Net Assets. Net Working Capital (NWC) is Current Assets minus Current Liabilities minus Total 
Cash and Short Term Investments and scaled by Net Assets. Capex is Capital Expenditure scaled 
by Net Assets. Acquisition is the Acquisition Expenditures scaled by Net Assets. R&D is the R&D 
Expenditure scaled by Net Assets. Dividend Dummy is an indicator variable that takes the value 1, 
if the firm pays dividend, and zero otherwise. Tobin’s Q is calculated using Total Assets minus 
Total Common Equity plus Market Value of Equity scaled by Total Assets. Foreign Revenue is the 
Total Revenue minus Revenue earned in Singapore scaled by Total Revenue. MNC is an indicator 
variable that takes the value 1, if the firm Foreign Revenue is more than 20%, and zero otherwise. 
The Corporate Governance Index (CGI) is the CGI index of all SGX listed firms provided by 
SKBI (SMU). The CGI is a continuous number that ranges from 0 to 100. All continuous variables 
are winsorized at the 1% and 99% levels. Superscript ***, **, and * denotes statistical significance 
at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels, respectively. 
  Full Sample Non-Temasek Temasek   
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) 
Variable  Obs Mean Obs Mean Obs Mean Difference 
Cash 4,178 0.3444 3,933 0.3510 245 0.2380 0.1130*** 
Cash_At 4,180 0.2000 3,936 0.2014 245 0.1774 0.0240** 
Industry Adjusted Cash 4,178 0.1554 3,933 0.1617 245 0.0537 0.1080*** 
∆Cash 4,169 0.0348 3,924 0.0355 245 0.0222 0.0133 
Firm Characteristics       
Size 4,178 4.9226 3,933 4.7765 245 7.2684 -2.4919*** 
Cash Flow 4,149 0.0798 3,904 0.0773 245 0.1200 -0.080*** 
Revenue Growth 3,981 0.1763 3,738 0.1778 243 0.1541 0.0237*** 
Leverage 4,182 0.1509 3,937 0.1498 245 0.1675 -0.0177* 
NWC 4,178 0.021 3,933 0.0267 245 -0.0720 0.0987*** 
Capex 4,121 0.0678 3,876 0.0673 245 0.0749 -0.0076 
Acquisition 4,178 0.0086 3,933 0.0086 245 0.0097 -0.0011 
R&D 4,178 0.0008 3,933 0.0008 245 0.0008 0.0000 
Dividend Dummy 4,195 0.6529 3,950 0.6410 245 0.8449 -0.2039*** 
Payout Ratio 4,195 0.3393 3,950 0.3298 245 0.4927 -0.1630*** 
Tobin's Q 3,937 1.3395 3,693 1.3145 244 1.7184 -0.4039*** 
Foreign Revenue 4,195 0.5732 3,950 0.5752 245 0.5401 0.0351 
MNC 4,195 0.7213 3,950 0.7246 245 0.6694 0.0552* 
Corporate Governance Measure     
CGI_VW 2,534 62.6262 2,370 62.0672 164 70.7044 -8.6373*** 
CGI_EW 2,534 61.1523 2,370 60.5383 164 70.0247 -9.4864*** 
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Table 2 Correlation matrix 
The sample consists of 4195 firm-year observations from 2004 to 2013, manually collected from Capital IQ. All continuous variables are winsorized at the 1% and 99% 
levels. P-values are reported in brackets. 
    1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 
1 TEMASEK Dummyt 1.00                      
             
2 Casht -0.05 1.00            
[0.00]             
3 CGI(VW) t-1 0.22 -0.09 1.00           
[0.00] [0.00]            
4 Sizet 0.37 -0.40 0.33 1.00          
[0.00] [0.00] [0.00]           
5 Cash Flowt 0.06 0.12 0.12 0.05 1.00         
[0.00] [0.00] [0.00] [0.00]          
6 Tobin's Qt 0.08 0.24 -0.02 -0.17 -0.09 1.00        
[0.00] [0.00] [0.42] [0.00] [0.00]         
7 Leveraget 0.03 -0.27 0.02 0.20 -0.24 0.08 1.00       
[0.09] [0.00] [0.36] [0.00] [0.00] [0.00]        
8 NWC t -0.06 -0.34 0.00 0.12 0.20 -0.40 -0.14 1.00      
[0.00] [0.00] [0.93] [0.00] [0.00] [0.00] [0.00]       
9 Capext 0.02 0.08 0.10 -0.03 0.19 0.13 -0.02 -0.22 1.00     
[0.18] [0.00] [0.00] [0.04] [0.00] [0.00] [0.22] [0.00]      
10 Acquisition t 0.01 0.00 0.02 0.04 0.00 0.09 0.00 -0.05 -0.01 1.00    
[0.62] [0.94] [0.40] [0.02] [0.76] [0.00] [0.88] [0.00] [0.71]     
11 R&D t 0.00 0.05 -0.01 0.05 0.04 0.05 -0.05 0.00 0.03 0.00 1.00   
[0.99] [0.00] [0.53] [0.00] [0.02] [0.00] [0.00] [0.79] [0.08] [0.95]    
12 PayoutRatiot 0.05 0.05 0.08 0.04 0.08 -0.03 -0.07 0.05 0.00 -0.01 0.02 1.00  
[0.00] [0.00] [0.00] [0.02] [0.00] [0.09] [0.00] [0.00] [0.84] [0.42] [0.24]   
13 Foreign Revenuet -0.02 -0.10 -0.03 0.11 -0.02 -0.07 0.01 0.06 0.02 0.02 0.11 0.00 1.00 
[0.18] [0.00] [0.18] [0.00] [0.19] [0.00] [0.45] [0.00] [0.31] [0.15] [0.00] [0.80]   
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3.3.6 Correlation Matrix 
Table 2 presents the correlation matrix for the main variables used in the study. 
We can see that the Temasek dummy is positively correlated with the Value-
Weighted CGI, Size, Cash Flow, Leverage, Capital Expenditure, Payout Ratio, 
Tobin’s Q, and negatively correlated with Lagged Cash Ratio, or Net Working 
Capital. Thus, we should control for these variables when doing the multivariate 
analysis. 
3.4 Empirical Results 
3.4.1 Determinant of Cash Holding 
Determinants of corporate cash policy and how cash policy eventually affects firm 
value are interesting and important matters that attract the attention of academic 
researchers and regulators to explore. Using similar empirical exercises as Gao et 
al. (2013), Harford et al. (2008), and Sufi (2009), respectively, we aim to shed 
new light on the how sovereign funds affect cash holdings by examining the 
determinants of cash policy in Singapore related to ownership structure, financial 
constraints, and investment opportunities. 
Table 3 presents the cross-sectional pooled regression results on cash holdings. 
The explanatory variables are chosen according to the prior literature. The 
dependent variable is Cash Ratio, measured by the nature logarithm of total cash 
holdings scaled by net assets. We also use cash over total assets as the dependent 
variable and the results are similar. To save space, we only tabulate the results 
when cash is measured by the log of cash over net assets. In addition to the 
explanatory variables mentioned in the data section, industry and year fixed 
effects are included to control for the industry-adjusted and year-adjusted 
unobserved effect. 
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Table 3 Determinants of cash holdings 
This table examines the determinants of cash holdings of firms listed in SGX. In column 1, we 
regress the nature logarithm of cash divided by net assets on various firm characteristics in year t. 
In Column 2 to Column 5, we examine the logarithm of cash holdings of Temasek's publicly-listed 
firms relative to firms listed on SGX. To do this, we regress Cash on the Temasek dummy, various 
firm characteristics, and alternative liquidity. Columns 2-3 are regressions with the Temasek 
dummy as an independent variable, whereas Columns 4-5 are regressions with Temasek Voting 
Rights (Temasek VR) as an independent variable. The sample consists of 4195 firm-year 
observations from 2004 to 2013, collected from Capital IQ. The firm's industry classification is 
based on the Fama French 17 industry classification using their respective 4-digit SIC code. The 
standard errors are clustered at the industry level. Superscript ***, **, and * denotes statistical 
significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels, respectively. 
Ln Casht (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
TEMASEK Dummyt-1   0.606*** 0.379***     
  (0.073) (0.072)   
TEMASEK VRt-1    0.011*** 0.007*** 
    (0.001) (0.001) 
Sizet -0.201*** -0.286*** -0.225*** -0.282*** -0.220*** 
 (0.011) (0.014) (0.013) (0.014) (0.013) 
Cash Flowt 1.172***  1.207***  1.214*** 
 (0.149)  (0.163)  (0.163) 
Tobin's Qt 0.048**  0.043**  0.046** 
 (0.020)  (0.018)  (0.018) 
Leveraget -2.141***  -2.080***  -2.080*** 
 (0.122)  (0.128)  (0.129) 
NWC t -0.587***  -0.567***  -0.569*** 
 (0.067)  (0.069)  (0.069) 
Capext -0.195  -0.020  -0.031 
 (0.216)  (0.230)  (0.229) 
Acquisition t 0.397  0.257  0.224 
 (0.446)  (0.465)  (0.468) 
R&D t 14.455***  14.309***  13.933*** 
 (3.427)  (3.664)  (3.674) 
Payout Ratiot 0.071***  0.063***  0.063*** 
 (0.015)  (0.015)  (0.015) 
Foreign Revenuet 0.012  0.002  0.000 
 (0.042)  (0.044)  (0.044) 
Constant -0.773*** -0.198 -0.289** -0.210* -0.306*** 
 (0.104) (0.121) (0.113) (0.121) (0.113) 
Year  Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Industry Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
N 3881 3693 3500 3693 3500 
adj. R-sq 0.306 0.165 0.315 0.164 0.314 
 
The regression results of the determinants on cash holding are reported for the 
whole sample in Column 1. Larger firms hold less cash which supports the 
economies of scale theory. Similarly, firms with greater cash flow, greater 
investment opportunities, less net-working capital, and less debt hold more cash. 
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Firms that spend more on capital expenditures hold less cash. These two findings 
are consistent with the spending hypothesis. Firms that do more research and 
development hold more cash, supporting the financing constraint story. Overall 
these estimates suggest that the determinants of cash holding for Singapore firms 
are comparable to U.S. firms shown by Harford et al. (2008). 
There are some unique findings on the cash holdings of Singapore firms. Different 
from U.S. evidence, firms that pay more dividends hold more cash, which 
contradicts the financial constraint story. Moreover, multinational firms or firms 
with greater Foreign Revenue do not hold more cash. One possible explanation is 
the difference in corporate tax laws between the U.S. and Singapore. In the U.S., 
foreign cash is taxed when companies repatriate back to the U.S. The study by 
Foley et al. (2007) finds that, due to this repatriation tax, U.S. MNCs with greater 
foreign cash hold more cash. In contrast, Singapore does not practice double 
taxation on the same revenue. Secondly, Singapore adopts one of the lowest 
corporate tax rates of 17% (Menon and Associates 2014). Consistent with the 
repatriation tax story, no relationship is found between foreign cash and cash 
holdings for Singapore firms.  
Column 2 to Column 5 in Table 3 present the cash model regression results with 
the Temasek dummy and voting rights as additional explanatory variables. 
Column 2 indicates that Temasek-owned firms hold 60.6% more cash (log of cash 
holding) than non-Temasek firms of similar size. If we change the dependent 
variable from the logarithm of cash to the cash over total assets in Table 4, the 
Temasek-owned firms still hold 8.8% more cash holding than peer firms. This 
difference is both economically and statistically significant. The Temasek effect 
on cash remains when we use Temasek ownership instead of the Temasek dummy 
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variable. Economically, every 1% increase in Temasek voting rights leads to a 0.7% 
increase in log of cash holdings. 
3.4.2 GLCs and Cash Holdings 
The management of cash is largely related to the monitoring of agency conflicts. 
Sim et al. (2014) and Ang and Ding (2006) provide evidence that GLCs practice 
better corporate governance. Corporate governance is shown to cast a significant 
effect on corporate cash holdings. Harford et al. (2008) find that firms with 
weaker corporate governance tend to hold less cash, because managers tend to 
spend the excess cash on unprofitable projects and on repurchases. Temasek-
owned firms are shown to adopt good governance, which we further explore in the 
next section.
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Table 4 Temasek holding, corporate governance, and cash holdings 
This table examines how corporate governance affects the relationship between Temasek 
ownership and subsequent cash holdings. The dependent variable here is the logarithm of cash 
over net assets. To do this, we add corporate governance indices and their interaction terms with 
the Temasek dummy into the regression model. The governance indices are called CGIA, CGIB, 
CGIC, CGID, and CGIE, respectively, in the table which represent five aspects of corporate 
governance: Rights of Shareholders, Equitable Treatment of Shareholders, Role of Stakeholders, 
Disclosure and Transparency, and Board Responsibilities. CGIEW and CGIVW are equal 
weighted and value weighted for 5 indices. Since the governance measures are available from 2008, 
the sample consists of around 2096 observations. The firm's industry classification is based on the 
Fama French 17 industry classification using their respective 4-digit SIC code. The standard errors 
are clustered at the industry level. Superscript ***, **, and * denotes statistical significance at the 
1%, 5%, and 10% levels, respectively. 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) 
Ln Casht CGIEW CGIVW CGIA CGIB CGIC CGID CGIE 
TEMASEK Dummyt-1 -0.737 -1.480** -0.431 -1.076 -0.078 -0.684 0.726* 
 (0.534) (0.626) (0.415) (0.742) (0.212) (0.640) (0.399) 
TEMASEK Dummyt-1*CGIt-1 0.016** 0.026*** 0.022** 0.016** 0.006** 0.013* -0.005 
 (0.008) (0.009) (0.011) (0.008) (0.003) (0.008) (0.005) 
CGIt-1 0.002 0.001 -0.000 -0.003 0.003** 0.002 0.002 
 (0.002) (0.002) (0.003) (0.002) (0.001) (0.002) (0.002) 
Sizet -0.247*** -0.247*** -0.242*** -0.239*** -0.254*** -0.245*** -0.244*** 
 (0.017) (0.017) (0.017) (0.017) (0.017) (0.017) (0.017) 
Cash Flowt 1.551*** 1.556*** 1.553*** 1.570*** 1.575*** 1.544*** 1.528*** 
 (0.202) (0.202) (0.202) (0.201) (0.211) (0.202) (0.204) 
Tobin's Qt 0.086*** 0.085*** 0.086*** 0.083*** 0.077*** 0.087*** 0.087*** 
 (0.027) (0.027) (0.027) (0.027) (0.028) (0.027) (0.027) 
Leveraget -1.967*** -1.957*** -1.990*** -1.987*** -1.942*** -1.993*** -1.994*** 
 (0.164) (0.163) (0.164) (0.164) (0.165) (0.164) (0.165) 
NWC t -0.479*** -0.475*** -0.475*** -0.481*** -0.468*** -0.486*** -0.479*** 
 (0.069) (0.068) (0.069) (0.069) (0.070) (0.069) (0.069) 
Capext -0.147 -0.110 -0.156 -0.111 -0.173 -0.176 -0.182 
 (0.332) (0.331) (0.332) (0.330) (0.337) (0.332) (0.333) 
Acquisition t 0.179 0.185 0.117 0.048 0.101 0.068 0.089 
 (0.718) (0.718) (0.724) (0.726) (0.709) (0.721) (0.722) 
R&D t 14.957*** 15.527*** 14.936*** 15.429*** 15.519*** 14.342*** 14.377*** 
 (4.570) (4.613) (4.533) (4.584) (4.572) (4.530) (4.511) 
Payout Ratiot 0.056*** 0.056*** 0.058*** 0.057*** 0.057*** 0.057*** 0.057*** 
 (0.015) (0.014) (0.015) (0.014) (0.015) (0.014) (0.015) 
Constant -0.563*** -0.524*** -0.442** -0.144 -0.423*** -0.595*** -0.436** 
 (0.194) (0.201) (0.207) (0.214) (0.161) (0.186) (0.173) 
Year  Y Y Y Y Y Y Y 
Industry Y Y Y Y Y Y Y 
N 2096 2096 2084 2087 2071 2089 2087 
adj. R-sq 0.337 0.339 0.338 0.337 0.337 0.337 0.335 
 
In Table 4, we introduce an interaction term of corporate governance and 
Temasek dummy. The governance indices are named CGIA, CGIB, CGIC, CGID, 
and CGIE, which represent five aspects of corporate governance, respectively. 
They are the Rights of Shareholders, the Equitable Treatment of Shareholders, the 
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Role of Stakeholders, Disclosure and Transparency, and Board Responsibilities. 
CGIEW and CGIVW are equal weighted and value weighted measures of these 
five indices. Different from U.S. evidence, corporate governance is not related to 
cash holding in Singapore. The interaction term between the Temasek dummy and 
the corporate governance index has a positive and significant coefficient estimate, 
suggesting that GLCs with good corporate governance hold significantly more 
cash. This finding is consistent with Harford et al. (2008) who show that firms’ 
governance has a positive relation with cash holdings. We contribute this to the 
mechanism that GLCs with good governance hold more cash, due to the presence 
and oversight of Temasek Holdings. Another piece of evidence indicates that our 
finding is consistent with Gao et al. (2013). For example, the coefficient of the 
Temasek dummy has negative and significant coefficient estimates. This evidence 
suggests that Temasek Holdings plays an important monitoring role overall and 
reduces corporate cash to lower agency problems related to free cash flow overall 
while Temasek allows well governed portfolio firms to hold substantial more cash. 
We use alternative measures to capture the presence of Temasek, such as its 
voting rights in firms, and find similar evidence. The results are quite similar 
when we use cash over total assets as the alternative dependent variables, 
The results reported in Table 4 thus support our hypothesis that Temasek-owned 
firms, in general, have lower cash holdings, suggesting a strong monitoring role of 
Temasek Holdings via reducing the free cash flow of GLCs. However, Temasek is 
exerting effective monitoring by differentiating a firm’s corporate governance 
quality. GLCs practicing high standard of corporate governance hold substantially 
more cash, suggesting that Temasek Holdings is not concerned with agency 
conflict due to abundance of cash. On the other hand, GLCs with a low standard 
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of corporate governance hold substantially less cash, since Temasek Holdings 
closely monitors managers by pushing cash to a very low level. 
The next session investigates why Temasek owned firms hold more cash in 
general. We run tests using a Temasek subsample and compare the results with 
tests using a non-Temasek subsample and report the F-statistics associated with 
the Chow-test for different coefficients of the same financial variable across these 
two samples.  The regression results are reported in Table 5. 
Table 5 Determinants of cash with Temasek holding 
This table compares the prime drives of the cash holdings between Temasek's publicly-listed firms 
and non-Temasek firms listed on SGX. To do this, we regress the logarithm of cash on the firm 
characteristics in year t within Temasek and non-Temasek firms, respectively. Column 1 is the 
regression estimates for non-Temasek firms, and Column 2 is regression estimates for Temasek 
firms. Column 3 presents the F-statistics of the Chow test of the difference of coefficients reported 
in Column 1 and Column 2. The non-Temasek sample consists of 3637 firm-year observations 
from 2004 to 2013, and the non-Temasek sample consists of 244 firm-year observations from 2004 
to 2013, collected from Capital IQ. The firm's industry classification is based on the Fama French 
17 industry classification using their respective 4-digit SIC code. The standard errors are clustered 
at the industry level. Superscript ***, **, and * denotes statistical significance at the 1%, 5%, and 
10% levels, respectively. 
  Temasek=0 Temasek=1 F-statistics (2)-(1) 
Ln Casht (1) (2) (3) 
Sizet -0.236*** -0.123*** 10.13*** 
 (0.013) (0.037)  
Cash Flowt 1.176*** 0.498 2.90* 
 (0.149) (0.737)  
Tobin's Qt 0.041** -0.079 4.15** 
 (0.020) (0.059)  
Leveraget -2.093*** -0.542 2.99* 
 (0.126) (0.489)  
NWC t -0.562*** -1.343*** 4.55** 
 (0.067) (0.338)  
Capext 0.104 -3.836*** 18.53*** 
 (0.224) (0.803)  
Acquisition t 0.491 -0.267 0.31 
 (0.462) (1.131)  
R&D t 16.027*** -44.432*** 8.02*** 
 (3.496) (11.276)  
Payout Ratiot 0.073*** -0.068 6.01** 
 (0.015) (0.053)  
Foreign Revenuet -0.000 0.353*** 7.81*** 
 (0.044) (0.113)  
Constant -0.619*** -1.324***  
  (0.110) (0.392)   
Year Yes Yes  
Industry Yes Yes  
N 3637 244  
Adj. R-sq 0.324 0.303   
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In Table 5, it is evident that the primary drivers of cash holdings are significantly 
different between GLCs and other firms. For non-Temasek-owned firms, cash 
holdings are positively related to Cash Flow, Tobin’s Q, R&D Expense, and 
Dividend Payout, while it is negatively related to Firm Size, Leverage, or Net 
Working Capital. In contrast, for Temasek-owned firms, cash holdings are largely 
dependent on investment factors such as Net Working Capital, Capital 
Expenditure, and R&D Expense. The estimated coefficients between the two 
subsamples are statistically different as reported in Column 3. For non-GLCs, the 
factors explaining cash holding are mostly related to precautionary motivation. In 
contrast, for GLCs, the factors explaining cash holding are mostly related to 
investment expenditures or opportunities. These tests suggest that Temasek GLCs 
are less likely to be affected by financial constraint consideration. Temasek’s main 
monitoring role on GLCs regarding corporate cash reserves should be about 
corporate expenditures. 
Cross-sectional tests show that corporate policies on cash holdings in Temasek-
owned firms are centered on firms’ investment expenditures. One concern with 
the cross-sectional tests is the omitted firm-specific effects. To address this 
question, we follow Hartford et al. (2008) and regress the change in cash holdings 
on the change in the variables pertinent to cash policies. To verify this regression, 
we plot the distribution of the change of cash across these two subsamples. The 
change of cash is defined as ΔCash (Casht-Casht-1) normalized by the industry 
mean value and scaled by the industry standard deviation. The result is presented 
in Figure 1. The figure shows that the distribution of ΔCash of Temasek firms 
have fatter tails than the distribution of non-Temasek firms, i.e., the probability of 
large ΔCash (both positive and negative) for Temasek firms is higher than the 
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probability of large ΔCash for non-Temasek firms, suggesting Temasek firms are 
more likely to accumulate cash.  
Figure 1. The probability density function (pdf, hereafter) of changes normalized in cash 
holdings.  
This figure plots the pdf of change in cash holdings in the sample, which is constituted by 
Singapore listed firms from 2004 to 2013. Normalized Cash over Total Assets is Cash over Total 
Assets minus the Industry Median Value. The red line represents the pdf of non-Temasek Holdings 
firms, and the blue line represents the pdf of Temasek Holdings firms. 
 
We further examine to the determinants of corporate expenditures. We run 
multivariate regressions in which the dependent variables are expenditures such as 
CAPEX, acquisitions or payouts such as dividends and stock repurchases and 
independent variables of interest are Temasek dummy and Temasek Voting Rights. 
The regression results are reported in Table 6. Other independent variables include 
cash, size, and investment opportunities. 
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Table 6 Temasek holding and corporate expenditures  
This table examines the effect of Temasek Holdings on subsequent corporate expenditures. The 
dependent variables are corporate expenditures, including: Capital Expenditure (Capex), 
Acquisition, and Payout Ratio. Columns 1-3 are regressions with a Temasek dummy as an 
independent variable, whereas Columns 4-6 are regressions with Temasek Voting Rights 
(Temasek VR) as an independent variable. The sample consists of 4195 firm-year observations 
from 2004 to 2013, collected from Capital IQ. The firm's industry classification is based on the 
Fama French 17 industry classification using their respective 4-digit SIC code. The standard errors 
are clustered at the industry level. Superscript ***, **, and * denotes statistical significance at the 
1%, 5%, and 10% levels, respectively. 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
  Capext Acquisitiont Payout Ratiot  Capext Acquisitiont Payout Ratiot 
TEMASEK Dummyt -0.025*** -0.005* 0.118**    
 (0.006) (0.003) (0.057)    
TEMASEKVRt    -0.000*** -0.000 0.002* 
    (0.000) (0.000) (0.001) 
Sizet -0.002 0.002*** 0.013 -0.002* 0.002*** 0.015 
 (0.001) (0.000) (0.009) (0.001) (0.000) (0.009) 
CFt 0.088*** -0.002 0.425*** 0.088*** -0.002 0.427*** 
 (0.012) (0.003) (0.050) (0.012) (0.003) (0.050) 
Tobin Qt 0.007*** 0.003*** 0.005 0.007*** 0.003*** 0.006 
 (0.001) (0.001) (0.008) (0.001) (0.001) (0.008) 
Leveraget 0.011 -0.008** -0.247*** 0.010 -0.008** -0.247*** 
 (0.010) (0.004) (0.075) (0.010) (0.004) (0.075) 
Revenue Growtht 0.010*** 0.004*** -0.142*** 0.009*** 0.004*** -0.142*** 
 (0.003) (0.002) (0.022) (0.003) (0.002) (0.022) 
Constant 0.062*** -0.004 0.271*** 0.062*** -0.003 0.264*** 
 (0.009) (0.004) (0.076) (0.009) (0.004) (0.075) 
Year Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Industry Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
N 3420 3442 3442 3420 3442 3442 
adj. R-sq 0.149 0.032 0.030 0.149 0.031 0.030 
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From Columns 1 and 2 in Table 6, Temasek-owned firms have lower capital 
expenditure as well as lower acquisition activities than non-GLCs. Column 3 in 
Table 6 shows a positive significance effect of Temasek Holdings on dividend 
payout policy. This suggests that the presence of Temasek Holdings firms is 
associated with more dividend payout for Temasek portfolio firms. 
3.4.3 GLCs and Their Investment and Payout Decisions on Excess Cash 
In this section, we examine why GLCs hold more cash than other similar public 
firms by analyzing how Temasek-owned firms use excess cash. Here we define 
excess cash as the firm’s unexplained cash holdings from reduced-form regression 
residuals. First, we calculate each other’s residuals of cash holdings by regressing 
cash on firm-specific characteristics from Column 3 of Table 3. We focus on 
several possible decisions a firm makes with excess cash (proxied as positive cash 
residuals). First, a firm can use its excess cash to make investments. We 
investigate this possibility relating excess cash to capital expenditures and 
acquisition expenditures. Second, a firm can return the excess cash back to the 
shareholders in the form of dividends or stock repurchases.  
We examine the joint effect of Temasek and excess cash on the firm’s future 
expenditures or investment decisions. Since it is possible that a firm’s investment 
levels and Temasek ownership are jointly co-determined, we mitigate this 
problem by following Harford, Mansi, and Maxwell (2008) and focus on the 
change in the underlying investment decisions by controlling for the previous 
year’s investments and relate them to the pre-existing Temasek holding status of 
the firm. Hence, the dependent variable is one of the three expenditures decisions, 
and the main explanatory variable is the lagged Temasek variable and the 
interaction variable between lagged Temasek and excess cash. The other control 
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variables include: lagged dependent variable, lagged excess cash, lagged change 
in excess cash, lagged size, net working capital, leverage, and revenue growth. 
The regressions control for year and industry fixed effects. 
Table 7 Temasek, cash holdings and investment and payout decisions 
This table examines Temasek's decisions regarding investments and payout decisions. For 
investment decisions, the dependent variables are Capital Expenditure (Capext) and Aquisitiont. 
For Payout decisions, the dependent variables are Payout Ratio (PayoutRatiot) and Share 
Repurchase (ShareRept). Columns 1-4 are regressions with the Temasek dummy as an independent 
variable, whereas Columns 5-8 are regressions with Temasek Voting Rights (Temasek VR) as an 
independent variable. The firm's excess cash (E.Cash) is the saved residue from the regression of 
Column 3 in Table 3. The sample consists of 4195 firm-year observations from 2004 to 2013, 
collected from the Capital IQ. The firm's industry classification is based on the Fama French 17 
industry classification using their respective 4-digit SIC code. The standard errors are clustered at 
the industry level. Superscript ***, **, and * denotes statistical significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% 
levels, respectively. 
  Temasek Dummy Temasek VR 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) 
  Capext Acquisitiont Payoutt ShareRept Capext Acquisitiont Payoutt ShareRept 
TEMASEKt-1 *E.Casht-1 -0.015*** 0.001 -0.120** -0.003 -0.000** -0.000 -0.003** -0.000 
 (0.004) (0.003) (0.058) (0.013) (0.000) (0.000) (0.001) (0.000) 
TEMASEKt-1 -0.003 0.001 0.152** -0.003 -0.000 0.000 0.003** -0.000 
 (0.004) (0.003) (0.066) (0.023) (0.000) (0.000) (0.001) (0.000) 
Capext-1 0.588*** 
   
0.590*** 
    (0.026) 
   
(0.026) 
   Acquisitiont-1 
 
0.147*** 
   
0.148*** 
   
 
(0.035) 
   
(0.035) 
  Payout Ratiot-1 
  
0.085*** 
   
0.086*** 
  
  
(0.025) 
   
(0.025) 
 Share Repurchaset-1 
   
0.379*** 
   
0.381*** 
 
   
(0.141) 
   
(0.140) 
E.Cash t-1 0.001 0.002** 0.099*** 0.007* 0.000 0.002** 0.097*** 0.008* 
 (0.001) (0.001) (0.025) (0.004) (0.001) (0.001) (0.025) (0.004) 
∆E.Cash t-1 0.005** 0.001 -0.041 -0.008 0.005** 0.001 -0.040 -0.008 
 (0.002) (0.001) (0.028) (0.005) (0.002) (0.001) (0.028) (0.005) 
Sizet-1 -0.001 -0.000 0.006 0.001 -0.001 -0.000 0.008 0.002 
 (0.001) (0.000) (0.010) (0.006) (0.001) (0.000) (0.010) (0.006) 
NWCt -0.027*** -0.003* 0.140*** 0.011 -0.027*** -0.003* 0.139*** 0.012 
 (0.005) (0.002) (0.034) (0.021) (0.005) (0.002) (0.034) (0.021) 
leveraget -0.015* 0.001 -0.292*** 0.012 -0.015* 0.001 -0.297*** 0.011 
 (0.008) (0.004) (0.085) (0.022) (0.008) (0.004) (0.086) (0.021) 
Revenue Growtht 0.004* 0.005*** -0.147*** 0.009 0.004* 0.005*** -0.147*** 0.009 
 (0.002) (0.002) (0.033) (0.006) (0.002) (0.002) (0.033) (0.006) 
Constant 0.040*** 0.009** 0.392*** -0.006 0.040*** 0.009*** 0.384*** -0.011 
 (0.007) (0.003) (0.106) (0.040) (0.007) (0.003) (0.106) (0.038) 
Year Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Industry Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
N 2842 2852 2852 206 2842 2852 2852 206 
adj. R-sq 0.496 0.049 0.038 0.168 0.495 0.049 0.038 0.171 
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Table 7 reports the result of the tests. Results from Model 1 and 2 suggest that 
Temasek firms, on average, do not have less capital expenditure and acquisition. 
However, with excess cash, they spend significantly less on capital expenditure. 
These results are robust when we use Temasek Voting Rights instead of the 
Temasek dummy. Excess cash is negatively associated with the payout ratio for 
Temasek firms. This result is similar when using Temasek Voting Rights instead 
of the Temasek dummy. It suggests that Temasek-owned firms may hoard cash 
despite having excess cash. This suggests that Temasek’s main approach in 
containing agency problems takes place via reducing investment or expenditures. 
As previous evidence showing, sovereign funds on the one hand reduce free cash 
flow in bad governed firms and on the other hand can exert the governance's 
positive effect on cash in good governed firms. In this case, how cash expenditure 
is affected by Temasek Holdings should also be different across governance. 
Therefore, we do the similar tests to table 7 within subsamples divided by 
corporate governance. Table 8 reports the results across subsamples by CGI_VW. 
In each year, a firm is classified to good governance groups if its CGI VW is 
higher than the median value. Otherwise it is classified as a bad governed firm. 
We also use CGI_EW to classify subsample groups and get similar results.  
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Table 8 Temasek, cash holdings and investment and payout decisions: subsample tests 
This table examines Temasek's decisions regarding investments and payout decisions based on Corporate Governance Index. Each year, we classify firms below the median 
of value weighted CGI index into poor governance group, and other firms to be good governance group. For investment decisions, the dependent variables are Capital 
Expenditure (Capext) and Aquisitiont. For Payout decisions, the dependent variables are Payout Ratio (PayoutRatiot) and Share Repurchase (ShareRept). Columns 1-4 are 
regressions with the Temasek dummy as an independent variable, whereas Columns 5-8 are regressions with Temasek Voting Rights (Temasek VR) as an independent 
variable. The firm's excess cash (E.Cash) is the saved residue from the regression of Column 3 in Table 3. The sample consists of 4195 firm-year observations from 2004 to 
2013, collected from the Capital IQ. The firm's industry classification is based on the Fama French 17 industry classification using their respective 4-digit SIC code. The 
standard errors are clustered at the industry level. Superscript ***, **, and * denotes statistical significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels, respectively. 
  Poor Governance Good Governance 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) 
  Capext Acquisitiont Payoutt ShareRept Capext Acquisitiont Payoutt ShareRept 
TEMASEK Dummyt-1 *E.Casht-1 -0.009 -0.003 -0.329*** 0.031*** -0.014*** 0.002 -0.107 0.012 
 (0.009) (0.003) (0.095) (0.009) (0.004) (0.004) (0.086) (0.009) 
TEMASEK Dummyt-1 0.024 -0.007** -0.258** 0.112** -0.005 0.005 0.283** -0.023 
 (0.016) (0.003) (0.113) (0.048) (0.005) (0.004) (0.124) (0.027) 
Capext-1 0.551***    0.561***    
 (0.049)    (0.041)    
Acquisitiont-1  0.060    0.119**   
  (0.044)    (0.057)   
Payout Ratiot-1   0.114    0.047**  
   (0.071)    (0.023)  
Share Repurchaset-1    0.380***    0.120 
    (0.125)    (0.128) 
E.Cash t-1 0.000 0.002** 0.138*** 0.004 0.003 0.002 0.103* 0.005 
 (0.002) (0.001) (0.051) (0.009) (0.002) (0.001) (0.053) (0.005) 
∆E.Cash t-1 0.007** 0.001 -0.066 0.006 0.004 0.002 -0.070 -0.010 
 (0.003) (0.001) (0.072) (0.009) (0.003) (0.002) (0.050) (0.008) 
Sizet-1 -0.001 -0.000 -0.008 0.001 -0.002* -0.001* -0.000 0.004 
 (0.002) (0.001) (0.018) (0.008) (0.001) (0.001) (0.024) (0.007) 
NWCt -0.028*** -0.001 0.216*** -0.017 -0.026*** 0.001 0.151** 0.035 
 (0.009) (0.002) (0.060) (0.025) (0.008) (0.002) (0.066) (0.039) 
leveraget -0.032** 0.009 -0.235 -0.003 0.010 0.008 -0.301 0.011 
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 (0.013) (0.006) (0.155) (0.049) (0.014) (0.007) (0.208) (0.029) 
Revenue Growtht 0.005* 0.006** -0.147** -0.024 0.000 0.005 -0.233*** 0.019** 
 (0.003) (0.003) (0.059) (0.028) (0.005) (0.003) (0.065) (0.007) 
Constant 0.030*** 0.004 0.554** -0.023 0.041*** 0.010** 0.420** -0.010 
 (0.010) (0.005) (0.266) (0.056) (0.011) (0.005) (0.170) (0.054) 
Year Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Industry Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
N 974 977 977 53 1011 1013 1013 116 
adj. R-sq 0.448 0.065 0.042 0.25 0.506 0.024 0.022 -0.009 
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Columns 1 to 4 are empirical results within bad governed firms. In bad governed 
firms, sovereign funds, i.e., Temasek Holdings have no impact on CAPX or 
acquisitions, indicating that Temasek Holdings neither reduce nor increase 
investments if firms’ governance is poor. As for the payouts, Temasek Holdings 
reduce the dividend payout ratio but increase repurchases of stocks, indicating that 
Temasek Holdings firms tend to return cash to shareholders via stock repurchases. 
Harford et al. (2008) show that bad governed firms tend to use more flexible 
payouts, i.e. repurchases rather than dividends which is stickier. Temasek 
Holdings make this phenomenon even more pronounced. Columns 5 to 8 are 
empirical results with good governed firms. It's shown that in good governed 
firms, sovereign funds reduce CAPX, supporting our story that good governed 
firms with more sovereign funds hold more cash because sovereign funds help 
monitor managers to reduce excessive spending of cash on capital expenditure. 
Also, in good governed firms, sovereign funds have no impact on dividends 
payout or stock repurchases. 
3.4.4 GLCs, Excess Cash and Profitability 
In this section, we study the effect of excess cash on Temasek-owned firms’ 
profitability. We are interested to understand, during this period, if decisions 
affect the next period’s profitability. To measure profitability, we use three 
different measures: Tobin’s Q, Return on Equity (ROE), and Return on Assets 
(ROA). As for the main independent variable, we examine the relationship 
between Temasek firms’ profitability and the interaction of Temasek with excess 
cash. Other control variables in the cross-sectional analysis include: the lagged 
dependent variable, dependent variable, lagged excess cash, lagged change in 
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excess cash, lagged size, net working capital, leverage, revenue growth, and year 
and industry fixed effects. Table 8 presents the regression results.  
Table 9 Temasek's cash holdings in relation to subsequent profitability 
This table examines Temasek's firms’ profitability in relation to holding excess cash. The 
dependent variables are all different profitability measures, namely the Return on Equity (ROE), 
Return on Assets, and Tobin's Q. Columns 1-3 are regressions with the Temasek dummy as an 
independent variable, whereas columns 4-6 are regressions with Temasek Voting Rights (Temasek 
VR) as an independent variable. The firm's excess cash (E.Cash) is the residue from the regression 
in Table 4. The sample consists of 4195 firm-year observations from 2004 to 2013, collected from 
Capital IQ. The firm's industry classification is based on the Fama French 17 industry 
classification using their respective 4-digit SIC code. The standard errors are clustered at industry 
level. Superscript ***, **, and * denotes statistical significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels, 
respectively. 
  Temasek Dummy Temasek VR 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
  ROAt ROEt TOBIN's Qt ROAt ROEt TOBIN's Qt 
TEMASEKt-1 *E.Casht-1 -0.015*** -0.065*** -0.064 -0.000** -0.001** 0.000 
 (0.006) (0.021) (0.048) (0.000) (0.001) (0.001) 
TEMASEKt-1 0.022*** 0.051*** 0.241*** 0.000*** 0.000 0.004** 
 (0.007) (0.020) (0.080) (0.000) (0.000) (0.002) 
ROAt-1 0.508*** 
  
0.509*** 
   (0.048) 
  
(0.048) 
  ROEt-1 
 
0.264*** 
  
0.267*** 
  
 
(0.074) 
  
(0.074) 
 TOBIN's Qt-1 
  
0.640*** 
  
0.642*** 
 
  
(0.056) 
  
(0.056) 
E.Casht-1 0.002 0.012 -0.025 0.001 0.010 -0.030 
 (0.003) (0.011) (0.027) (0.003) (0.010) (0.027) 
∆E.Casht-1 0.011** 0.003 -0.015 0.011** 0.003 -0.015 
 (0.005) (0.016) (0.038) (0.005) (0.016) (0.038) 
Sizet-1 0.003* 0.016*** -0.054*** 0.004** 0.018*** -0.050*** 
 (0.002) (0.006) (0.016) (0.002) (0.006) (0.016) 
NWCt 0.074*** -0.017 -0.663*** 0.073*** -0.019 -0.663*** 
 (0.026) (0.050) (0.129) (0.026) (0.050) (0.129) 
Leveraget -0.038 0.119 0.396 -0.039 0.114 0.394 
 (0.023) (0.075) (0.260) (0.024) (0.075) (0.261) 
Revenue Growtht 0.034*** 0.053*** -0.071** 0.034*** 0.053*** -0.071** 
 (0.006) (0.014) (0.031) (0.006) (0.014) (0.031) 
Constant 0.016 -0.045 0.782*** 0.015 -0.052 0.766*** 
  -0.017 -0.054 -0.108 -0.017 -0.054 -0.105 
Year Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Industry Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
N 2852 2852 2851 2852 2852 2851 
adj. R-sq 0.393 0.104 0.512 0.393 0.102 0.511 
 
The coefficients on the interaction term between excess cash and the Temasek 
dummy are negative in 5 out of 6 of the models, and the coefficients are 
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economically significant when profitability is measured by ROE and ROA. This 
suggests that holding on to excess cash may result in the reduction in a firm’s 
future profitability. 
3.5 Conclusion 
In this study, we ask the general question of the monitoring role of Sovereign 
Wealth Funds in portfolio firms. We investigate this question with Temasek 
Holding and Singapore listed firms as the case. One main reason of focusing on 
Singapore is that Temasek practices have been heralded as the role model of 
Sovereign Funds and many countries start to adopt Singapore’s approach of 
overseeing SOEs. 
We study the effect of Temasek on corporate cash reserves and show that their 
influence is important. The empirical evidence shows that Temasek-owned firms 
or GLCs, on average, hold more cash than non-Temasek-owned firms. However, a 
careful examination reveals that Temasek’s positive cash effect concentrates in 
GLCs with higher governance quality. This suggests that Temasek Holdings may 
cast a discerning effect on corporate cash holdings: Temasek reduces corporate 
cash holdings for weaker-governed GLCs but allows well-governed GLCs to 
hoard more cash reserves. Consistent with this view, we find that Temasek-owned 
firms do not spend more on investments or acquisitions but do pay more dividends. 
The main objective of Temasek Holdings is to contain agent problems by reducing 
spending.  
Our research suggests that Temasek Holdings, the reputable sovereign fund, exerts 
a great impact on state-owned enterprises through affecting corporate cash 
reserves, expenditures, and payout policies to contain agency problems. The 
findings here highlight the important monitoring role of Sovereign Wealth Funds 
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in state-owned enterprises in general. Our research provides important policy 
implication on how Sovereign Wealth Funds can effectively monitor portfolio 
firms through influencing corporate cash and other financial policies.  
Since Temasek holdings finally worsen the accounting performance by holding 
excess cash, it needs to be further explained the reasons. One way is to test 
whether the investments reduced by Temasek firms are bad projects. 
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Appendix 
Appendix A. Financial Variable Description 
Table 1 Financial variable description 
Panel A. Financial variables 
variable Description Calculation 
Car Cash holdings CHE/NAT 
NAT Net asset AT-CHE 
MB Market-to-book ratio  (AT-CEQ+CSHO*PRCC_F)/AT 
RD /Sale R&D to sale ratio  XRD/SALE 
NWCAP Net Working Capital WCAP/NAT 
RealSize Firm size in 1994 dollar log(AT*CPI Adjustment Ratio) 
CAPX Capital expenditure CAPX/AT 
Divdummy Dividend indicator  1 if DVC>0, otherwise 0 
CFO Cash flow from operation  (EBIT+DP-XINT-TXT-DVC)/NAT 
Indsigma Industrial cash flow volatility  Avg(STD(CFOt-20 ~ CFOt)) 
Leverage Debt to asset ratio (DLC+DLTT)/AT 
Aqc Acquisition to asset ratio AQC/NAT 
Panel B. Variables used to construct earnings transparency  
variable Description Calculation 
Ibe Earnings per share IB/CSHO 
EPt Earnings to price ratio  Ibe/Lag(PRCC_F) 
EPt-1 Lagged earnings to price ratio Lag(Ibe)/Lag(PRCC_F) 
∆EP Change in earnings to price ratio EPt- EPt-1 
Ret Compounded annual return Return on a share over the 12 months 
extending from 9 months prior to the 
fiscal year-end to 3 months after the 
fiscal year-end 
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Appendix B. The Determinants of Earnings Transparency 
Table 1 The determinants of earnings transparency 
This table reports the estimates of earnings transparency determinants. Column 1 shows the estimates of regressing earnings transparency on accounting based earnings 
quality such as accrual quality, discretionary accruals and absolute abnormal accruals. Column 2 shows the results of regressing earnings transparency on corporate 
governance proxy by institutional ownership. Column 3 shows the results of regressing earnings transparency on MNC. Column 4, column 5 and column 6 show the 
estimates of regressing earnings transparency on information asymmetry measures such as bid-ask spread and number of analyst. Column 7 is the estimates when all the 
variables above are included in the regression. All variables are winsorized at 1% and 99% level. Superscript ***, **, and * denotes statistical significance at the 1%, 5%, and 
10% levels, respectively. 
   (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) 
Accounting based 
earnings quality 
Accrual quality -0.158**      -0.563*** 
 (0.063)      (0.187) 
Discretionary accruals 0.179**      0.528** 
 (0.071)      (0.210) 
Abs_abn_acc -0.053***      -0.019 
 (0.015)      (0.048) 
Corporate governance Institutional ownership  0.014***     0.001 
  (0.005)     (0.020) 
MNC MNC   -0.005*    -0.000 
   (0.003)    (0.008) 
Information Asymmetry bid-ask spread    -0.003**  -0.002 -0.015** 
    (0.001)  (0.002) (0.006) 
Analyst number     0.002*** 0.003*** 0.003*** 
     (0.000) (0.000) (0.001) 
 MB -0.017*** -0.014*** -0.015*** -0.015*** -0.016*** -0.017*** -0.026*** 
  (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.003) 
 Realsize 0.019*** 0.014*** 0.015*** 0.015*** 0.010*** 0.007*** 0.004 
  (0.002) (0.001) (0.001) (0.002) (0.002) (0.003) (0.006) 
 CF -0.080*** -0.069*** -0.075*** -0.063*** -0.048*** -0.035*** 0.010 
  (0.011) (0.006) (0.008) (0.009) (0.009) (0.011) (0.046) 
 Nwcap 0.034*** 0.031*** 0.045*** 0.035*** 0.028*** 0.036*** 0.043 
  (0.009) (0.006) (0.008) (0.011) (0.009) (0.013) (0.032) 
 Capx 0.077*** 0.078*** 0.083*** 0.115*** 0.085*** 0.121*** 0.231*** 
  (0.019) (0.013) (0.015) (0.022) (0.017) (0.026) (0.067) 
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 Leverage -0.038*** -0.023*** -0.017** -0.028*** -0.019*** -0.022** -0.046** 
  (0.008) (0.006) (0.007) (0.009) (0.007) (0.010) (0.022) 
 RD/Sales -0.002 0.001 0.001 0.001 0.001 0.001 0.035** 
  (0.003) (0.001) (0.002) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.016) 
 Dividend 0.018*** 0.018*** 0.018*** 0.022*** 0.019*** 0.022*** 0.034*** 
  (0.003) (0.002) (0.003) (0.004) (0.003) (0.004) (0.009) 
 Constant 0.443*** 0.439*** 0.434*** 0.342*** 0.440*** 0.373*** 0.538*** 
  (0.009) (0.006) (0.007) (0.015) (0.009) (0.020) (0.054) 
         
 Firm Y Y Y Y Y Y Y 
 Industry Y Y Y Y Y Y Y 
 Observations 53,484 94,559 69,041 50,209 65,719 39,615 9,561 
 R-squared 0.387 0.383 0.411 0.380 0.391 0.392 0.431 
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Appendix C. The Change of Effect of Earnings Transparency on Cash 
Holdings 
 
Table 1 The impact of earnings transparency on cash holdings before and after SOX 
This table reports the change of the impact of earnings transparency on corporate cash holdings. 
The dependent variable is the natural log of cash over net assts. Yeardummy equals to 1 if fiscal 
year is less than 2002, else it equals to 0. The sample of column 1 includes observations available 
both in COMPUSTAT and CRSP from 1980 to 2013 except 2002. The sample of column 2 
includes observations available both in COMPUSTAT and CRSP from 2003 to 2013. The sample 
of column 2 includes observations available both in COMPUSTAT and CRSP from 1980 to 2001. 
All columns present estimates from OLS regressions including year and firm fixed effects with 
standard errors clustered at the firm level. The standard errors are under the coefficients. 
Significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels is represented by ***, **, and *, respectively. 
  (1) (2) (3) 
VARIABLES Log(Cash/Nat) Log(Cash/Nat) Log(Cash/Nat) 
Sample Period whole sample except year 2002 fyear>2002 fyear<2002 
Transt-1 0.039 -0.044 -0.147*** 
 (0.045) (0.040) (0.033) 
Transt-1*Yeardummy -0.214***   
 (0.056)   
MB 0.076*** 0.094*** 0.059*** 
 (0.007) (0.012) (0.007) 
RealSize -0.072*** -0.103*** -0.002 
 (0.019) (0.035) (0.023) 
CF 0.282*** 0.344*** 0.396*** 
 (0.071) (0.109) (0.089) 
NWCAP -2.753*** -2.526*** -2.809*** 
 (0.083) (0.159) (0.094) 
CAPX -2.612*** -3.208*** -2.323*** 
 (0.135) (0.293) (0.143) 
Leverage -2.844*** -1.836*** -3.125*** 
 (0.080) (0.135) (0.094) 
Indsigma 0.064 0.043 0.032 
 (0.075) (0.103) (0.089) 
RD/sales  0.076*** 0.059*** 0.079*** 
 (0.012) (0.012) (0.017) 
Aqc -1.297*** -1.831*** -0.973*** 
 (0.086) (0.117) (0.116) 
Divdummy 0.040 0.033 -0.002 
 (0.027) (0.041) (0.035) 
Constant -0.880*** -0.836*** -1.056*** 
 (0.073) (0.242) (0.083) 
Year Y Y Y 
Firm Y Y Y 
Observations 78,119 24,059 54,060 
R-squared 0.751 0.845 0.754 
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Appendix D. The Construction of Accounting-based Earnings Quality 
C.1 Construction of Accrual quality  
Accrual quality (hereafter, AQ) is the standard deviation of residuals from 
adjusted Dechow-Dichev(2002) (hereafter, DD) model (Mcnichols,2002) relating 
current accruals to lagged, current, and future cash flows from operations, 
augmented with the fundamental variables from modified Jones model, PPE and 
change in revenues.  
Specifically, the model is as below. 
TCAj,t = ϕ0,j + ϕ1,jCFOj,t−1 + ϕ2,jCFOj,t + ϕ3,jCFOj,t+1 + ϕ4,jΔREVj,t +
ϕ5,jPPEj,t + vj,t  
, where TCAj,t = TAj,t+DEPNj,t; CFOj,t = EBITj,t - TAj,t; TAj,t = ∆CAj,t - ∆CLj,t - 
∆CASHj,t + ∆STDEBTj,t. 
The meanings of notations are as follows. TCAj,t is total current assets of firm j in 
year t; CFOj,t is cash flow from operation of  firm j in year t; ΔREVj,t is revenue 
change of firm j in year t; PPEj,t is gross value of PPE of firm j in year t; DEPNj,t 
is depreciation and amortization expense in year t;  EBITj,t  is earnings before 
interest and tax of firm j in year t; ΔCAj,t is change in current assets of firm j in 
year t, ΔCLj,t is change in current liabilities of firm j in year t; ΔCASHj,t is change 
in cash and equivalents of firm j in year t; ΔSTDEBTj,t is change in debt in current 
liabilities of firm j in year t. All variables are scaled by total assets in year t-1. 
I estimate the adjusted DD model using 15-industry classification in order to be 
consistent with this paper and require there are at least 20 firms in year t. I get 
firm-specific residuals annually, and calculate standard deviation of residuals for 
each firm year with current and previous 4 years data. 
C.2 Construction of Absolute abnormal accruals  
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Following Francis et al. (2005) and Sun et al. (2012), the absolute abnormal 
accruals is generated following the modified Jones (1991) approach. 
First, we estimate the following regression for each industry group classified by 
Barth (1998) and similarly require there are at least 20 firms in each year. 
TAi,t/Asseti,t−1 = β1 ∗ 1/Asseti,t−1 + β2 ∗ ΔRevi,t/Asseti,t−1  + β3 ∗
PPEi,t/Asseti,t−1 + εi,t , 
where TAi,t is the total accruals of firm i in year t; ΔRevi,t is changes in revenue of 
firm i in year t; PPEi,t is gross value of PPE of firm i in year t and the calculations 
are same with those illustrated in accrual quality part; Asseti,t−1 is the total assets 
of firm i in year t-1. 
The parameters estimated in the first step are used to estimate the firm-specific 
normal accruals (NAs) as a percentage of last year’s total assets: 
NAsi,t = β1̂ ∗ 1/Asseti,t−1 + β2̂ ∗ ΔRevi,t/Asseti,t−1  + β3̂ ∗ PPEi,t/Asseti,t−1 +
εi,t . 
The absolute abnormal accruals (Abs_Abn_Acc) in year t equals to the absolute 
value of TAi,t/Asseti,t−1  − NAsi,t. 
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Appendix E. Industry Classification 
Table 1 Industry classification 
This table presents the distribution of Temasek firms and non-Temasek firms in each of the 17 
industries (excluding financial and utility firms). A firm’s industry classification is based on the 
Fama-French 17 industry classification using their respective 4-digit SIC code. 
  Non-Temasek   TEMASEK  
INDUSTRY Freq. Percent Cum. INDUSTRY Freq. Percent Cum. 
1 Food 296 7.49 7.49 1 Food 17 6.94 6.94 
2 Mines 84 2.13 9.62 3 Oil 29 11.84 18.78 
3 Oil 171 4.33 13.95 5 Durables 3 1.22 20 
4 Clothings 70 1.77 15.72 8 Construction 5 2.04 22.04 
5 Durables 297 7.52 23.24 11 Machn 29 11.84 33.88 
6 Chems 65 1.65 24.89 12 Automobile 2 0.82 34.69 
7 Consumer 40 1.01 25.9 13 Transport 105 42.86 77.55 
8 Construction 504 12.76 38.66 15 Retail 6 2.45 80 
9 Steel 117 2.96 41.62 17 Other 49 20 100 
10 FabPr 80 2.03 43.65     
11 Machn 619 15.67 59.32     
12 Automobile 52 1.32 60.63     
13 Transport 242 6.13 66.76     
15 Retail 213 5.39 72.15     
17 Other 1,100 27.85 100     
Total 3950 100  Total 245 100  
